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ABSTRACT
LOOKS THAT KILL: WHITE POWER, CHRISTIANITY, AND THE OCCLUSION
OF JUSTICE

Wesley Sutermeister, B.A., M.Div., Th.M.
Marquette University, 2020

One of the most prominent, destructive, and long-lasting forms of racism in the
United States and elsewhere is that which stems from the eyes of white people’s personal
and social bodies. Their looks have been mobilized and deployed to exclude, exploit, put
down, police, manage, intimidate, mark, and kill people of color at both an interpersonal
and organizational level for the purpose of securing their own substance and future. Such
exercises of power are rooted in human embodiment and suggest that justice and injustice
are also rooted in our flesh, in how we relate to each other both corporeally and
perceptually. We can commit injustices in the very way we see other people or groups of
people. Recent experiences of hate crimes, police brutality, profiling, white supremacist
rallies, and deadly massacres at places of worship reveal that embodied habits of white
power – especially eyepower – that developed in history still detrimentally affect the
lives of many people today.
This dissertation traces the white racist eye from its beginnings, describes the
social and economic processes involved in its development, and suggests a new way to
understand both whiteness and power, that is, as visuality. There is power in looking as
looking is a kind of praxis that does something to those who are seen whether at an
individual or corporate level. In the light of the phenomena of unjust looks examined
throughout the project, it is argued that Christian theology and practice must take
seriously the question of how we see others and incarnate the eyes of Jesus in personal
and collective practices of vision. More specifically, Christian faith and the experiences
of racism demand that Christians partake in a discipleship of vision whereby they learn to
see with Jesus and then go out into the world and to others in an apostolate of seeing that
is rooted in love, compassion, and justice. It is only through the development of a
contemplative eye and a robust sense of justice that Looks that kill can be challenged and
ultimately overcome.
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Introduction
“People look at us with aggressive eyes as if they wanted to destroy us.” 1
“The ‘gaze’ has always been political in my life… There is power in looking.” 2
“… situations can be more loaded than guns and gestures more eloquent than words.” 3

In 2002 journalist Deborah Mathis wrote a book entitled, Yet a Stranger: Why
Black Americans Still Don’t Feel at Home, in which she describes encountering in her
own nation “an absence of hospitality, a distance, a hesitation, a suspiciousness directed
at black Americans that is unbecoming of a place called home.” 4 Instead of feeling
welcome and at home, Mathis and other black Americans daily confront what she called
a “passive racism,” or, “the sense of being on shaky ground, the awareness of hostility
and confrontation bubbling just beneath the surface.” 5 Coupled with this state of
precariousness is the “feeling that at any moment the little dance of tolerance may be
abandoned and there you’d have it: a full frontal assault of prejudice, fear, anger, and
deadly assumptions even though, these days, the attack may be so subtle and shifty that it
is difficult for even the beholder to discern, let alone for its targets to indict.” 6 One way
an attack might occur is through what Mathis calls “the Look.” As she describes it,
We learn to recognize the Look very early in life. It radiates from white strangers’
faces. It’s not the same look of benign curiosity that is cast upon the typical
newcomer, but a distinct look of unease, confusion, dislike, disapproval, alarm,
dread, even hatred. And it conveys myriad questions – What are you doing here?
What do you want? What are you up to? – while making one unmistakable
appeal: go away. 7
1

Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1953), 49.
2
bell hooks, Black Looks: Race and Representation (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1992), 115.
3
Ralph Ellison, Shadow and Act (New York: Random House, 1964), 129.
4
Deborah Mathis, Yet a Stranger: Why Black Americans Still Don’t Feel at Home (New York, NY: Warner Books,
2002), 3.
5
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 3.
6
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 3.
7
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 15.
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Mathis admits that it is difficult to describe the Look “to those outside its range,”
and even “the transmitter is hardly aware he or she has dispatched it.” 8 Yet the Look’s
impact is felt: “black people can feel it as sharply as the cutting wind and have learned to
anticipate it, though the Look occasionally catches us off guard.” 9 Even more, “if you are
hit by it early in life or often enough, the Look can kill. Not your body, but your spirit.
Kill your faith that you will ever belong. Kill your hopes that what you have to offer the
world will ever be noticed, appreciated, nurtured, or rewarded. Kill your desire to
participate, to go along, to get along. Snuff out your will to even try.” 10 Mathis explains
how the frequency that black Americans encounter the Look depends on several factors,
such as “where we live and do business, the cast of our skin and how much or little we
reflect white norms and customs in the way we walk, talk, and dress.” For example,
“males who are poor and black are likely to be snared by the Look so often and harshly
that the Look leaves a stab wound.” 11 While as infants and toddlers black Americans are
often passed unnoticed by strangers or even treated well, “being too young to rouse
suspicion or fear,” Mathis notes that “by the time the natural rambunctiousness of youth
takes hold and we begin to act and think independently, the Look begins to land on us,
raising that sense of ‘otherness’ that black people have been writing and talking about
ever since Africa lost its treasure to these shores.” 12 Once this transformation occurs, “the
Look gradually becomes more frequent, harder and more corrosive, supplanting the
presumption of innocence with the anticipation of criminality, depravity, and

8

Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 15.
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 15-16.
10
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 16.
11
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 16.
12
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 16-17.
9
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incompetence.” 13 The consequences of the Look on the individual are debilitating as it
“yokes the child with self-doubt, intimidation, and a definite sense of unwelcomeness, a
sense of strangeness, [and] in response the black child may become more careful and
self-conscious, more cunning, or more reckless and rebellious.” 14
The adjectives and verbs used by Mathis to describe the Look and its effects on
black Americans are poignant and attest to its power. The Look drains, sizes up, discards,
scalds, eats away, chews, threatens, assumes, radiates, disapproves, hates, cuts, snuffs
out, corrodes, lands on, stabs, and kills. The best way to sum up these attributes is to say
that the Look is monstrous, both in the sense that it threatens and damages like a typical
Hollywood monster, but also in the sense that the Look shows, or de-monstrates (from
the Latin monstrare meaning “to show, point out”), the felt, sensed, and embodied impact
of racism in America. 15 The Look is an attempt by white people to control “their” space,
whether personal, physical, or social; to mark “others” as a threat and so keep them away;
and to dictate who appears and how they appear before their own eyes and the eyes of
society. The Look is inhospitable and unwelcoming as it sees no shared life or common
cause to make with those it wants to keep at a distance or under control. The Look
exercises power.
While Mathis spoke of the Look as killing the spirits, faiths, hopes, desires, or
wills of black Americans, the years since Mathis’ powerful description have
demonstrated that the Look kills in a biological sense. One notorious incident occurred in
2015 when Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people – all African Americans – at an

13

Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 17.
Mathis, Yet a Stranger, 17.
15
Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “demonstrate.”
14
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African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church in Charleston, South Carolina, hoping to
start a race war. 16 Roof later explained that he chose his target because Charleston “is the
most historic city in my state, and at one time had the highest ratio of blacks to Whites in
the country,” and in his mind “Blacks” are “the biggest problem for Americans.” 17 A
website he operated, named The Last Rhodesian after the white minority-led apartheid
regime in South Africa, espoused his racist views and offered to the world his personal
manifesto. Roof claimed in this document that, “segregation was not a bad thing. It was a
defensive measure. Segregation did not exist to hold back negroes. It existed to protect us
from them… Not only did it protect us from having to interact with them, and from being
physically harmed by them, but it protected us from being brought down to their level.
Integration has done nothing but bring Whites down to level of brute animals.” 18 When
other people are equated with brute animals and contact with them is marked as
dangerous, polluting, or negative, then it is easy to see that the next step in the
dehumanizing process is physical violence. This is the logic of hate and a failure to see
the other person in their dignity and worth; it is a logic with material repercussions. As
Howard Thurman claimed, “The logic of hate is to kill, to translate the willing of the
nonexistence of another into the literal deed of his extermination.” 19 Roof shot a look at
nine people and it killed them. He failed to regard – to see and judge – African
Americans as equals and deserving of life and respect.

16
Ralph Ellis, Greg Botelho, and Ed Payne, “Charleston church shooter hears victim’s kin say, ‘I forgive you,’” CNN,
June 19, 2015, accessed May 8, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting-main.
17
“Dylann Roof’s Manifesto,” New York Times, December 13, 2016, accessed May 9, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/13/universal/document-Dylann-Roof-manifesto.html. Spelling and
grammatical errors in Roof’s Manifesto have not been corrected in quotations.
18
“Dylann Roof’s Manifesto.”
19
Howard Thurman, “The Discipline of Reconciliation,” Journal of Religion and Health 3, no. 1 (October 1963): 16.
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Looks that kill, however, should not be viewed as merely personal, although the
example just cited may give that impression. Instead, various looks, whether racist or
anti-racist, can take on institutional, cultural, and organizational forms whenever likeminded people get together and work together to implement a shared goal or vision. 20
Thus, we speak of the public eye, the eyes of society, the eyes of the law, the eyes of
government, the eyes of the police, and American eyes. Whether these social eyes see
with justice or injustice depends on the views of the people who shaped them throughout
their historical development and continue to do so in their present instantiations. For
positive examples of collective looking, we might point to different watch groups, such
as groups looking out for human rights violations around the world or groups involved in
cop watching, which are forms of organized looking that attempt to counter various forms
of unjust looks at an institutional level. 21 Looks that kill can themselves be mobilized on
an organizational plane. They can also be passed down generationally, whether through
family and parenting dynamics, the pressure of peer groups and the draw of social
acceptance, or through the creation of legislative measures and laws with their
concomitant enforcement, to name just a few examples. The Look is a serial offender
because it shows up and commits similar, patterned crimes against humanity through the
actions of both individuals and organizations. It is possible to speak of a polygenesis of
the Look; it is not the creation of one person or even one organization, but is developed

20

Following Karl Rahner, throughout this work an “institution” is defined as “all those realities in the social sphere
which are subject to change, and which impose certain compulsions upon human freedom, in other words not merely
human laws bearing upon various departments of human life and having juridical effects, but also dominant ideas,
customs, taboos… and other realities in such society, which do in fact exist but are capable of being changed.” See Karl
Rahner, “Institution and Freedom,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 13, trans. David Bourke (New York: Crossroad,
1983), 112.
21
For examples, see Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org); WeCopwatch (www.wecopwatch.org); Southern Poverty
Law Center’s “Hatewatch” blog (www.splcenter.org/hatewatch).
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out of a conglomeration of historical, economic, social, cultural, linguistic, political,
familial, educational, technological, and numerous other materials. The Look has killed
and still kills in different ways and in different contexts, but, following Mathis, the
underlying messages have consistently been the same to those who aren’t ostensibly
white: go away (threat), or, you’re mine to do whatever I want with (control).
Because Looks that kill are shaped by both personal and social forces, throughout
this work we call the expressions of Looks that kill unjust looks and the countering and
overcoming of these distorted looks just looks. As will be seen, however, just looks not
only confront unjust looks in the same field of vision, but also re-envision the space and
manner of seeing itself; that is, what and who is seen, and how these are seen. 22 By using
the language of justice, though, we call attention to how Looks that kill move between
the personal and the social, the individual and the collective, each being shaped by the
other. As David Michael Levin states, “The visionary life around which a society is
gathered reflects and amplifies the character of the vision developed within each one of
its individual members; but conversely, the conditions of society as a whole bear in many
decisive ways, some of them oppressive and destructive, on the development of
individual predispositions and capacities.” 23 Speaking of just and unjust looks challenges
us to consider how our perceptions of others are shaped by all the larger forces named

22

Just ways of seeing will not necessarily be dominated by the geo-optical metaphor of the field, whether a farm field,
plantation field, or battlefield, historically so dominant in Euro-American imaginaries, but will perhaps appreciatively
utilize ancient, indigenous, urban, or dystopic metaphors that shape our perceptions in far more humane and generous
ways. To give one example from an urban context, perhaps instead of talking about the field of vision, we will begin to
talk about the street of vision, where so many different “seeings” from different people cause traffic, where our seeing
moves among people and cars and buildings, where our seeing must constantly stop, yield, and strain to truly encounter
other eyes, where our seeing has the choice to move slow or put the pedal to the metal, where seeing is fragmentary and
dazzled by different colors and gestures of others, where our looking is restricted by space and by the claims of others,
where our seeing gets crowded and cramped or becomes anonymous and less masterful of reality.
23
David Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation (London: Routledge, 1988),
10.
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above, just as personal views and perceptions influence these same forces. For example,
the law views, or regards, some people in certain ways and not in other ways, and these
laws are themselves the enshrinement of the views of lawmakers and those constituents
to whom they are accountable. To consider immigrants who enter the country as illegal
aliens rather than as temporary residents or citizens obviously has real implications for
the livelihoods of the people concerned. Yet the views of Supreme Court justices – their
eyes – have tremendous power to shape the eyes of the law in the decisions and
judgments they make throughout their careers.
In addition, justice itself concerns both the personal and social. As traditionally
understood, justice is both a personal virtue – one of the seven cardinal virtues – and a
goal for many societies in equally distributing land, food, wealth, political representation,
health care, media coverage, and all other things related to power in society. Justice can
also be construed as the goal of providing equal opportunity and access to society’s many
benefits, such as stable employment, education, or legal protection from various harms.
Justice is much more than this, for we also speak of having a sense of justice and even a
thirst for justice. Justice is felt; justice is sensed; justice fills us with substance and we
experience emptiness without it. Justice, at its core, means to give to each person their
due, their just desserts. Although the word “dessert” is not intended this way in the
definition, where it means what each person deserves, when justice is dished out there is
a certain sweetness to it, like an after-dinner dessert, a certain satisfaction that calms our
nerves and eases the existing tensions in our minds, bodies, and spirits. As Bryan
Massingale writes, “justice is a pathos, a desire, a longing, a yearning… indeed a
passion… before it is a concept or a definition. In the African American experience,

8
justice is something visceral; it is an ache, a groan, an inner fire.” 24 Justice can be
“served,” or perhaps not. Instead of filling up another person with justice, of satisfying
their thirst, hunger, and other felt demands for what is right, true, and good, Looks that
kill suck the life out of others, reversing the process. They fail to give due regard to the
personality, dignity, space, life, embodiment, or uniqueness of other people. The Look
calls into question the humanity of the other in the way it communicates itself to others; it
frays the psychosomatic fabric of being and the social fabric of communities.
The violence perpetrated by Roof and his sighting is connected on many levels to
other racist acts and organized violence both past and present. Even if we would like to
see his deadly perception as isolated, it is not. “There is no such thing,” explains Brad
Evans and Henry Giroux, “as a ‘random act’ of political violence. A defining
characteristic of such violence is its public display – the spectacle of its occurrence that
through its very performance makes a metaphysical claim such that the individual act
relates to a broader historical narrative.” 25 Roof himself connected his violence not just to
a general and vague notion of white racist violence, but to specific forms of violence: the
88 bullets he took with his .45 Glock into the basement of Mother Emanuel church for a
Bible study are symbolic of “Heil Hitler,” the “H” being the eighth letter of the alphabet
(“88”). Mother Emanuel itself is the same church graced by Denmark Vesey, a free black
man and minister who in 1822 attempted to lead a revolt of both free and enslaved
persons against white slaveholders in the Charleston area. The conspiracy was discovered
by the white community and Vesey and his co-conspirators were rounded up, questioned,

24

Bryan M. Massingale, Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010), 131.
Brad Evans and Henry A. Giroux, Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of Spectacle (San
Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 2015), 42.

25
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tortured, and ultimately put to death. Roof knew this and targeted the place and its people
for what he perceived as its past (and present) intransigence. Before the massacre he also
visited historic sites around South Carolina that conjured up scenes of a violent past:
Sullivan’s Island, where captive people were quarantined and eventually brought to
market; Boone Hall; McLeod and Kensington Plantations; Fort Moultrie; and
Confederate war memorials. 26
Rev. Clementa Pinckney, the pastor of Mother Emanuel slain by Roof’s deadly
Look, also knew the history of his city and congregation, holding up Vesey’s so-called
conspiracy as something to be proud of, not stamped out. Months before his death,
Pinckney explained to a group of visitors on a Civil Rights Ride that “what our church
and denomination stands for… [is] the universal vision of all people being treated fairly
under the law as God sees us in his sight.”27 He also gave a geographical and historical
lesson to the group, explaining that Emanuel church was originally built outside the city
of Charleston proper. It was “outside of the city boundaries, out in the ‘country’ or the
‘suburbs,’” where the majority of African Americans initially resided. 28 Fearing this
group of free people, especially after Vesey’s plot was discovered, the white community
established the Military College of South Carolina, known today as the Citadel, on a site
adjacent to the church. According to Pinckney, “the guns of the Citadel were basically
facing this site [of Emanuel church] and the community of African Americans who were

26
For an excellent story regarding Roof’s background, see Rachel Kaadzi Ghansah, “A Most American Terrorist: The
Making of Dylann Roof,” GQ, August 21, 2017, accessed April 15, 2019, https://www.gq.com/story/dylann-roofmaking-of-an-american-terrorist. Sullivan’s Island was the point of entry for an estimated 40% of the 400,000 captive
Africans brought to British and later American territories, making it the largest slave port in North America.
27
“Civil Rights Ride 2013 – Clementa Pinckney, SC Senate, Pastor Mother Emanuel A.M.E.,” Mullikin Law Firm,
February 20, 2015, accessed November 17, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XP35_JVnP6g.
28
“Civil Rights Ride 2013.”
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living in this area. And that’s how the Citadel got started.” 29 His historical anecdote
reveals the concrete reality that guns, and therefore eyes, were trained on the African
American community in Charleston from early on, marking this population as a potential
threat to white persons and property. As we will see, Looks that kill are often trained and
shot out of citadel-like bodies and structures with their defensive postures and strong
fronts. 30
Yet contemporary violence is also connected to Roof’s own decision to act. Just
weeks before being assassinated by a Look that kills, Pinckney, also a politician, spoke
out in the South Carolina senate urging the state to legislate the use of body cameras by
the police. Pinckney’s recommendation followed the shooting of Walter Scott by a police
officer in the Charleston area that momentarily claimed national media attention. Scott,
after a scuffle with a police officer, was shot in the back while running away, and all of it
was caught on tape. His own posture, his fleeing, reveals a state of fugitivity, of perpetual
flight, not just from a police officer, but from a Look that kills stemming from both an
individual and an institution. It is likely this Look pursued and harassed Scott throughout
his life, and it finally found, in a white police officer, a host through which to manifest
itself in full measure. How can we address this eye, this monstrous and killing Look,
before it sights its target? This eye that people run from, seek cover from, hide from, or
daringly confront at great risk of bodily harm; how can it be stopped? It seems we always

29

“Civil Rights Ride 2013.”
Consider the extremist group “Stormfront,” founded online in 1995 by former Alabama Klan leader Don Black in
West Palm Beach, FL. According to SPLC, this group had 300,000 online members as of March 2015 and its members
have been connected to nearly 100 murders. See “Stormfront,” SPLC, accessed April 15, 2019,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/stormfront. Or, consider the “Northwest Front,” a white
nationalist group who wants to establish a separate and sovereign Aryan nation in the Pacific Northwest. In both cases,
the rhetoric, language, and posturing of these groups follows the basic shape of a “front,” a clear division of friends and
enemies and a martial attitude towards the government and mainstream media as well as their usual targets of people of
color, immigrants, Jews, and Muslims.
30

11
see this Look for what it is only after it has wreaked its havoc on others. Can we find
another look, another set of eyes, that incarnates welcomeness, empathy, fellow feeling,
compassion, and human recognition that leaves the flourishing of life behind? Are there
just looks to counter and overcome unjust looks and other Looks that kill, not only on a
personal level, but on the social and institutional levels?
In what follows we will explore historical roots and forces that helped produce
Looks that kill and the moments throughout American history where they showed up
most explicitly and left broken hearts, psyches, and bodies in their wake. We will also
look at places in the Christian tradition where material and inspiration for just looks
might be found, and how the presence of Looks that kill in our communities moves us to
think differently about how a Christian should live and how the Church should engage
with the world. Part I unpacks each term in the phrase, “white (eye) power,” which is
used to denote the embodied, looking character of white power in both its personal and
organized instantiations. To talk about white (eye) power and its varied manifestations is
to talk about Looks that kill and associated unjust looks, except that the phrase also
moves us to consider the meaning of whiteness, embodiment, and power as these relate to
looking. As Shannon Sullivan astutely claims, “white people’s supremacist
understandings of race are located not just in their unconscious habits, but also in their
bodily constitution.” 31 Chapter 1 explores the terms “white” and “whiteness” and
attempts to come to some initial clarity as to how Looks that kill are racialized. It is
suggested that it is crucial to talk about whiteness as a form of visuality. The examples

31
Shannon Sullivan, “The Hearts and Guts of White People: Ethics, Ignorance, and the Physiology of White Racism,”
Journal of Religious Ethics 42, no. 4 (2014): 596-97. She continues that, “White racism can also help shape white
people’s biochemical make-up and activities: for example, their serotonin and other neurotransmitter levels, the activity
patterns of their automatic nervous system, their predisposition for gastric tachyarrhythmia, their levels of hormone
production, and so on” (597).
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used in the chapter can also help us understand how white (eye) power has been deployed
against various immigrant and religious communities along with African Americans.
Chapter 2 works to discover how our “inner eyes” are produced and, in terms of white
(eye) power, what historical forces gave the “inner eyes” of white people contours and
vitality as they developed during the era of discovery, the colonial era, and beyond. The
basic point is made throughout that our eyes, our interpretations and perceptions of the
world and others, are produced not only biologically but also, just as importantly,
socially. This is precisely what thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter call
“sociogeny,” a notion that will need unpacking as we seek to understand Looks that kill.
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the notion of power by engaging the writings of German
theologian Karl Rahner, especially his understanding of concupiscence and what he
called the danger of “integralism.” We will also look at the basic metaphors behind the
way we think about our embodied experiences as they relate to social organizations. All
this conceptual work leads to a definition of power as the ability to take matter/s into
one’s own hands through self-anthropomorphization, that is, through mental, corporeal,
organizational, and technological extensions of the self, to secure one’s substance. 32 As
will be seen, however, power is not only the “ability” to take matter/s into one’s own
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hands, but the actual “taking” of matter/s into one’s own hands; power is both potential
and actual in relation to matter/s at hand.
Having laid out a framework for thinking through white (eye) power, Part II of
this dissertation delves into a damage analysis of white (eye) power and associated Looks
that kill from the Southern plantation in history to the 21st century urban streets of the
United States. In this analysis, inevitably incomplete and fragmentary, we trace some
ways that white people, both individually and collectively, have looked at black people in
the past and what material legacies these Looks have left behind for us today. The
question is asked not only how have white people looked at black people, but for what
reasons and for what purposes did white people look at black people in these ways. We
will also explore some ways that African Americans experienced, interpreted, and
challenged Looks that kill at various times and in different ways. Chapter 4 explores the
overseeing and patrolling eyes trained on keeping enslaved and free persons of color “in
their place.” The focus in this chapter is on how the social roles of overseers and slave
patrols reveal aspects of Looks that kill in their personal and organized forms. Chapters 5
and 6 delineate the cycloptic eye (also called the kluxing eye) and the Jim Crowing eye as
historical manifestations of Looks that, following emancipation and the end of the Civil
War, took shape amidst a changing social and political landscape. In the latter chapter we
highlight the personal experiences of Melba Pattillo Beals and others who dared to look
“ferocious white racism in the eye, didn’t blink, and lived long enough to tell America
the truth about this glaring hypocrisy in a bold and defiant manner.” 33 Chapter 7
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addresses the legacies of the overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes in
American life, especially in terms of contemporary policing practices.
One major idea that comes out of the explorations in Part II is that calling Looks
that kill “racist” – and only that – covers over the diverse meanings and practical
functions of the Look as it appeared and still appears in everyday life. Here it can be seen
that Looks that kill are not simply racist, but versatile in how they “take” people of color;
“taking” being multivalent in the sense of taking or capturing a picture or a moment,
assessing a situation or a person (“what’s your take on the matter”), and the physical
sense of taking someone somewhere, like to jail or across the Atlantic. The Look shot by
an overseer at an enslaved person on a cotton plantation in Mississippi in 1850, the Look
shot by a white conductor at a black passenger on a train traveling from Memphis to
Cincinnati in 1922, and the Look shot by a police officer at a young black male on the
streets of Milwaukee in 2016 are all clearly distinct and shaped by innumerable forces
that are unique. Yet they all share important commonalities such as the attempt to control,
immobilize, and put the other at one’s own disposal. By exploring the roots of Looks that
kill in Part II we can come to a better understanding of both the nature of racism in
America and, from a theological perspective, of sin and the related concept of
concupiscence, which leads us to the next section.
Part III articulates, from a biblical and theological framework, how Christian
beliefs and practices might contribute to both healing and resisting Looks that kill.
Chapter 8 looks at biblical depictions of how God is portrayed as seeing people and of
how Jesus saw people during his earthly ministry. While God’s seeing is typically
connected with the classical attributes of God such as omniscience – God the all-seeing
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or all-knowing one – we will see that God’s seeing is also connected to the theme of
justice throughout the Bible. Likewise, we will search the New Testament, especially the
Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life and ministry, to see what Jesus and his followers did with
their eyes in their encounters with different individuals and groups of people. Important is
the question of not only who Jesus sees, or draws attention to, but also how he does so.
Moving from the biblical witness to a focus on Christian living today, Chapter 9 explores
the role of contemplation, as a spiritual form of seeing, for overcoming Looks that kill
and a distorted relationship to being in general. Taking our cue from some of the latest
teachings of Pope Francis, we suggest that a discipleship in vision and an apostolate of
seeing is essential to Christian mission and for resisting personal and collective trainings
in vision that seek to mark, target, and kill.
The basic claim made throughout this dissertation is that Looks that kill in society
is not merely an interpersonal or social problem, but a theological one. The reason for
this is that Looks that kill block that opening into the incomprehensible God that every
human person, being made in the image of God, is through their very existence and
unique, embodied mode of being human in the world. As the U.S. Catholic bishops
recently put it, “Every racist act – every such comment, every joke, every disparaging
look as a reaction to the color of skin, ethnicity, or place of origin – is a failure to
acknowledge another person as a brother or sister, created in the image of God.”34 It is
precisely this failure to see a human neighbor that also occludes a saving vision of God.
Additionally, if sin and concupiscence show up in the flesh, in our corporeal, sensorial,
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and perceptual relationships to the world and other people, then Christian mission must
also begin with the flesh. Looks that kill are a challenge for Christians to develop a robust
“sense” of mission and justice, not just in their heads, but with and in their personal and
social bodies. 35 Seeing is thus fundamental to the orthopraxis – right way of practicing
the faith – of Christians.
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PART I: White (Eye) Power
“To see or to perish is the very condition laid upon everything that makes up the
universe, by reason of the mysterious gift of existence. And this, in superior measure, is
man’s condition.”36
“History—big or small, national or personal—is little more than the story of the collision
of perceptions.” 37

The terms “whiteness” and “power” are notoriously difficult to pin down, and
when combined in “white power” the theoretical task does not get any easier. Whiteness
itself began to be studied at an academic level within the field of labor history only a
couple of decades ago, and ever since scholars have debated its definition and value for
historical and social research. 38 The best example of such lively debate was when the
International Labor and Working-Class History journal published a series of essays in
2001 from prominent labor and social historians on the meaning of whiteness and the
historians’ imagination. The leading protagonist of the debate was Eric Arnesen, who
forcefully argued that “while whiteness scholars… have effectively and laudably made
white racial identity a subject of direct examination,” “historians have defined whiteness
too loosely and… the category of whiteness has to date proven to be an inadequate tool of
historical analysis.” 39 For Arnesen, the concept of whiteness suffers from “conceptual
inflation” in that it is given “overlapping and at times competing definitions and
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theoretical inflections.” 40 His summary of various scholarly takes on whiteness shows the
concept’s elasticity:
Whiteness is, variously, a metaphor for power, a proxy for racially distributed
material benefits, a synonym for “white supremacy,” an epistemological stance
defined by power, a position of invisibility or ignorance, and a set of beliefs about
racial “Others” and oneself that can be rejected through “treason” to a racial
category. For those seeking to interrogate the concept critically, it is nothing less
than a moving target.41
For this reason Part I offers a take on whiteness that is aware of the ambiguities
and complications involved in defining whiteness, and follows Michael Eric Dyson’s
broad understanding of whiteness as identity, ideology, and institution, with the
additional understanding of whiteness as visuality. The examples of white (eye) power
scattered throughout this project allow us to see how whiteness (or more often, its
proxies) is enacted in bodily fashion, whether personal or corporate, and how whiteness
is experienced by human subjects and their “objects” or “targets.” In a similar vein,
power is defined with a view to its rootedness in human embodiment. Power is not just
getting stuff done in the world or influencing others through force or persuasion, but
dynamic relating in the flesh in terms of how “we” incarnate our personal, social, and
national selves vis-à-vis “other” movements and bodies (other matter/s). In this respect
“white power” can initially be seen as the power of whiteness in the flesh that happens
when historically formed, habituated, and racializing white bodies work with their eyes to
assign others to “an inferior category” and determine “their social, economic, civic, and
human standing on that basis.” 42 This racism in the flesh – which James Cone called “a
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cancer in the body politic” – “is an act of peremptory, hostile, and supremely – often
fatally – consequential identification that unceremoniously overrides its objects’ sense of
themselves,” undermining both “identity and agency.” 43 Whiteness and power together
make for an explosive mix; our focus in Part I is on the many ways that Looks that kill
are racialized and what it might mean to say that there is power in looking.
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Chapter 1: Whites in the Eyes
“Hate is the great insulator, making it possible for one man to deny the existence of
another or to will his nonexistence.” 44
“The white eye sees its world as one of unracialized equality, of the merely human, in
which the charge of discrimination is unintelligible. The others inhabit a racialized world
in which they find themselves given lesser status in the name of that (white) equality.” 45
“The characteristic American mode of interpersonal relations is one of Power and
Domination.”46

On the morning of August 5, 2012, forty-year-old Wade Michael Page walked
into a Sikh gurdwara in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and fatally shot six people and wounded
four others before taking his own life. 47 At the time of the shooting, the community was
preparing a meal (langar) that was to be served later in the day, a meal freely offered to
all visitors regardless of distinctions based on religion, caste, gender, or ethnicity. The
horrific shooting sparked national outrage as Wisconsin congressman Paul Ryan
introduced a bill condemning “the senseless attack,” while First Lady Michelle Obama
visited later that month to offer her condolences and support to the families of the
victims. 48 Authorities soon discovered that Page, an army veteran from Cudahy,
Wisconsin – a working-class town just south of Milwaukee – had ties to various white
supremacist groups. He was also involved in the white power music scene, having played
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in bands such as End Apathy, Definite Hate, Celtic Warrior, Max Resist, Intimidation
One, Aggressive Force, and the Blue Eyed Devils. Page had even become a member of
the Hammerskin Nation (HN), a well-organized and international neo-Nazi group formed
in the late 1980s. 49 Page’s skin was itself covered with tattoos that revealed his
allegiances: the number “838” standing for the letters HCH (“Hail the Crossed
Hammers”), the Hammerskins’ motto; the letters “W” and “P” on the backs of his hands
standing for “White Power”; and the Celtic cross, recognized by experts as “a symbol of
white pride and… one of the most popular symbols for neo-Nazis and White
Supremacists.” 50 Page also had the number 14 inscribed within a circle on his arm, which
corresponds to the number of words in the supremacist motto written by David Lane
while imprisoned in the 1980s: “We must secure the existence of our people and a future
for white children.” Page acted out these words and hateful ideologies and left a
community in mourning. 51
For Wade Michael Page, “our people” meant white people; his “we” was limited
to a select group of humans, or more precisely, “9%” of all humans. Why 9%? For white
supremacists this numeric is the “percentage of the world’s population that is purportedly
white,” and as such it is used as a symbol for their beliefs. 52 White supremacists have
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loved percentages ever since the reinvented Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s preached the
sacred values of “pure Americanism” and of being “100% American.” 53 The belief that
only 9% of humanity are worthy of both an existence and a future allowed Page to violate
others who, in his eyes, were not worthy of being his people, of being included in his
sense of life and sense of self. Page’s violence was a failure of his senses, of his
perception and recognition of the other as “another self.” 54 His take on the world and
other people contrasted sharply with the values of the community he targeted, just like
Dylann Roof and the holy ones of Emanuel church. A central component of Sikh belief
and practice that comes from the teachings Guru Gobind Singh is to “Recognize the
whole human race as one.” 55 Their further emphasis on the unity of humanity and the
equality of humans defies all ideologies that declare white people supreme and all others
inferior. One can gainfully speculate that the Sikh community was for Page a symbol of
both a religious and racial “other” who was a threat to the white Christian establishment.
Page, as a “blue-eyed devil,” regarded – or saw – the Sikh community in a violent
fashion. 56 Much like Roof, his unjust look first violated their dignity as humans through
his judgment of them as outside the domain of common humanity, and then later his
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Look violated their bodily integrity through hate-infused shots. His perception of them
first reduced their status to that of the expendable, and this Look was then concretized in
bullets emanating from his line of sight. The popular logo of the Blue Eyed Devils band
in white power circles was incarnated in Page: a white man pointing a pistol out of a
Celtic cross, refitted as a target.
The Eyes of Hate
The tragedy sparked by the miseducation and mis-sensing of Wade Michael Page
was not the first of its kind. Only a few days after 11 September 2001 – an event which
precipitated what some have called a “national hate crime epidemic” in the United States
– Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh American, was murdered in Mesa, Arizona just outside the
gas station he owned. In the words of Sikh studies scholar Jaideep Singh, Sodhi was “the
first person to die from domestic terrorism after 9/11.” 57 Targeted by a white man
distraught over the 9/11 attacks, Sodhi was a “convenient scapegoat” for the crimes of
Muslim extremists “because of the way he looked.” 58 Frank Silva Roque, the perpetrator,
had reportedly told his friends on 9/11 he was “going to go out and shoot some towelheads.” 59 Roque shot Sodhi five times from his truck, killing him, and then drove to
another gas station where he fired on a Lebanese American clerk. After missing his
target, Roque drove to his former residence purchased by a local family of Afghan
descent and fired shots outside the house. When the police arrested him the next day,
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Roque reportedly shouted, “I am a patriot!” and “I stand for America all the way!” 60
Apparently, America did not include Sikh Americans, Lebanese Americans, or Afghani
Americans.
Like many other Sikh men, Sodhi’s physical appearance was “largely defined by
religious symbols, such as facial hair, non-Western attire, and religious headwear.” 61
According to Singh, after 9/11 “the appearance of a recognizable Sikh had been clearly
designated as the ‘other’ in public life.” 62 Even moments after the Twin Towers fell, Sikh
Americans experienced the targeting, unjust looks of a nation in chaos. Singh tells the
story of “one Sikh American” who, while walking to work in New York City, “was
yelled at, cursed, and chased by several men – who somehow identified him as
responsible for the attack that had just occurred.”63 The man fled in terror, ducked into a
subway to hide, and removed his turban fearing his life. “For months after 9/11,” says
Singh, “Sikh Americans continued to receive verbal and gestured threats, were spat upon,
had garbage thrown at them, were run off the road and menacingly tailgated, were shot at
with guns, and suffered numerous cases of arson, firebombings, beatings, and murders.” 64
It would take time and the efforts of Sikh activists promoting educational information
about their community and faith that other Americans would realize “that the vast
majority of people wearing turbans in the US were Sikh,” and not Arab Muslims. 65 Singh
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concludes that “to this day, the historic nature of the hate crime epidemic after 9/11 is
very rarely broached in remembrances of that traumatic period in US national history.” 66
Less than a month after 9/11, Waqar Hasan, a Pakistani Muslim, was found fatally
shot in his grocery store in Dallas, Texas. The police reported there was a “considerable
amount” of money left in the cash register, evidence of a hate crime and not a simple
robbery. 67 The same killer, Mark Anthony Stroman, would also shoot Vasudev Patel, an
immigrant from India, behind the counter of a Shell gas station on October 4, 2001,
killing him. Stroman claimed that he wanted to “retaliate on local Arab Americans, or
whatever you want to call them,” and court documents show he told authorities he was a
member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a notorious white supremacist group. 68 According to
a statement made by Mukesh Patel, a brother-in-law of the victim, Stroman “said he has
skin allergies against people like us.” 69 Stroman, who soon dubbed himself the “Arab
Slayer,” also severely wounded Rais Bhuiyan – a recent immigrant from Bangladesh –
with another hate-infused look incarnated in shotgun pellets. 70 Stroman’s white (eye)
power partially blinded Bhuiyan, who described the shot hitting him “like a million bees
stinging my face.” 71 The meaning of Stroman’s embodied and sensorial comportment
toward other people – his skin – was violently enacted against another as if this “other”
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was an allergen that had gotten under his white skin, onto his nerves, and was infecting
his life system. While Wade Michael Page’s skin presenced, or bodily performed, his
whiteness as a dominating and forceful hammer against all others (“Hammerskin”),
Stroman’s skin acted as an antibody against anybody and any bodies deemed foreign and
aggressive toward his life and values, both personal and national. The force of his own
skin skinned the other of the ability to manifest their presence as a distinctly human other,
thus killing them.
Like others, Stroman’s white skin and white power tattoos covered his life and
self-understanding with meaning and value, and they also protected him from those
deemed “outside.” According to Anand Giridharadas, Stroman’s ideas and observations
“were grounded in a profound sense of besiegement,” and that “he felt himself and
people like him to be standing on a shrinking platform at which minorities and
immigrants and public dependents were nibbling away.” 72 His citadel-like response to
this “besiegement” was a narrowing of his perceptual and judging capacities that pinned
and fixed the other in stinging fashion; there was no opening up of his understanding, no
broadening of his vision, but a radical closure of his visual and ethical fields. His eyepresencing in the world, the embodied, visual manifestation of his core values as a white
man in America, would destroy all others he saw as “Arab”— even if they were actually
from South Asia. As social theorist Ghassan Hage explains, “from the perspective of the
racializing subject, it is unclear where the Arab and the Muslim begin and end, where
they are separate and where they fuse and where they even go beyond to delineate anyone
who in the eyes of the Western racists looks like a ‘third-world-looking-person.’” 73 As
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meaningful distinctions blurred in the face of rage, hatred, bitterness, and insecurity, any
“Middle Eastern-looking” or “third-world-looking-person” would do as an object for
retributive violence. Stroman himself “had gone after an Indian, a Pakistani, and a
Bangladeshi – the latter two Muslim, but none of them Arab – in the name of avenging
attacks he and many others blamed on people who looked like them.” 74
Miraculously, Bhuiyan survived Stroman’s attack and after multiple facial
surgeries, a pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), and a decade of healing, he started a campaign to
stop the execution of Stroman, his attacker. Despite initially dealing with recurring
nightmares which featured “that man with those searing eyes walking in, pointing the
twin-barreled gun, asking where he was from, and then the stings,” Bhuiyan now fought
for the preservation of that man’s life. 75 Along with some family members of the other
victims, Bhuiyan preached a message of forgiveness through his World Without Hate
organization and looked for legal ways to spare Stroman from death by lethal injection. 76
Bhuiyan repeatedly told others that he wasn’t interested in an eye for an eye justice, and
that his Muslim faith taught him that “saving a life is like saving the entire mankind,” a
beautiful principle found in the Qur’an. 77 Bhuiyan’s charity had a remarkable effect on
Stroman, who towards the end of his life changed his tone and opened up to others.
Before he was executed on July 20, 2011, he stated in an interview, “Please don’t

74

Giridharadas, True American, 78.
Giridharadas, True American, 60. Hage argues that, “it is good enough to call ‘racist’ any bundle of practices which
aim at problematizing, excluding, marginalizing, discriminating against, rendering insecure, exploiting, criminalizing,
and terrorizing and harbouring exterminatory fantasies against an identity group of people imagined as sharing a
common and inheritable determining feature” (Hage, Is racism, 11-12).
76
See “World Without Hate” website: https://worldwithouthate.org.
77
Qur’an 5:32. The same Surah in which this principle appears also includes text which reads: “And We ordained for
[the Children of Israel in the Torah] a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a
tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him” (5:45).
75

28
stereotype these Muslims.” 78 Stroman also acknowledged his own hatred: “In the free
world, I was free but I was locked in a prison inside myself because of the hate I carried
in my heart.”79 Most hate crime stories, however, do not end with such an
acknowledgment of wrong.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hate Crime Statistics, in 2017
there were 7,175 hate crime incidents reported by 2,040 law enforcement agencies across
the United States. 80 Of the roughly 7,100 single-bias incidents, 58.1% were motivated by
race/ethnicity/ancestry bias, 22% prompted by religious bias, and 15.9% resulted from
sexual-orientation bias. Of those offenses motivated by race/ethnicity/ancestry (58.1% of
total single-bias incidents), 48.8% were motivated by anti-Black or African American
bias, 17.5% stemmed from anti-White bias, and 10.9% were classified as anti-Hispanic or
Latino bias. Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,679 offenses in
2017, of which 58.1% were anti-Jewish, 18.7% were anti-Islamic (Muslim), 4.5% were
anti-Catholic, and 1.4% were anti-Sikh. According to the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) in their 2018 Civil Rights Report, aptly titled “Targeted,” there was a
17% increase in anti-Muslim bias incidents nationwide in 2017 over 2016, and a 15%
increase in hate crimes directed against American Muslims over the same time period. 81
The incidents included hate crimes, intimidation, denial of service or access, employment
discrimination, bullying, immigration and citizenship delays, and anti-mosque incidents
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including vandalism and bombings. Of all anti-Muslim bias incidents recorded by CAIR
in 2017, federal government agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, TSA,
and the FBI caused 35% of them, occurring most frequently at air, bus, or train
terminals. 82 The report considers the increases to be largely due to Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign rhetoric and election victory in 2016, and his executive orders
banning travel from several Muslim-majority countries. 83 According to an article
published online by the Southern Poverty Law Center – an organization committed to
tracking various hate groups and ideologies and taking legal action against them – “in the
first 34 days after [Trump’s] election, the SPLC documented 1,094 bias-related incidents
and found that 37% of them directly referenced Trump, his campaign slogans or his
notorious comments about sexual assault.” 84 The article says that, more generally, “each
year, across America, an average of 250,000 people are victimized by hate crimes,”
which are defined as “criminal expressions of bigotry that terrorize entire communities
and fray the social fabric of our country.” 85 Eyes that hate to see “others,” that can’t bear
the sight of “others” or their symbolic proxies (e.g. turbans, hijabs, long beards, dark skin
color, menorahs), seem to be as American as apple pie. 86
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Monstrous Eyes
The Looks shot by Roof, Stroman, Page, Roque, and others like them are not
anomalous, but reveal and make explicit the racism in America that Deborah Mathis
spoke of as “bubbling just beneath the surface.” The Look that Mathis might receive
while shopping at a local mall is felt by many to be related to the Look that can propel
itself into a Sikh gurdwara, a Texas gas station, a Charleston church, a rugged American
frontier, an Iraqi town, or an urban street and kill black, brown, and red people. These
Looks are white power in the flesh. Yet what is whiteness, and how does whiteness relate
to vision and perception? In an interview titled, “Giving Whiteness a Black Eye,” which
tellingly suggests the nature of whiteness as “eyepower,” Michael Eric Dyson offers a
way to approach these questions by way of another example. Reflecting on Timothy
McVeigh, the man who bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
in 1995, Dyson claims that McVeigh “viewed himself as part of a tiny outpost of pure
patriotic rebels whose patriotism was expressed in the logic of radical antipatriotism: one
must blow up the state as it is to get to the state as it should be.” 87 Further, “McVeigh
believed he was reviving a heroic vision of whiteness that he thought was being
suppressed within the institutional matrices of American democracy and ‘legitimate’
government.” McVeigh, like Stroman, Page, and Roof later, believed that only a war
could save white civilization or culture from the corrupting influence of racial and
religious minorities; but in McVeigh’s case, the war was not necessarily against African
Americans, immigrants, or “third-world-looking-people,” but against an American body
politic that had increasingly disallowed its hands and arms to serve as overt expressions
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of white supremacy with its fundamentalist views of race, religion, and Americanism.
Indeed, in McVeigh’s view, the government was complicit in its own debasement and
corruption through its affirmative action policies; support of multiculturalism; perceived
abridgement of individual liberties such as religious freedom, free speech, and the right to
bear arms; the expansion of federal government oversight; and implementing a welfare
state. According to this view, in pandering to nonwhite racial groups and their bogus
needs and in allowing them representation and leverage over the state apparatus, the
government itself had become culpable and morally weak. If American political bodies
with their wealth in ideas, organization, and technological sophistication would no longer
serve the interests of white people and forcefully secure these interests, then the hands of
individuals and loosely formed “militia” groups would have to do. McVeigh, and others
later, felt like he had to take matter/s into his own hands to secure his (white) substance:
white power. As Ghassan Hage explains the dynamic,
Nation-states are built around nationals disinvesting themselves of the capacity to
deploy personal violence and investing this capacity in the state. Nationals with a
high degree of governmental belonging don’t need to deploy personal violence for
national purposes. They are secure in the knowledge that the state is acting out
their violence for them. In this sense, those [like McVeigh or white supremacists]
who engage in such personal violent acts feel that they have lost this special
relation to state power. They feel that their governmental national belonging is
threatened or in decline. Nevertheless, they think they have a legitimate claim to
represent the national will embodied in the state. This is why they feel that they
should take matters back into their ‘own hands’, as it were. 88
McVeigh’s own actions, however, drew on public political discourse, actions, and
pathos for its inspiration. His actions, according to Dyson, “articulate in the extreme the
logic of repressive, hegemonic whiteness that hibernates within the structures of
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legitimate government: vicious attacks on welfare and its recipients; brutal attacks on
black progress and its advocates; heartless attacks on the crime-ridden black ghetto; and
exploitative attacks on the alleged pathologies of black culture.” 89 The result of “such
attacks is the implementation of policies that punish the black poor and stigmatize the
black middle class as well as the legitimation of crude cultural biases toward black
citizens.” 90 McVeigh not only brought out the white power aspirations that hibernated
within the structures of legitimate government, but also, with other figures like him,
became “hugely discomfiting manifestations of the hidden animus toward blackness and
civility that such discourses of attack encourage.” 91 McVeigh, and one could argue Roof,
Stroman, Page, Roque, and the perpetrators of hate crimes who latch onto political
rhetoric as justification for their crimes, are “a living embodiment of… vitriolic,
vituperative verbiage” that consistently floods the airwaves, internet, and national media
across the nation. The undercurrent of pathos-laden resentment, bitterness, shame, and
hatred toward the nonwhite scapegoats of national cultural, racial, and material decline
finds its incarnation in the Looks of these killers, and to a lesser degree in the stares and
glares received by African Americans and other people of color during everyday life. A
constant fixing of white eyes on those marked as a threat soon becomes a fixation that
turns into an obsession. Looks that kill are not, then, exceptional; they are made in the
U.S.A. It takes a second grand effort of media portrayals and coverage, social
commentary, and political moves to make these individuals’ acts seem exceptional and
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separate from the racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and classist elements of American life that
bubble just beneath its surface.
The “monsters” McVeigh, Roof, Stroman, Page, Roque and other white
supremacists thus demonstrate the hideous elements of a society that consistently
produces this figure, this array of monstrous Looks. McVeigh, for Dyson, “is the monster
created by the Frankensteins of white hatred. And there’s a great deal of shame in him
because he’s out of control and destroying his creators. In this regard, it’s crucial to
remember a salient fact: Frankenstein is not the name of the monster but the name of the
monster’s creator. The real terror, then, is the mechanisms of reproduction that sustain
and rearticulate ideologies of white supremacy, and that sanction the violent attack on
black and other minority identities.” 92 Like those characters in Ronald Milner’s play,
“The Monster” (1968), we might naively and indignantly ask each other, “how do they
make ‘em, create ‘em like that?! How can they keep coming off like that!?” to which
someone inevitably responds, “You know how… a few centuries of practice and all the
machinery set-up… turnin’ ‘em out like – like Mustangs and Coupe DeVille’s.” 93 These
“monsters” which are turned out by deep-abiding historical and cultural forces of the
nation are animated and excited by whiteness fantasized in the play as a woman to be
protected, groped, and eaten up: “Mygloriouswhitestuff! Myyumyumwhitestuff!
Goodwhitestuff! Marvelouswhitestuff!” 94 In looking at these so-called monsters, it is
easy to hide behind one’s own sense of goodness and self-righteousness and say, “Well,
at least I’m not like them; I don’t look at the world and other people like that.” Such an
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individualized and de-historicized view rarely leads to a change in one’s own life and a
collective struggle to change the policies, practices, and organization of society; rather, it
often leads to a complacent moral posturing distracted from the necessity of critically
looking at oneself, beyond appearances, and at how one benefits from past and current
social arrangements, content as it is to be critical and condemnatory of others. If we are
ever to label some killer a monster and avoid the trap of using this language to distance
their actions from our own and those of the larger dominant culture, we must recall that
we are the Frankensteins, the masterminds who imagined this creature and gathered the
materials for its self-construction and self-awakening. As long as “whitestuff” continues
to nourish the social beings of people as they seek more meaning, satisfaction, and
fulfillment in life, there will almost always be wickedness and violence against those who
threaten to spoil it. 95 But what is this “whitestuff,” and how does it relate to seeing,
especially in terms of Looks that kill?
White Eyes
Later in “Giving Whiteness a Black Eye,” Dyson explains that “when we talk
about whiteness in the context of race in America, we have to talk about whiteness as
identity, whiteness as ideology, and whiteness as institution.” 96 These three elements are
crucial in the makeup of what Milner portrays as “whitestuff,” but we also add that we
need to talk about whiteness as visuality, that is, as the many ways white people have
imagined, represented, and secured their white substance, their “whitestuff,” through
visual and perceptual means. First, however, Dyson explains that whiteness as identity is
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“the self-understanding, social practices, and group beliefs that articulate whiteness in
relationship to American race, especially in this case, to blackness.” 97 In addition,
whiteness “bears a particularly symbiotic relationship to redness and blackness” in that
“whiteness is called into existence as a response to the presence of redness and
blackness,” and, we should add, brownness. 98 He explains that, “Only when red and
black bodies – from colonial conquest and slavery on to the present – have existed on
American terrain has whiteness been constituted as an idea and an identity-based reality.
White people’s sense of themselves as being white is contingent on a negation of a
corollary redness and blackness, and… the assertion of that blackness as the basis of a
competing racial identity.” 99 White people only saw themselves as white in seeing
“others” as black, brown, or red; it was through the “blackening” of these others that eyes
painted themselves as white and regarded themselves as such. 100 The eyes of white
people painted themselves in white primarily by painting “others” in black. Further,
because white identities have mostly been developed “unconsciously” and “invisibly”
throughout American history, it is only recently that whiteness has “been constituted as a
trisected terrain of contestation: over ethnicity, over ethnocentrism, and over the way
groups manufacture and reproduce racial identity through individual selfunderstanding.” 101 But while whiteness as an identity was typically invisible to those who
benefited from the prevailing political, social, and economic arrangements of the nation
because it was normed so much that it ceased to stick out or bear on one’s conscious life,
black people have historically understood the meaning of whiteness. As Dyson says
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elsewhere, “for blacks, the meaning of whiteness was singularly oppressive. The varied
expressions of whiteness were viewed as the elaboration of a single plot: to contain,
control, and, at times, to destroy black identity.” 102 Interestingly, “for whites, their racial
identities were never as concretely evoked or sharply defined as when the meanings of
blackness spilled beyond their assigned limitations to challenge white authority.” 103 The
challenge of blackness sketched out the lineaments and counters of whiteness.
These white racial identities that were evoked or further defined when blackness
“spilled beyond,” however, were not evoked or defined solely in the abstract, in the realm
of pure thought, but also in white actions, gestures, and embodiment as black bodies
“spilled beyond” assigned limitations such as neighborhoods and social roles. We should
not forget that identities are forged in bodies and in the produced spaces these bodies
weave in and out of. Whiteness as identity not only includes the self-understandings and
self-descriptions of white people in contrast to black and brown people, but also their
place-identities. The concept of place-identity, as described by social psychologists Kevin
Durrheim and John Dixon, acknowledges “how people invest everyday environments
with richly symbolic, aesthetic, moral, and above all, identity-relevant meanings. In other
words, questions of who we are are intimately related to questions of where we are.
Places are not only revelatory of identity but are also actively implicated in its
constitution and maintenance.” 104 Whiteness as identity has much to do with “territorial
entitlement” and labeling nonwhite others as “invasive” or “unmannerly” in relation to
both physical, interpersonal, and imagined spaces, such as neighborhoods or national
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borders. 105 It was the special role of the eyes of white people to watch and look out for
any encroachments on their “whitestuff”: whether turf, fields, neighborhoods, bodies,
fantasized national space, or social roles and positions.
As an ideology, whiteness is “the systematic reproduction of conceptions of
whiteness as domination” that is indivisible from the invention of America itself. 106 From
its founding, “the discursive defense and political logic of American democracy has
spawned white dominance as a foundational myth of American society – a myth whose
ideological strength was made all the more powerful because it was rendered
invisible.” 107 The ideas of white people defined “the intellectual and cultural status quo”
of the nation. 108 Ideas such as freedom, justice, and equality were articulated and
deployed within the “intraracial” struggle with Europe over the power of representation
and the representation of power, and not with a view to the black and red peoples of the
land. 109 For Dyson, “the white race [with] its cultural habits, political practices, religious
beliefs, and intellectual affinities” was “socially constructed as the foundation of
American democracy.” 110 With little to challenge their beliefs, white people could make
whiteness to be coextensive with, and inseparable from, Americanness. Indeed,
“whiteness and democracy were coextensive because they were mutually reinforcing
ideologies that under-girded the state” and which were “encoded in state discourse,” such
as the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 111 The “laws of the land,”
which reveal the eyes of the law, viewed the world and individuals within it from the
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perspective of the eyes of white people and their representative lawmakers. The eyes of
the law were white. These laws, according to Dyson, “eroded the social stability of
African American people, first as slaves and then as subjugated victims of the state
through debt peonage, sharecropping, Jim Crow law, the assault on the welfare state, and
so on.” 112 Furthermore, “also written into the laws of the land was the explicit articulation
of black racial inferiority and the implicit assumption of white racial superiority.” 113 In
other words, the eyes of the law were also whiting eyes. Importantly,
These two poles [of black inferiority and white superiority] were reproduced
ideologically to justify white supremacy; the mutually reinforcing structures of
state-sponsored racial domination and the ideological expression of white racial
superiority solidified the power of white people, white perspectives, and white
practices. As a result, whiteness in its various expressions was made to appear
normative and natural, while other racial identities and ideologies were viewed as
deviant and unnatural. 114
Finally, Dyson speaks of whiteness as institution, by which he means those
institutions, such as homes, schools, governments, and churches, that “compose the
intellectual and ideological tablet on which has been inscribed the meanings of American
destiny.” 115 Giving the example of churches, Dyson notes that “while ostensibly free
from state rule, religious communities were not impervious to secular beliefs; the
theological discourse of many faiths actively enunciated the ideology of white
domination.” 116 Along with Manifest Destiny that “bled through” the theological
articulations of the churches, “the belief in blackness as an innately inferior identity
galvanized the missionary activities of most religious communities as they sought to
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contain and redeem the black slave’s transgressive body.” 117 In this way, “black identity
became the ontological template for the reproduction of discourses of racial primitivism
and savagery,” discourses repeated today not only in relation to African Americans, but
especially to Muslims and immigrants with the related labels of “terrorist,” “drug dealer,”
and “criminal.” 118 From this perspective, everyone placed in these categories need some
kind of salvation. On this point Dyson insightfully claims that, “the black body became a
contested landscape on which the torturous intersections of theology and ideology were
traced: it was at once the salvific focus of the white missionizing project and the foremost
example of what unchecked transgression could lead to.”119 Certainly whiting eyes
painted in “colors” that contained both positive and negative moral and theological
values. In seeing nonwhite “others” as dangerous, deviant, savage, or helplessly poor, a
trigger was pulled within the consciences of white people to act towards these racialized
others in two seemingly contradictory extremes: in paternalistic fashion, acting the part of
the savior and deriving moral and personal benefits from such help given to those “less
fortunate,” or in violent confrontation wherein the threat to white purity and Christian
morality must be eliminated. In both cases, distinct and inviolable human modes of being
were lost in the eyes of white people, and instead there existed a project to be managed,
an evil to be exorcised, an example to be made, or a danger to be removed.
Whiteness as institution thus points to those organizations formed with a view to
surveilling, controlling, and dealing with nonwhite people in the United States to secure
white property, space, values, and life, i.e. “whitestuff.” These institutions, such as law
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enforcement or real estate organizations, were created as much to display for the white
public the negative, moral dross of whiteness as they were to provide for “public” peace,
accommodations, and order. White (eye) power stigmatizes and marks those threats to the
racialized economic and social order to hold onto its own privileges and advantages.
Whiteness as eye power refers to those concrete policies, laws, and practices that attempt
to contain, control, “blacken,” or destroy “other” identities and bodies, however they be
articulated or enfleshed, so they do not rise and disturb the status quo as imagined,
represented, and (re)produced by white people. These “blackened” identities and bodies
are contained, controlled, or destroyed insofar as the eyes of white people have succeeded
in their desire to dictate the terms of appearing, presencing, and living for “their” others.
This dictation of the terms of visibility has occurred primarily through the power of
imagining, representing, and surveilling black, brown, and red bodies at both personal
and organizational levels: whiteness as visuality.
Visual culture scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff has recently spoken of visuality, as
distinct from mere vision, to understand social orderings of control through various forms
of imaging and imagining the world and others in the world, and the technological,
media, economic, political, and military apparatuses that increase surveillance over these
others. He refers to an early work in visual culture, Hal Foster’s Vision and Visuality
(1988), where vision refers to “the physical processes of sight” and visuality to a “social
fact” which itself could not be so easily separated from the former given the role of
society in eye production. 120 Mirzoeff quotes Foster to the effect that, “the difference
between the terms [vision and visuality] signals a difference within the visual… a
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difference, many differences, among how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to
see, and how we see this seeing or the unseen therein.” 121 Mirzoeff himself describes
visuality in several other ways: as “that authority to tell us to move on” and as “that
exclusive claim to be able to look.” 122 It is the power to say and enforce the saying,
“there’s nothing to see here.” 123 Yet for Mirzoeff, visuality is also “an old word for an old
project” that originally pointed to a specific “visualization of history,” progress, and
civilization that rendered other non-Western, emancipatory, or revolutionary ways of
being human as backward, primitive, uncivilized, barbarian, or savage. 124 As explained in
his article, “On Visuality,” Mirzoeff locates the origins of the term visuality in the work
of the Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle in his lectures On Heroes (1841). Carlyle,
himself “opposed to Chartism, panopticism and all the emancipatory movements that
stemmed from the French Revolution… imagined a moral imperialism led by great men
in a visualized narrative that came to have considerable resonance in the period.” 125 The
initial coining and use of the term visuality “emerged into Western discourse at a specific
and charged moment of modernity as a conservative critique of Enlightenment and its
emancipations.” 126
The Oxford English Dictionary entry for “visuality” includes four examples of the
word by Carlyle himself, and among the definitions given are “the state or quality of
being visual or visible to the mind,” “a mental picture or vision,” and “visual aspect or
representation; physical appearance.” 127 What Mirzoeff stresses is the importance of
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finding “a mode of thinking about visuality that incorporates its embodied dimension at
an individual and collective level, together with visuality as cultural and political
representation.” 128 To understand whiteness as visuality is to think of the many ways
white people have sought to impose their own mental visions of the world and other
groups of people on reality, and how the appearances of these others were made visible,
or represented, in the eyes and minds of white people. The question of visuality is
therefore a question of reality: how is reality to be “taken,” that is, seen, viewed,
apprehended, understood, and captured (both materially and perceptually)? Whiteness as
visuality claims that “reality,” that which is, is to be “taken” according to the desires,
values, aspirations, ends, and projections of white people and their ideas of life and
“civilization,” and all other takes on reality must conform to this vision of the world; it is
assumed to be the only “correct” vision.
Last, whiteness as visuality refers to those “great white hopes,” or white heroes,
who are seen as representative of, and embodying, (white) “American” values and whose
moral, political, or physical victories over nonwhite others become a cause of great
celebration and public acclaim. 129 These heroes of whiteness are cast in “a conservative
mode of anti-emancipation,” and are, to use the words of Carlyle, “flowing lightfountain[s]… of native original insight, of manhood and heroic nobleness; in whose
radiance all souls [read: white souls] feel that it is well with them.” 130 Whiteness as
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visuality taps into the nativist imagery from American history and views the American
story as one of white intellectual, cultural, spiritual, and physical superiority over
immigrants and other nonwhite and non-Christian groups of people. Its heroes are
specific individuals such as George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Daniel Boone, Davey
Crockett, James Bowie, Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, John
Wayne, George Wallace, Donald Trump, and often stereotypically represented groups
such as police officers, soldiers, and politicians of like persuasion. As Pam Morris noted
while speaking about 19th century literature, but which also applies to great white heroes,
“the hero embodies a specifically masculine national ideal; the virility of the hero holds at
bay threats of cultural effeminacy and racial degeneration.” 131 In terms of visuality,
whiteness is the portrayal and memorial of American values and its heroes in masculinist
and violent forms that keep the forces of darkness and evil from destroying the nation.
Their violence is redemptive, and their masculinity is salvific. Whiteness cannot be
understood, at least in this country, without understanding the contestations over, and
representations of, Americanness and manliness, especially in its relation to military
actions overseas and policing operations at home.
Racializing Eyes
In terms of racialization, it should be clear by now how social meanings, values,
and representations shape our perceptions of others, and vice versa. Social constructions
such as race get wired into our visual circuitry and we see and experience others, and
ourselves, differently as a result. 132 Theologian Mayra Rivera insightfully explains that,
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in looking, “the perceived data itself is affected by the sedimentation of social
knowledge. Once race becomes encoded as a set of visible differences, it works tacitly
through perception. This means that my seeing is colored by racialization, regardless of
whether or not I think there is a biological link between phenotype and behavior or
believe in the characteristics attributed to a given ‘race.’” 133 Even more, “racialization
works in and through practices and habits of perception. ‘Gazing’ is performative. The
effects of the racializing gaze accumulate, shaping subsequent perception, which in turn
impacts the levels of surveillance to which racialized bodies are exposed, the
punishments imposed on them, and so on.” 134 Looks that kill could come in a white union
blocking the entry of perceived nonwhite others, racist media coverage, the personal
prejudices and actions of a mayor, or a Supreme Court decision like United States v.
Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) which ruled that “Hindus” (Indians) were not white and
therefore could not be naturalized as U.S. citizens. In all these cases and in many more,
the views of white people shaped the social and political landscape, as well as the bodies
therein.
Vision and visuality, then, are central components in the construction, use, and
reproduction of race and racism; this is precisely why we can talk about a racializing eye.
“Race,” according to W. T. J. Mitchell, “is something we see through, like a frame, a
window, a screen, or a lens, rather than something we look at. It is a repertoire of
cognitive and conceptual filters through which forms of human otherness are
mediated.” 135 We emphasize racializing eyes rather than frames or windows to highlight
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how the socially-constructed medium of race is wired into the biological and neurological
circuitry of our eyes and brains; embodied modes of seeing are both racialized and
racializing. As such, race is “both an illusion and a reality… a vehicle for both fantasy
and reality.” 136 It is “a reality that is constructed out of the Symbolic and the Imaginary—
that is, out of words and images, the sayable and seeable, discourse and concrete things,
spaces and institutions, prohibitions and taboos, on the one hand, and sensuous
experience on the other.” 137 Racializing eyes are used to makes sense of, control,
exclude, or defeat those thought and sensed to be “other.” And as Mitchell explains,
“Anyone, it seems, is now a candidate for racialization—that is, for characterization as a
group whose bodies, psyches, and bloodlines are seen as inimical to the ‘real America’
that is routinely invoked” in mainstream political debate. 138 Those in the racializing eye’s
line of sight includes African Americans, Arabs, Muslims, immigrants, terrorists, “thirdworld-looking-people,” and Hispanics or Latinxs, those who have been constantly
“blackened” in contemporary social and political life. 139 The racializing eye blackens
others, and in doing so it reveals itself as a whiting eye, an eye that moves its carrier to
see themselves as whiter, purer, nobler, truer, prettier, and better than “them.” This
dynamic is at work in various forms of Looks that kill. In the next chapter we will expand
on whiteness as visuality and give a broader picture of our power in looking by exploring
human eyes on the personal and the social, the psychological and the world historical.
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Chapter 2: Eyeballing the Other
Some view our sable race with scornful eye, / ‘Their color is a diabolic die.’140
“Man cannot express that which does not exist – either in the forms of dreams, ideas or
realities – in his environment. Neither his thoughts nor his feelings, his sensibility nor his
intellect are fixed, innate qualities. They are processes which arise out of the
interpenetration of human instinct with environment, through the process called
experience; each changing and being changed by the other.” 141
“Thirteen lavatories / At Notting Hill Gate Underground / Thirteen English gentlemen
zip their trousers down: / But they cannot straightly pee / For eyeballing me!” 142

From the beginning humans have recognized the power in looking. In the realm of
interpersonal relations, the looks we give each other communicate a tremendous variety
of meanings. Looks can rebuke, warn, caress, intimidate, welcome, and perform a host of
other things. We speak of being shot a look or a glance, emphasizing the directness and
force with which someone seeks to communicate something to us. Kids almost
immediately recognize the look from their parents when they’re doing something they
shouldn’t be doing. We sometimes speak of someone giving us a look that was strange,
undecipherable, and which gave us a weird feeling. We speak of an arresting look that
stops us dead in our tracks. Looks can also communicate intense animosity and
resentment. Consider this Israeli soldier’s description of Palestinian teenagers in the
occupied West Bank in 1988: “Their eyes show hatred – no doubt. And it is a deep
hatred. All the things they cannot say and all the things they feel inside of them, they put
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into their eyes and how they look at you.” 143 The solider, Lieut. Col. Yisrael, explained
that the battle he was involved in was “a battle of eyes – Israeli eyes against Palestinian
eyes, looks meant to kill against looks meant to intimidate, darting glances versus blank
stares, eyes begging for a little friendship meeting eyes round with fear.” 144 Commenting
on this “War of Eyes,” sociologist James C. Scott says that, “The feeling conveyed in this
case is crystal clear. Knowing they might be arrested, beaten, or shot for throwing rocks,
the teenagers substitute looks, which are far safer but which, nonetheless, give nearly
literal meaning to the expression, ‘If looks could kill…’” 145
We also regularly speak of the importance of looking someone in the eye when
we speak or listen to them, of making eye contact with our audience when giving a
speech, and of not seeing eye to eye with someone we disagree with. A look can
communicate esteem, but it can also make someone feel like they are only a few inches
tall. The plea, “Don’t look at me like that,” is said in a variety of contexts: from a child
who can’t bear the disciplining look of a parent or from someone who just wants to stay
friends with a wannabe lover. But the total absence of looks from others can make
someone feel both isolated and invisible. We speak of craving another’s attention,
revealing how we hunger for, and gain sustenance for our sense of self, through the
attentive looks of others. Another belief about eyes found in different human societies
throughout history is that of the evil eye, which is described by John H. Elliott as “a longstanding and widespread folk concept that some persons are enabled by nature to injure
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others, cause illness and loss, and destroy any person, animal or thing through a powerful
noxious glance emanating from the eye.” 146 Further, “this belief holds that the eye is an
active organ that emits destructive emanations charged by negative dispositions.” 147 The
rare English words “eyelight” and “eye-lamp” capture this sense of the outwardprojecting nature of the eye, for both words conceive of the eye as shining outward like a
light or a lamp. And so, in John Dunne’s poem, “The Ecstasy” (1633), we read about
lovers whose “eye-beams twisted, and did thread / Our eyes upon one double string.” 148
While modern science tells us it is light that comes into the eye and is processed by the
brain and that is how we see things, our lived experience with looking tells us that deeply
felt and sensed meaning happens in the comings and goings of looks. We hold eyeparleys with each other all the time.
Mirroring Eyes
The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty once exclaimed, “I live in the
facial expressions of the other,” by which he meant that his very self, his identity, his
sense of being alive and not merely existing, was dependent on the faces of others. 149
Building on this insight, psychoanalyst Kenneth Wright has made the center of his
academic and clinical work the view that the face of the other acts as a mirror for
ourselves in early development, out of which we develop our sense of self. His basic
claim is that there is in human development “the progressive structuring of a psychic
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space (the mind) by the internalization of a developing social reality.” 150 This is
particularly the case in the relationship between an infant and the mother in the first few
years of life. Wright’s early work, Vision and Separation (1991), convincingly
demonstrates that “[s]eeing is forming, and the idea that the self, as a conceivable entity,
is formed – or de-formed, or re-formed – at that place where the Other’s view meets with
the felt substance of the person.” 151 Self-consciousness, then, is actually shaped by the
look of the other and depends on the other’s look to move from an undifferentiated
consciousness to self-consciousness. For Wright, self-consciousness
… arises when the subject (the child) becomes aware of the looking of the object.
It is the space within which the person looks at himself through the eyes of the
Other. I often speak of consciousness as an interface, or inter-face. This is to
emphasize that both consciousness and self-consciousness, and the symbols that
mediate these experiences, only arise between faces, in other words, in an
interpersonal setting, within which relations between persons, and relations with
objects governed by those persons, are formative. 152
The necessity of the other for self-consciousness, for developing one’s sense of identity,
comes to the fore in what could be called the interfacial matrix of persons-incommunity. 153
In answering the question of how we come to “see” our own self, Wright
responds that “the answer will be through the eyes and looks of others, through the image
that they bestow upon us,” and that “the experiential underpinning of this mediation by
the Other remains essentially visual and that this fact is enshrined in language in the
notion of the Other’s view.” 154 Yet for Wright, who analyzes Jean-Paul Sartre’s analysis
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of the look found in L’Être et le Néant (1943), there are instances when the look of the
other is not empathic, loving, or nurturing, but domineering, absent, or cold. This latter
situation is for him associated with the experience of “being looked at,” whereby a person
is the object of an unloving, distant, and uncaring stare from the other. 155 In such a
“catastrophic looking which objectifies and destroys,” the other looks at another from a
distance “out of contact, far from any possibility of touch or closeness.” 156 Wright
continues to describe the self-alienating effects of this unjust look: “we could say that the
self that is looked at in this way now has an ‘outside’; but, of course, the trauma is to feel
that this ‘outside’ is not just a complement to the ‘inside’ and something that can be
integrated with it, but a usurper of it, so that the self becomes completely defined from
the outside.” 157 The other’s looking, when it does not recognize, affirm, or respect the
other qua other, can lead to the other’s alienation from themselves. This is precisely the
psychological impact of a Look that kills which Deborah Mathis described so well.
In extreme situations of domination or neglect, as in the history of racist, sexist,
anti-Semitic, and classist subordination of people in the United States, the other’s look
(or lack of a look) can become a “dislocation from oneself, from a center of subjective
experiencing to an external position, a locus of otherness, from where one would be
obliged to look back on this dreadful spectacle of ‘me.’ It was as though a new ‘object’
were to be forced on one’s awareness, the image of one’s self as one appeared to this
Other.” 158 Here Wright is describing how the other’s look can become internalized and
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lead to a sense of shame, embarrassment, invisibility, or even inferiority. 159 In contrast to
“the smiling mother,” the looking at which the other performs “reflects back an image of
the self” that is concerned solely with appearances, and which also “makes no approach
to touch, hold, or comfort.” 160 They are ultimately an “unempathic Other” who dishes out
a Look that kills. In face-to-face encounters such as this, “[t]he Other as object is like a
bomb – he can go off at any time, and the upsurge of his subjectivity will then destroy me
as subject.” 161
Mayra Rivera has also noted the importance of the other’s look in the formation
of the visual image or representation we have of ourselves, especially our bodies. In her
words, “acquiring a visual image of myself makes self-observation possible and thus a
new mode of relationship to myself, to my body. But self-contemplation is also
associated with the view that others have of my body, and thus a visual body image is
inherently linked to imagining how others see me. It makes possible the construction of
an ideal image of myself.” 162 What is vital to understand is the sense in both Wright and
Rivera that “perception of the world [and others] is not subsequent to self-awareness, but
is part of its development.” 163 The looks of others are the material out of which we
construct the image and sense of ourselves (self-images), and we develop and shape our
own looks as we present ourselves before the looks of others (self-imaging). Initially, at
the micro level, it is the mother, father, caregivers, and families who act as this looking
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and mirroring other out of which we develop a sense of self and a self-image. Later, at
the mezzo level, our neighborhoods, friends, and other local groups provide the looks;
and finally, at the macro level, organizations and structures of society provide us with the
looks through which, ideally, we can come to see, know, and experiences ourselves as
individuals and communities.
In American racism, the history of white (eye) power in the United States
comprises various attempts to force different images and values onto the bodies of people
of color, images and values created by white minds and imaginations, and to make it so
these images and values were the only viable and acceptable ones that would be received
and interacted with in public. Exceptions existed but even the exceptions depended to a
large extent on the goodwill of the white people in power. Perhaps no writer has
articulated the connection between mirroring and racism better than James Baldwin, who
in several essays refers explicitly to the mirror in terms of the role of the other in selfimaging and self-understanding. For Baldwin, “we all exist… in the eye of the beholder.
We all react to and, to whatever extent, become what that eye sees. This judgment begins
in the eyes of one’s parents (the crucial, the definitive, the all-but-everlasting judgment),
and so we move, in the vast and claustrophobic gallery of Others, on up or down the line,
to the eye of one’s enemy or one’s friend or one’s lover.” 164 Indeed “it is virtually
impossible to trust one’s human value without the collaboration or corroboration of that
eye – which is to say that no one can live without it.” 165 The looks of others, their eyes,
give us a sense of our own value, of our humanity; they collaborate and corroborate an
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ongoing process of self-revelation. As Michael Eric Dyson says, “There’s a relationship
between ethnography and epiphany, between self-revelation and the excavation of the
other.” 166 Looks, however, can also harm our sense of value and trust in ourselves and
others, or make us wonder what it is, precisely, that other people see in us they find so
offensive or disagreeable. Eyes can corroborate the ongoing process of self-revelation or
collaborate with the racist, sexist, and classist powers-that-be which say that no such
revelation is tolerated. What Baldwin constantly advocated and sought to do with his
writing and in how he lived, was to insist with other black men and women “that the
white man cease to regard him as an exotic rarity and recognize him as a human
being.” 167 Genuine recognition of others – which includes recognizing truths about the
past, about history; about the present, in the call to justice and responsibility; and about
the future, in terms of hope and life aspirations – leads to a greater recognition of oneself
and one’s own desires.
The Eyes of History
Most white Americans react defensively when questions about the lingering
effects of slavery, Jim Crow, and racialized economic and sexual subordination come up
in public life. These questions, as questions, are taken to be accusations; hence, the
defensiveness. Similar defensive statements can be heard in private conversations,
classroom discussions, and in various media venues. How can we address these attitudes
and the divergent interpretations of historical events and processes along with their
legacies? To extend the metaphor of mirroring, it is possible to say that history also
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serves as a mirror. Looking at the past, we are also looking at ourselves in relation to
others and at the present situations we find ourselves in. As Saidiya Hartman suggests, “If
slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an
antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because
black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic
that were entrenched centuries ago.” 168 The pattern of speculation and valuation, which is
actually a devaluation, continues. Hartman calls the “skewed life chances, limited access
to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment” as “the
afterlife of slavery.” 169 And so we speak of the past, and as we speak of it, we keep an
eye on our present. Yet whose present are we speaking to? Is the present something we
can speak of as “ours”? Who is “we”? Whose reality does the past speak to, and what or
who from the past do we conjure up? Hartman continues that, “Every generation
confronts the task of choosing its past. Inheritances are chosen as much as they are passed
on. The past depends less on ‘what happened then’ than on the desires and discontents of
the present. Strivings and failures shape the stories we tell. What we recall has as much to
do with the terrible things we hope to avoid as with the good life for which we yearn.” 170
Eyes see, interpret, remember, and imagine personal and social worlds of both oppression
and liberation that trickle into our present motivations, desires, and actions.
By looking into the mirror of history, we can see that the mirroring process
between Europeans and those they encountered in Africa and the New World was both
fragmented and destructive; the reflections of themselves that the peoples of Africa and
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the Americas received from the looks of European explorers, traders, colonists, settlers,
and missionaries were often distorting. Eyepower has been around from the inception of
human culture, yet “white” eye power first trained itself on the “black” people of Africa
beginning in the 1400s. These European eyes were not only after wealth and trade routes,
but also in search of lost souls on which they might shed the light of Christianity. Fabien
Eboussi Boulaga, a philosopher and theologian from Cameroon, argues that how
European Christians viewed Africans was a major factor in the latter’s experience of selfalienation. He would affirm, with Kenneth Wright, that “the self that we know, and love
or hate, is the self that is reflected back to us by the mirror of the Other – whether that
reflection is a real or imagined image.” 171 For Boulaga, the African “discovers himself
and recovers after being ‘discovered’ by the imperialist and ethnological view.” 172
According to him, there was a moment “when the boundary was opened between our life
as perceived by ourselves and the same life as exposed to different views and outside
looks,” when Africans discovered themselves “as an Other for Others.” 173 As Shannon
Sullivan argues, “The white man’s arrival in a black world did not merely shatter black
people’s horizons in the sense of their futures; it also shattered their horizons that are
their bodies. Or more accurately: black people’s future horizons were shattered precisely
in and through the shattering of their bodily horizons.” 174 To generalize, the other’s view
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of the African, and later the African American, was objectifying, cold, distant, lacking
empathy, suspicious, demeaning, and holding a superior attitude. Christian missionaries
and laypeople failed to see the other as they were, instead imposing their own categories
of being onto them. They could not see past their own anthropological and theological
constructions which placed the African in the region of the uncivilized, the possessed, the
pagan, the savage, the child, or in some other not-yet-and-therefore-sub-Christian
category.
Despite this the missionary could experience a certain deconstruction and
reconstruction of who they were in their personal encounter with the African other.
Boulaga notes how such an encounter might force someone to combine an internal
perception of oneself with an external view of the self “that tends to function as a
mirror.” 175 In a genuine, mutual intercommunicative experience, certain operations may
exist and thrive which allow “the transition from the self to the other and the other way
round, ‘the communication of idioms,’ that may become a way of life expressing itself in
speech or in freedom.” 176 Such an intercommunication of selves-in-community begins
with a face-to-face encounter wherein one truly sees the other, and sees oneself through
the eyes of the other in a mutually affirming and respectful way. “Personal being,” says
Boulaga, “is existence in the form of word, that is, it is arrival at self-fulfillment not only
in presence to self, but in being in a being-other: in receiving self from the other.”177 The
self is not a given already had, but a gift to be received from others. Yet there was little
room for hospitality in the souls and eyes of white people, nor was there any genuine
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sense they needed to go out and meet the other on their own terms and in their own
words. What gifts could they possibly receive from these “others” when they already felt
gifted with the fullness of being?
Conquering Eyes
Philosopher Enrique Dussel has also studied the first encounters between
Europeans and the indigenous peoples of Africa and the Americas in terms of the theme
of discovery. In his book, The Invention of the Americas, Dussel claims that
The birthdate of modernity is 1492, even though its gestation, like that of the
fetus, required a period of intrauterine growth. Whereas modernity gestated in the
free, creative medieval European cities, it came to birth in Europe’s confrontation
with the Other. By controlling, conquering, and violating the Other, Europe
defined itself as discoverer, conquistador, and colonizer of an alterity likewise
constitutive of modernity. Europe never discovered (des-cubierto) this Other as
Other but covered over (encubierto) the Other as part of the Same: i.e., Europe. 178
Europeans only saw the indigenous other in terms of the categories of the developing
European world system in its religious, cultural, and economic forms. Their seeing
covered over, rather than uncovered, the persons and places they visited. The revelation
of the “other” was only the revelation of themselves in different guise.
Characteristic of this European eye-set are the words of the philosopher Georg
Hegel, who considered a black person as “a human being in the rough,” and Africa as
“something isolated and lacking in history, submerged completely in the natural spirit,
and mentionable only as the threshold of universal history.” 179 It was only the light of
Christianity, of revelation, and of civilization that could pierce the darkness of evil, sin,
and primitiveness, putting Africa on the right track in this universal history identified
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with Euro-American ideals. As Dussel relates, “the Europeans (and the English in
particular) portrayed themselves as ‘the missionaries of civilization to all the world,’
especially to the ‘barbarian peoples.’” 180 The most developed form of this view of Africa
as the dark continent and Euro-American civilization as light we have come across is the
illustrated book Heroes of the Dark Continent (1890), in which J. W. Buel tells the stories
of David Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, and other white “heroes” who
courageously face the heart of darkness and provided Europeans with ample material for
self-construction and self-understanding through their own examples and its negation:
Africa and the African. The opening paragraph reveals the extent to which white people
exoticized and projected a negative of themselves onto the place and its peoples:
Religion and science, mystery and fact, ambition and disappointment, grandeur
and ruin – all the antitheses of human aspiration and realization – find remarkable
example in the history of that wondrous country surnamed the DARK
CONTINENT. Mystery has, for centuries, hung above it like a gruesome pall, the
wild riot of a boundless superstition has hovered over its strange people until the
world has whispered the very name with a feeling of dread and gives to it that
regard which attaches only to ghostly and ghastly things of distempered fancy.
But dark as has been the mantle of dread which enveloped her during the long
centuries, Africa has at least been revealed, through the search-light of bold
exploration, and now meets our scrutiny with the interest of a newly discovered
world. 181
Europeans and Americans continually projected onto this continent their worst visions
and fears: Africa the land of superstitions, dread, and darkness; shrouded in death and
evil forces; a gruesome and strange place now being penetrated by the search-light of
exploring eyes, allowing Euro-American peoples to scrutinize the land and its inhabitants
in a new way.
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This scrutiny, this looking, would give distorting images back to Africans
themselves. For white Europeans and Americans, however, to whisper the word “Africa”
was enough to conjure up, in magical fashion, the shadow-side of European civilization.
The role of “throwing shade” on Africa was primarily self-revelatory, to delineate and
cast light on white Euro-Americanness and what it is and what it values. Richard Wright
described the relationship between “modern man” and Africa in mirror terms:
One does not react to Africa as Africa is, and this is because so few can react to
life as life is. One reacts to Africa as one is, as one lives; one’s reaction to Africa
is one’s life, one’s ultimate sense of things. Africa is a vast, dingy mirror and
what modern man sees in that mirror he hates and wants to destroy. He thinks,
when looking into that mirror, that he is looking at black people who are inferior,
but, really, he is looking at himself and, unless he possesses a superb knowledge
of himself, his first impulse to vindicate himself is to smash this horrible image of
himself which his own soul projects out upon this Africa. 182
The self-image of white Europeans and Americans was thus constructed in part out of the
image they had made of others, whether peoples of Africa, Asia, or the Americas. Dussel
is clear that “the modern ego was born in its self-constitution over against regions it
dominated,” those regions where Europeans subjected the “Other” to the “Same.” 183 In
this image-making, “Europe constituted other cultures, worlds, and persons as ob-jects, as
what was thrown (arrojado/jacere) before (ob/ante) their eyes. Europe claimed falsely
that the covered one (el cubierto) had been dis-covered (des-cubierto).” 184 These worlds,
considered immature, primitive, and lacking in cultivation, religion, and civilization,
could be taken and subsumed into the European circulation of products and ideas without
many scruples of conscience.
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Dussel further explains that territorial expansion went with control of “the bodies
of the inhabitants, since they needed to be pacified, as it was customary to say in that
epoch.” 185 The person-to-person relationship mirrored the person-to-nature relationship
of plucking, taking, and subduing. Not surprisingly, Europeans depicted, spoke of, and
acted toward newly-explored land as if it were a female virgin waiting to be seduced and
plucked. Consider the words of explorer Lawrence Kemys in speaking of Guiana: “Here
whole shires of fruitful rich grounds, lying now waste for want of people, do prostitute
themselves unto us like a fair and beautiful woman, in the pride and flower of desired
years.” 186 Or, consider the emblematic drawing of Johannes Stradanus, also known as Jan
van der Straet (c. 1575), where lady “America” is depicted as naked and awaiting the
“spearing and plowing” of a worthy man, in this case Amerigo Vespucci. As Margarita
Zamora describes the scene, “‘America’ offers him her unclothed and recumbent body;
her empty hands show she has nothing else to offer. He reciprocates, erect and in full
armor, with his knowledge and his faith.” 187 Terrified Spanish men who refused to fight
for the empire and who thus failed to play the man “were tagged as effeminate and
violently dispatched.” 188 This virgin territory would be penetrated with masculinist desire
and violence, and the “rape” of the land would parallel the rape and sexual exploitation of
native women. Looks of desire shot out onto different objects, whether land, fruits,
natural resources like gold and silver, or even women. In the words of Peter Mason,
America was a male “voyeur’s paradise.” 189 Dussel would add that, “the modern ego of
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the conquistador reveals itself as also a phallic ego… In satisfying a frequently sadistic
voluptuousness, Spaniards vented their purely masculine libido through the erotic
subjugation of the Other as Indian woman.” 190 The colonization of land and people meant
also the colonization of their bodies. As Ghassan Hage notes, in general, “the thriving of
the human and the thriving of the colonist happens through extractions from nature and
the life-world of the colonized. Racial domination, then, resembles the process of
dominating natural otherness.” 191 The body of the woman would serve as a place to
satisfy the sexual desire of the Euro-American man, and the body of the man would
involuntarily serve the new, developing economy. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres writes,
“Coloniality is an order of things that put people of color under the murderous and rapist
sight of a vigilant ego. And the primary targets of rape are women. But men of color are
also seen through these lenses.” 192
In this order of coloniality, “the same,” says Dussel, “violently reduces the Other
to itself through the violent process of conquest. The Other… is denied as Other and is
obliged, subsumed, alienated, and incorporated into the dominating totality like a thing or
an instrument. This oppressed Other either is interned (encomendado) on a plantation or
hired as salaried labor on estates (haciendas) or, if an African slave, regimented into
factories turning out sugar or other tropical products.”193 The conquistador, as
representative of the European explorer and conqueror, “constitutes and extends his own
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subjectivity through his praxis.” 194 He was “the first modern, active, practical human
being to impose his violent individuality on the Other.” 195 It should be stressed that these
personal, material, and collective practices resulted from a certain view of the land and
the people of the land. This view of the land and its people included practices of
mapmaking through which Europeans could visualize and efficiently implement their
plans for production and profit, but also personal looks that dominated just the same. 196
Interestingly, Dussel notes that when Hernando Cortez first met the Mayan leader
Moctezuma it was a rule that “no one was permitted to look into [his] face.” 197 As Dussel
describes, “everyone else stared at the earth in front of the emperor. The ‘I-conqueror’
[Cortez] was the first ever with the freedom to look him in the face.” 198 Embedded in
Cortez’s act of looking was the notion that Europeans as explorers and conquerors would
look at whatever and whoever they desired and back such looking up with force. Thus
these early European adventurers would inaugurate not only what would soon become
known as colonialism, “a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a
nation or a people rests on the power of another nation,” but a coloniality of being and
especially of the visible. 199 This coloniality of the visible, of how the world and people
should be “taken,” would develop along “two axes of power”; first, “the codification of
the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of ‘race,’” and “the
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constitution of a new structure of control of labor and its resources.” 200 Conquering eyes
would dramatically shape the inner and outer worlds of the conquered.
Genres of Seeing – “Inner Eyes”
The work of Sylvia Wynter also demonstrates how a unique view of the world
and of other people categorized as different has been conceptually and linguistically
processed by Europeans at different points in their history. Wynter argues that Europeans
justified their exploratory and colonial conquests by identifying universal human nature
with themselves and by relegating non-Europeans to not-quite-human or non-human
status. To justify their exploitation, Europeans’ perceptions of others around the globe
were continually shaped to occlude the diverse modes of being human they encountered.
Wynter herself claims that “the eye is not only a physiological organ which looks at me;
it is the other person as consciousness. Thus, the look of the Other includes all classes of
judgements and valuations. To be seen by the Other means to apprehend oneself as an
unknown object of unforeseen configurations.” 201 Here she points to the dynamic reality
of how our self-understanding and self-imaging is constructed out of the eyes of others
and the looks they give to us.
Throughout her work Wynter is concerned to understand “the inner eye with
which Europe would look through its physical eyes upon the reality of the Others,”
borrowing the language of Ralph Ellison. 202 Pointing out one configuration of how
Europe looked at “their others,” Wynter notes that “through the institution of the
latifundium in the Iberian Peninsula, and the plantation in the New World, the black
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entered the Western architecture of signs conjoined as fact and fiction – black slave. He
was black (negro) because he was naturally a slave (esclavo); he was a slave (esclavo)
because he was naturally black (negro). To be a Negro was to be a slave.” 203 Like Dussel,
Wynter argues that “all non-Christian peoples and cultures became perceivable only in
terms of their usefulness to the European states in securing their this-worldly goal of
power and wealth.” 204 This perception of others, and therefore of themselves, by white
Europeans and later Americans would undergo shifts throughout history, and Wynter is
keen to track these changes. The question of who would fill the “matrix slot of otherness”
for European self-understanding and self-definition would be answered at first in
religious terms, and later on in terms of “race,” which was the “non-supernatural but no
less extrahuman ground… of the answer that the secularlizing West would now give to
the… question as to the who, and the what we are.” 205 Europeans who initially thought,
described, and performed humanness in primarily religious terms and categories later did
the same in secular, biological, economic, and racialized terms. As one commentator
notes of Wynter’s project: “while she is concerned to anchor the human and its projects
in its material (social and bodily) conditions, her concern is to track the ‘codes’ and
‘genres’ in terms of which the understanding (including self-understanding) is
constituted. It is not the body’s materiality itself that interests her so much as the
ideological hegemonies – race principal among them – that come to be imprinted on it in
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such a way that we live their inscriptions as the historically varying modes of our
truth.”206
The major argument that Wynter makes is that Europeans’ “inner eyes,” defined
both as an order of consciousness and mode of perception, could not tolerate seeing
themselves relativized by other rational humans. Europeans regarded themselves as the
Absolute Man/Being, possessing humanness and be-ing to the full. To avoid being
relativized by their new encounters with others, Europeans saw others “as less, not-quite
humans, and, as such, logically classifiable, and institutionalized, as ‘Indians’ and
‘Negroes.’” 207 As Katherine McKittrick comments, “the figure of Man – in Wynter’s
formulations – is the measuring stick through which all other forms of being are
measured.” 208 These “all other forms of being,” such as indigenous peoples of the New
World and Africa, had forms of life and modes of being human seen by Europeans as
“the irrational Lack of their own” or, later, as lower on the evolutionary ladder. Such a
Lack of Europeanness meant simultaneously a lack of humanness, of rationality, of
civilization, of cultural refinement, of redemption, of light, and other associated realities.
For when a European or American mode of being human is instituted and performed as
“the only, universally applicable mode of being human,” it remains impossible to imagine
an “other,” one outside this domain, who can also lay claim to full recognition as human;
something would always lack.
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The shifts in the genres of being human, of the experience of what it is like to be
human, represent what Wynter calls a “politics of being,” that is, “a politics that is
everywhere fought over what is to be the descriptive statement, the governing sociogenic
principle, instituting of each genre of the human.” 209 Such a governing sociogenic
principle allows people to see and experience themselves as having a certain ontological
fullness, a substance of humanness, or, of being human, in distinction to other modes or
forms of life. For Wynter, what remains necessary is a recognition, not only of those
fitted into the matrix slot of otherness, but of ourselves as a “population, who, as in the
case of all other genre-specific human populations, inscript and auto-institute ourselves as
human through symbolic, representational processes that have, hitherto, included those
mechanisms of occultation by means of which we have been able to make opaque to
ourselves the fact that we so do.”210 This leads us from ontogeny to sociogeny, from a
biologically-reproduced eye to a socially-produced eye, which are inseparable even as
they differ.
Sociogenic Eyes
In brief, the sociogenic principle points to how various senses of self in relation to
others gets imposed or inscribed onto the brains and consciousness of individuals within
each cultural system. The principle points to a transcultural constant that refers to the
culturally programmed rather than genetically articulated (ontogeny) sense of self. It
highlights the cultural-specific governing code of what it means and feels like to be
human: “how we identify ourselves… how we subjectively experience ourselves as
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human, is everywhere discursively and institutionally constructed.” 211 Sociogeny calls
into question a “purely biological definition of what it is to be, and therefore of what it is
like to be, human.” 212 In filling out the meaning of sociogeny, Wynter taps into the work
of Frantz Fanon. In Fanon’s well-known chapter on “L’Experience Vécue Du Noir” in
Black Skin, White Masks (1952), sociogeny is the word he uses to explain the always
socialized nature of our modes of being human and our experiences of what it is like to
be human. For Fanon, sociogeny occurs through “a constellation of postulates, a series of
propositions that slowly and subtly, with the help of books, newspapers, schools and their
texts, advertisements, films, radio, penetrate an individual – constituting the world-view
of the group to which one belongs.” 213 A purely ontogenic conception of the human
would represent the species “as existing in a purely continuist relation with organic life,
defining it on the model of a natural organism.” 214 Wynter states elsewhere that “in place
of the genetic programs that regulate the behaviors of all organic species, we developed
our own culture-specific programs by which our human behaviors – cognizing, affective,
and actional – came to be rule-governed and lawfully regulated.” 215 The sociogenic
principle gets at how social meanings and “looks” transform matter, the basic neural and
other physiological processes that make up our experiencing of the self. As Wynter
argues, “the transformation of subjective experience, is, in the case of human, culturally
and thereby, socio-situationally determined, with these determinations in turn, serving to

211

See Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic,” footnote 14.
Sylvia Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, of ‘Identity’ and
What it’s Like to be ‘Black,’” in National Identities and Sociopolitical Changes in Latin America, ed. Mercedes DuránCogan and Antonio Gόmez-Moriana (New York: Routledge, 2001), 31.
213
Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic,” 32. See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann
(London: Pluto Press, 2008), 118.
214
Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic,” 35.
215
Wynter, “1492,” 7.
212

68
activate their physicalistic correlates. In consequence, if the mind is what the brain does,
what the brain does, is itself culturally determined through the mediation of the socialized
sense of self, as well of the ‘social’ situation in which this self is placed.” 216 Here Wynter
touches upon how the experiences of ourselves are formed by the social imaginations,
descriptive statements, representations, valuations, looks, and actions of others in terms
of what it is like to be human. We sense our being and self in and through the “takes” that
others have of us; reality, in other words, is “a naturalized autopoietic social system.” 217
The prime example in Fanon’s work of the way social meanings and categories of
the other come to alter the subjective experience of this other is when Fanon himself
travels to France from Martinique and a little boy glances and points at him with the
words: “Look a nigger! Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up!” 218 Fanon realizes that he
no longer has the option, as in his native country, to behave like a “nigger” or not; in
these white eyes “he is a nigger.” The boy’s “cry and look fixes him in that subhuman
status” as “a chemical solution is fixed by a dye.” 219 The glances of white people,
epitomized in the little boy who clings to his mother in fear of Fanon, impose on him and
others ostensibly like him a certain sense of self originally foreign to his own sense of
self before he encountered the white glancers. The glance imposes a self from its own
imaginary, its own coding of the human, and this image of a “nigger” is put on Fanon
through a look and through words. The result is that his neural processes light up
differently in such a situation, and he is forced to make sense of himself in relation to
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such imposed meaning and objectification. The external image of his self is now a part of
his internal sense of self, even if in protest.
Fanon will later call this perceptual inscription of stereotypes and negative values
of some onto the skins of others as epidermalization. 220 His body and skin, and therefore
his sense of self in the world, are reified and objectified according to predetermined
meanings and associations. This process is so aggressive “that he is compelled to see
himself as he is seen by those ‘white’ eyes, which are the only ‘real,’ because the only
‘normal eyes.’” 221 Because of encountering the views of white others – their looks, their
words, their imaginaries, their performances – he experiences himself “through the
mediation of stereotyped concepts specific to a particular point of view and visual
phenomenology, in other words not as he is, but as he must be for a particular
viewpoint.” 222 As to the origins of this white viewpoint, or eye-set, that sees the “Negro”
as animal, bad, ugly, cannibal, etc., Wynter dives into her history of the hegemonic
genres of being human in European and American history. These eye-sets, or inner eyes,
produced the “corporeal malediction” that was “to be placed upon all peoples of African
hereditary descent, as the ostensibly non-evolved dysselected and therefore ‘racially
inferior’ Other to the true human, Man.”223 As Fanon writes about the work that white
eyes have done in his own personal history, “I am being dissected under white eyes, the
only real eyes. I am fixed. Having adjusted their microtomes, they objectively cut away
slices of my reality. I am laid bare. I feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new
man who has come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why it’s a Negro!” 224 The
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atrocious character and amount of personal and social eyepower sufficient to produce
such a subjective experience in someone is staggering. Further, this eyepower, at least as
subjectively experienced by Fanon, is like that of a microtome, an instrument
“resembling tiny shears” that is itself used to cut thin slices of material, and which allows
for preparing samples for observation. Under these microtomes (which are white eyes),
Fanon is just another microdissected and sculpted sample of “Negro.”
So when we talk about human eyes, we cannot simply talk about them as things or
organs and what these organs do and how they process light and are connected to the
neural circuits of the brain, but we also have to talk about what eyes do in the realm of
human experience, and how the eye’s doings are in turn shaped by economic practices,
personal encounters, social representations and ideologies, linguistic norms, and other
forms of meaning. Put simply, the eye is not simply ontogenically formed, but
sociogenically produced to see to the maintenance of one’s own sense of self and view of
reality. Therefore, our eyes are both the products and producers of socio-visual realities
that give human life meaning; we are both receivers and transmitters of culturallyspecific visions of what it is like (or not like) to be “fully” human. We have also seen
how white Europeans and Americans throughout history have chiseled negative
racialized meanings and images onto the bodies of “others” and the spaces in which they
appeared which served two primary purposes: 1) to heighten the experience or sense of
themselves as human, Christian, saved, pure, etc. (their “whiteself”), and 2) to justify and
secure their appropriation of land, people, and resources (their “whitestuff”). These white
eyes both crafted “others” and were crafty towards them; they have also had the
technological, political, and social power to make sure it was their eye work that would
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be legitimate, ensured, and reproduced in society. Because there is such power in the
sociogenic eye, the next chapter is concerned with teasing out an understanding of power
that considers both its embodied and organizational aspects.
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Chapter 3: Organized Eyepower
“I am Narcissus, and what I want to see in the eyes of others is a reflection that pleases
me.” 225
“The thing to do is to get organized; keep separated and you will be exploited, you will
be robbed, you will be killed. Get organized, and you will compel the world to respect
you. If the world fails to give you consideration, because you are black men, because you
are Negroes, four hundred millions of you shall, through organization, shake the pillars
of the universe and bring down creation, even as Samson brought down the temple upon
his head and upon the heads of the Philistines.” 226
Men drunk with power can no longer see what reality really is. 227

What kind of power is white (eye) power? In this chapter we seek to answer this
basic question through a reading of 20th century German Catholic theologian Karl
Rahner’s essay, “The Theology of Power” (1960), his theology of concupiscence, and the
metaphoric nature of anthropomorphic thinking. The rationale for focusing on Rahner’s
work as a theologian is to ensure that spiritual matters, such as faith, hope, and love, are
factored into this account of power with its own base in material realities and practices.
Thus, to say that power is the ability to take, and the actual taking of, matter/s into one’s
own hand to secure one’s substance, as noted in the Introduction, it must be emphasized
that sometimes the matter at hand can be spiritual. This should not be overlooked. It is
often said that love is the most powerful force in the world, and we want to ensure that
our focus on power in terms of politics, social organizations, and economic systems does
not lose sight of this truth that admittedly too often becomes a cliché. Yet there is also a
danger in theological discourse to understand power in such an overly spiritualized way it
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remains a world apart, powerless to change the world. We can hope to avoid this danger
by uniting the theological with the anthropological – a key feature of Rahner’s overall
approach – following the basic movement of the Incarnation, which is the Christian belief
that God took up human flesh in Jesus the Christ. Having looked at power from a
theological starting point, we can then look at power from an anthropological starting
point, especially at the anthropomorophic conceptual metaphors we use to talk about,
imagine, and act within and through organizations such as the state.
The Force of Factoring Eyes
Karl Rahner begins his theology of power with the Christian creed where God is
called the “almighty.” From this foundation Rahner reasons that the forms of power we
encounter in the world come from God and testify to God’s own power, who is power “in
a super-eminent sense.” 228 God does not simply have power as an attribute or a
possession, but is power in a superlative, infinite sense. Having grounded all power in
God, Rahner argues that power can be defined in a vague and general sense as “a certain
self-assertion and resistance proper to a given being and hence as its innate possibility of
acting spontaneously, without the previous consent of another, to interfere with and
change the actual constitution of that other.”229 Power, then, is exercised in relation to an
“other,” and it is both the ability and freedom to act. Rahner continues by ordering
various forms of power according to the “degrees of analogy of the power of beings in
general.” 230 For example, in his view, “humility understood as the courage to do what is
purely moral though apparently powerless, is on a higher degree of being, of a higher
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moral and ontological rank than for instance the power due to the possession of the
atomic bomb.” 231 Also, love as a real thing and as a potent spiritual power, which is
expressed in the realm of human relationships and in the enactment of justice, is more
powerful than the power of a gun to kill, even though in a tough pinch the opposite would
seem to be the case.
Because of these various ontological ranks of the forms of power and the many
questions associated with them, Rahner focuses his study on one kind of power, namely,
force. Force is defined as using physical means, “which do not address themselves to the
insight and freedom of the other,” to act on the other and change it without its previous
consent.232 Such exercise of power as physical or brute force limits the freedom of the
other and disregards the decisions or consent of the other in order to “force facts into their
existence.” 233 For Rahner, power in terms of brute force ought never to have existed.
Instead, were it not for sin, humans as individuals and as communities would exist in a
state of integrity, free from guilt and concupiscence, defined in Catholic teaching as the
inclination to sin or “the tinder of sin” (fomitem) that remains in humans because of their
primordial disobedience to God.234 Concupiscence is thus central to Rahner’s take on
power as force.
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Concupiscence, Rahner claims, points to the reality within human experience
where we find ourselves “unable to integrate fully and clearly the whole reality of [our]
existence, in all its dimensions, into the decision of [our] freedom.” 235 Instead, we wrestle
with a sharp split between what we desire to be, our ideal, and what we really are, our
current reality. In our free decisions we never “fully capture” and “master” ourselves;
there is always something missing, out of joint, left out, or looming on the horizon. 236 We
passionately desire to integrate all the disparate elements of life into a manageable whole
we can watch over and control but find ourselves unable to do so. Why? A partial answer
lies in our being “continually being affected by powers and forces from outside
[ourselves]” which are not in accordance with our free decision and so make us
“suffer.” 237 Concupiscence “is not simply something permanently the same.” 238 Instead,
concupiscence is itself “a changing historical entity,” and as such it must be “gradually
overcome” by means of “spirit, love, and grace.” 239 For Rahner, those Christians who
deny the power of love, truth, courage, and humility, and so fail to fight against power
exercised as brute force should be declared a “secret heretic who had fallen away from
the truth of Christianity, since he would refuse to admit that this force stems from sin and
should therefore be conquered with it.” 240 Even though power as force may be necessary
in a world of sin, error, and blindness and can in this sense be viewed as “natural,” all
steps must be taken to overcome this form of power with more humane, spiritual, and
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moral expressions of power. 241 Obviously this overcoming of power as brute force with
weightier and nobler forms of power has not been characteristic of the American nation, a
nation built on brute force in war and the enslavement and displacement of populations of
people, and on the power of the bomb and various arms racing policies and practices. The
pithy words of the Trappist monk Thomas Merton speak volumes: “Our city is frankly
built on concupiscentia.” 242
Rahner next explains that the space or sphere within which humans realize
themselves and the many possibilities available to them in freedom “is a space shared in
common by many.” 243 Because of this “one space of material being” wherein human
existence takes shape “as the interplay of persons,” the “very exercise of freedom… is at
once a restriction of the space of another’s freedom, essentially and inevitably.” 244
Rahner also notes in terms of human embodiment that “the bodily nature of [humans] and
its supporting environment are always involved in [their] free decisions, which is
therefore a physical act.” 245 When we make free decisions in this common environment,
we inevitably “impinge on the sphere of others, previous to their consent, because
physical space is strictly common to all.” 246 There is thus a metaphysical violence in
every free act of humans, and this is unavoidable due to the one shared material of
existence. Rahner explains more simply that when might, or force, is exercised in the
world, “something concrete and individual is given reality, without the previous consent
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of another person, in the sphere of his being.” 247 We have seen in the personal case of
Fanon how even “looking” can forcefully impinge on the spheres of others, on their selfunderstanding and embodied experiences. Such a recognition of the impact that one’s
free decisions and exercise of power has on the world and on the freedom spheres of
others is vital if power is to be wielded responsibly. 248 There always remains the
possibility of a “free agent who uses force” to spread themselves beyond themselves in a
limitless expansion, “because it takes place in the wholly universal and common and
unlimited medium of the material principle.” 249 In contrast to this activity of limitless
expansion of one’s scope of freedom and the parallel restricting of the freedom spheres of
others, the wielder of power in the world “should have canvassed those who were at its
mercy… [and] should have done his best for his part to eliminate the results of his power
on others.” 250 Put more succinctly, power should be “modified” and “absorbed” by
love. 251 Power, says Rahner, “should be used to bring about its own abrogation” and
“should be the agent of its own elimination,” though this ideal can only be approached
asymptotically. 252 However, when power is not used to eliminate itself, when instead
power becomes something “that tries to maintain itself definitively,” the true nature of sin
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is revealed: “the desire to be like God, the ‘no’ to service, the installation of self-will and
the finite as the absolute, power for power’s sake.” 253 Looks that kill are precisely this
“no” to service and a fleshing out of the “installation of self-will” for control, security,
and personal gain.
Rahner’s “Theology of Power” is significant because in it he connects power with
the theological notion of concupiscence. This connection needs to be made more explicit
and developed further. In a different essay Rahner claims that, in general, “the situation
entailed by the secular world is one of pluralism and ‘concupiscence.’” 254 This link
between pluralism in the world and concupiscence is also necessary, for white power is
often a reaction to the experienced pluralism in the world in terms of various modes of
being human, as we saw in the last chapter. But what exactly is the link between
pluralism and concupiscence? “Concupiscence,” Rahner explains, “implies an interior
pluralism within man at all levels of his being and in all his impulses, and that too a
pluralism of such a kind that it can never be totally or radically integrated into the single
decision of freedom (either for or against God).”255 This “inalienable state of
‘disintegration’” appears at all levels of human self-fulfillment, from moral acts to “the
dimension of knowledge,” and especially in “the ‘disintegration’ of death and of life
considered as a prolixitas mortis [as an “extension of death”].” 256 Yet this personal
struggle and profound desire to integrate into a manageable unity the disintegrating and
pluralist aspects of one’s existence does not simply stop at the level of the individual, for

253

Rahner, “Theology of Power,” 406.
Karl Rahner, “Theological Reflections on the Problem of Secularisation,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 10,
trans. Graham Harrison (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973), 341.
255
Rahner, “Problem of Secularisation,” 342.
256
Rahner, “Problem of Secularisation,” 342.
254

79
the human is “an open ‘system,’ constantly in communication with the world.” 257 The
world, says Rahner,
is in him and he in it, and what we call the ‘environment’ of man is man himself
in his state of radical outward orientation in space and time… The constitution of
man as ‘concupiscent’ and as having an ‘interior’ life of his own, and at the same
time the constitution of the world he lives in, necessarily correspond to one
another. Thus it is easier to deduce what ‘concupiscence’ properly speaking
consists in from the world than to do so by a process of ‘psychological’
introspection into man as he is in himself. 258
These comments point to the fact that the reality of concupiscence should never
be reduced to mere personal desires or psychological drives but that it shows up
especially in the social world of humans. This social concupiscence displays “exactly the
same basic qualities, subject to change from age to age, as does that ‘interior’ element of
concupiscence which is in man himself.” 259 There is in the social and political world, as
there is in the individual person, “a plurality of the objective factors involved and of the
various dimensions at which they exist, their state of disintegration, [and] the abiding
impossibility for man… of ever achieving a point of unity from which man himself can
control all these diverse factors and so overcome this pluralism.” 260 This impossibility of
ever gaining total leverage and control over the diverse and pluralist elements of the
world can fill individuals and groups with great anxiety, fear, or restlessness. When new
and diverse elements or people enter one’s sphere and are seen as threatening one’s life
or apparently bringing it closer to death (whether social or biological), then the result is
often closure (walls), escape (flight), or violence (kill) toward these “different” or
“unassimilable” elements. As Rahner explains, “it causes man anxiety not to have any
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absolute fixed point at his disposal within the integrated instability of the open system of
human life.” 261 Out of this anxiety or “mortal fear” of the sheer unpredictability of life
with its uncontrollable factors, individuals and groups sometimes accord “absolute value”
to “one particular element in the non-integrated and pluralist world,” such as whiteness,
capital, Americanness, or even being the man. 262 Unable to bear the relativization of their
mode of being human, of their sense of self, and of their ability to act in the world in
freedom, they hold onto these things all the more tightly and direct aggression and
animosity toward those who brought on such a relativization.
It should now be clear that tremendous force and violence takes place when facts
are forced into the existences of others, because underlying these acts is the attempt to
make one’s own version of reality fit into another’s who, as Rahner claims, should be
reverenced and loved for “the mystery of the individuum ineffabile [ineffable individual]”
that is in them as a person. 263 In this light, white power is the self-will, self-expansion,
and forceful factoring into the freedom spheres of nonwhite others, restricting their space
of freedom and the possibilities available to them for exercising their free decisions for
self-actualization. Because the free expression and exercise of freedom by the racialized
other is deemed a threat, white power practitioners tend toward brute force and away
from the power of love and truth to relate to this other. Instead of attempting to eliminate
the results of their power on nonwhite others, exercisers of white power pile on the
effects of their power on others and display these results as a perpetual reminder to
everyone of their own supremacy. As will be seen in Part II, a major aspect of white (eye)
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power is this ability to show or display its power over others. White power is the attempt
to maximize the space, material, and environment for the self-expression and selfrealization of white people to the exclusion of others constructed as different, and less
than, races. If social organizations and institutions also embody and carry out this goal,
the power is all the more effective and expansive. However, even without the official
backing and support of organizations and institutions, exercising white power as force
can still reveal itself in individual acts from people who feel they need to take matter/s
into their own hands.
To quote Rahner and adopt his words to what I am trying to say about white
power and its practice: “[white] men [and women] in his [or her] self-will and fear
elevates it [whiteness and its proxies]… to the single and all-dominating point of
reference for the integration of the world which, it is claimed, will be autonomously
achieved. This is what takes place at the theoretical level in that which constitutes a bad
‘ideology’ [white supremacy], and at the practical level in that which in simple terms is
called sin [Looks that kill].” 264 The only “point of reference” that white people allow is
that which is on top of the world and others, literally, metaphorically, and forcefully.
Merton voiced similar concerns in his famous “Letters to a White Liberal” in the 1960s,
writing that white people would rather “remain on top by the use of force, rather than
admit a change in which [they] will not necessarily be on the bottom, but in which [their]
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position as top dog will no longer be guaranteed.” 265 Writing directly to white people, he
claimed, “You will prefer your own security to everything else, and you will be willing to
sacrifice the Negro to preserve yourself.” 266
Rahner himself connects the drive for security and preservation to concupiscence,
noting that often “efforts are made to escape from the non-integrated pluralism of the
world by excluding from the outset certain dimensions as not ‘relevant’ to human or
Christian life.” 267 In terms of white power, those people who bring a different set of eyes,
values, and practices into the world are excluded as not relevant or as threatening (the
reasons for exclusion run from one extreme to the other). This over-simplification and
reduction of the world and the diverse modes of being human is itself a sign that the
complexity of the world and of humans cannot be tolerated and so must be ignored,
controlled, or eliminated. White power, as a manifestation of concupiscence both in
individuals and in social life, is the failure at both a theoretical, perceptual, sensorial,
imaginary, and practical level to accept and endure the pluralist and non-integrated reality
of the world and of humans. Ideally, humans are tasked to strive for harmony between
themselves even in the midst of legitimate tension and conflict. 268 Those who leverage
whiteness as power reject such an open and unresolved conflict between the different
sources of experience and knowledge in the world and opt instead for a homogenizing
system of so-called white culture, values, and civilization: might and white is right. This
view inevitably leads to the actual commission of sin, which, “as a pseudo-integration is
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really a strengthening of disintegration.” 269 Unable to bear the agon, the contest or
struggle, of living in a pluralist, non-integrated, unreconciled, and disharmonious world,
white power inflicts agonies upon agonies on the lives and bodies of scapegoated,
nonwhite people. 270
Integrist and Manipulating Eyes
White power is thus a “false integralism” which forcefully attempts to handle the
disparate and, in its eyes, unwanted elements of the world and human life for its own
advantage or security. The language used here again comes from Rahner, who speaks of
the phenomenon of “false integralism” that is sometimes apparent within the Catholic
Church as an institution. 271 In a discussion about the relationship of the Church to the
world, Rahner claims that integralism “is that attitude, whether at the theoretical or at the
practical… level, according to which human life can be unambiguously mapped out and
manipulated in conformity with certain universal principles proclaimed by the Church
and watched over by her in the manner in which they are developed and applied.” 272 Two
items from this definition of integralism are worth comment. First, the concupiscent and
visualizing aspects of integralism come to the fore both in the false attitude that human
life in all its complexities and gaps can be “unambiguously mapped out,” and in the
confidence that the principles applied to manipulate human realities can be adequately
“watched over” or policed by the Church as an institution. Yet as Rahner claims
elsewhere in commenting on institutions in society, “a society simply cannot exist which
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is constructed and controlled totally and all-embracingly from one single point.”273 White
power, like all totalizing tendencies, is the blind and brutal attempt to do so.
Second, it needs to be noted that the word manipulate as a verb means to handle,
and that as a noun manipulation – a direct borrowing from the French manipulation –
originally meant “a method of digging silver ore.”274 Interestingly, the first instance of
the French word manipulation appears in 1716 in an account of silver mines in colonial
South America. 275 Following this linguistic trail, integralism is the “taking” (in terms of
visuality and in actual practice) of the world as predictable, mappable, and able to be
completely controlled by the hands of humans. Today we sometimes speak of being
manipulated by others because we recognize their hand, or power, in shaping our lives to
negative effect. We constantly recognize the truth, sometimes painful, that other people
are factors and shapers (manipulators?) of our lives. Yet manipulation was a material
practice in the French colonies of South America in the 18th century, when native peoples
were forced to dig in silver mines at great risk to their own lives. 276 Manipulation was at
first labor exploitation, or, the control of the other’s hands by one’s own, forcing them to
act as your own. The power of all forms of false integralism, such as white power, is that
the world is visualized and practically handled according to the wishes and desires of a
certain group of people either directly through their own hands or indirectly through
appended human hands or technologized hands. White power, at least in its origins, is
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power carried out by factoring (“making”) hands out of human matter and manipulating
human facts with a view to the reproduction of white lives and modes of inhabiting the
world.
False integralisms, then, display a certain kind of relationship between theory
(“eyes”) and praxis (“hands”) in which nothing and no one may come between the two or
resist the process from one to the other. As Rahner states, “integralism… implicitly
presupposes that in his acts man simply puts his theory into practice, and that the world
and its history, considered as the material field in which these acts of his are posited, is
sufficiently predictable, malleable and submissive to his will, to make such a procedure
possible.” 277 In simpler terms, those holding an integralist attitude towards the world and
others believe that the world is there for them to do whatever they want with. There is
little or no pause or hesitation between what one sees fit and what one actually does in the
world or to others. Little attention is given to the autonomy and claims of “others.”
Consider as an example the words of Benito Mussolini in 1932 when speaking of his
relationship to the Italian “masses”: “When I feel the masses in my hands, since they
believe in me, or when I mingle with them, and they almost crush me, then I feel like one
with the masses. However there is at the same time a little aversion… Doesn’t the
sculptor sometimes break the marble out of rage, because it does not precisely mold into
his hands according to his vision?... Everything depends on that, to dominate the masses
as an artist.” 278 The integralist has a vision of the world and the material of the world at
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his hands, or so he thinks, and attempts to sculpt the world and others according to his
own delight and for his own purposes. This is precisely what Looks that kill aim to do.
Although tremendous planning can be involved, integralist attitudes and actions
betray a basic avaricious impulse and desire – a concupiscence – that is the real fire
behind them. As Pope Paul VI taught in his encyclical Populorum Progressio (1967),
“Both for nations and for individual men, avarice is the most evident form of moral
underdevelopment.” 279 Again, the thought runs (whether consciously or not): the world is
there not only for our taking, but for our making, and we will ignore or suppress any
resistance we encounter from the material at hand, whether the material be human or
otherwise. We have matter/s (human bodies, natural resources, political and social
agendas) in our hand and we will squeeze them for profit, for pleasure, for moral
catharsis, for the rewards of being missionary, for security, for a sense of
accomplishment and progress, and so on. “The will that is obsessed with power,” says
Merton, “can refuse to see and to assess vitally important realities. It can remain obdurate
and closed in the presence of human facts that contradict its obsessions.” 280
The integralist further believes that they, or the Church, or white people, or the
West, or “America,” are “already in possession” of all the most important principles,
values, and techniques needed for the good life. 281 They believe that their own
institutions, race, culture, or nation is without a doubt “the guide of the world.” Because
these claims are false, giving up integralist affects, takes, attitudes, and practices toward
worldly matters means leaving this world and others to be themselves in their own
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freedom and responsibility. Because white power is at its source white hands
(individually and collectively) trying to control, manipulate, or cut off “dark” hands
(individually and collectively) for their own purposes, resistance to white power often
takes the form of actions and demands that white people give up their grasp on the world
and others as malleable and able to be manipulated, and let go of the attitude that assumes
they can get people to do what they want and if they don’t then: tough luck. As Merton
asked the “white liberal” in his day: “Is there no alternative but violent repression, in
which, reluctantly no doubt, you decide that it is better for the establishment to be
maintained by the exercise of power which is entirely in white hands, and which ought to
remain in white hands because they are white (because, of course, Negroes are ‘not
ready’ for any kind of power)?” 282 White power is the view and construction of reality by
white eyes and white hands – although these hands manipulate “other” hands – that will
not be budged from its vantage point at the top of society. White power is the clamor and
hammer for order at all costs, whether through law or violence. The power it exercises is
direct, and it uses blunt force to immobilize and shape human matter according to its own
image and designs. 283
The Power of the Body (Politic)
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White power is embodied and often organized; it is the power of the white body
organized for maximum influence, control, or elimination of those outside privileged
cultural, ideological, economic, or religious systems. White power is exercised when
white individuals and communities take matter/s into their own hands regardless of the
presence, views, rights, and claims of those sensed, and often marked, as “others.” White
power has been realized in various organized forms, but especially in the foundational
organization of the American nation, which imagined and actualized itself as a white
body politic. The word “organization” itself hints at its embodied nature, a fact that
usually gets lost in our everyday use of the word. “Organization” is a biological term
used to describe “the development or coordination of parts (of the body, a body system,
cell, etc.) in order to carry out vital functions.” 284 In medicine, the term refers to
“conversion into fibrous tissue,” and in social terms organization refers to “systematic
ordering or arrangement” of social activities or institutions. As a verb, to “organize”
means “to give organic structure or function to,” or socially, “to coordinate or manage the
activities of (a group of people); to set up (an institution, enterprise, society, union, or
other political organization).” 285 Clearly, the medical uses of the term are related to the
social uses and describe an analogous process: just as cells form into tissues, and tissues
into muscles, and muscles into arms, so also individuals organize into cells, and cells into
groups, and groups into larger organizations. Although organizations are realities larger
than individual human persons with their biological bodies, organizations do not lose
their embodied character. Instead, organizations, through the mobilization of the
attitudes, thoughts, views, and actual bodies of people, extend and strengthen each
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individual’s embodied capacities and processes through the individual’s active
participation in the organization. Instead of the sole individual’s eyes, this individual now
sees – organizationally – with the eyes of all other affiliated individuals, albeit in an
analogous sense. Likewise, joining a militia adds other arms to one’s own two arms, so
one’s self-defense is made more secure by organizing or linking up with other arms to
combat perceived enemies. In the remainder of this chapter we come to an understanding
of power from the bottom-up, that is, from the anthropological, by exploring
anthropomorphic thinking about power: society as a body politic and the eye-hand
coordination of this body politic as necessary for the exercise of power.
The understanding of society or the state as a body politic has a strong pedigree.
A classic example of this line of thought in political theory is presented in Swiss writer
Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758), a work highly influential during the early
formation of the American nation and in debates over the admission of Missouri into the
union as a free or slave state in and around 1820. 286 In the opening line of his work,
Vattel claims that “nations or states are bodies politic, societies of men united together
for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of
their combined strength.” 287 Human societies and states are here likened to a body, and
each member of the body is important for its collective safety and advantage, that is, for
its power. The very purpose of the establishment of a society is to procure, “to those who
are its members, the necessaries, conveniences, and even pleasures of life, and, in
general, every thing necessary to their happiness,—of enabling each individual peaceably
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to enjoy his own property, and to obtain justice with safety and certainty,—and, ﬁnally,
of defending themselves in a body against all external violence.” 288 Through social and
political organization, an individual as a member of this body is afforded better protection
against external violence, aided in his or her quest for justice, and supported in the
procurement of life’s necessities and pleasures. It is good, obviously, to have a personal
body, but even better to be “in a body” that is social.
The danger was that the distinctly European visualization of the social and
political body that Vattel’s thinking represents was taken to be the right way to think and
for all peoples. One form of social organization, one genre of being human, and one way
to describe and interpret this social world – the European form – was presumed to be both
natural and applicable to all. Any groups of people who did not accept this social
organization, activity, and parallel interpretation were lacking, incomplete, or worse,
savage. Thus, the visualization and production of the body politic, especially as this
related to land use and social space, was by no means neutral: there were beneficiaries
and victims of such a social organization, imagination, and visuality. In Vattel’s time the
victims were people around the world who Europeans saw as persisting in an “idle mode
of life,” of hunting and living by their flocks, and who “usurp more extensive territories
than, with a reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for.” 289 These peoples,
therefore, have “no reason to complain, if other nations, more industrious, and too closely
confined, come to take possession of a part of those lands.” 290 So even while he
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acknowledges that the conquest of civilizations such as the “empires of Peru and
Mexico” was “a notorious usurpation,” Vattel claims that the establishment of colonies
on the North American continent “might… be extremely lawful.” For Vattel, “the people
of those extensive tracts rather ranged through than inhabited them.” 291 Those who range
through the land and do not view the land and put their hands to the land as is “natural,”
like the Europeans do, are justifiably colonized. Although they may have roots in the
land, they have no complete nation, no body politic of their own, no rights and legal
claims to a space and place of their own, and can therefore serve as a colonized people,
appropriated and appended as hands onto the body politic of the white nations. And if not
appended, then extirpated. This logic was still on full display over a hundred years after
Vattel’s time, when U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt claimed in 1894 that, “the white
settler has merely moved into an uninhabited waste; he does not feel that he is
committing a wrong, for he knows perfectly well that the land is really owned by no
one.” 292
Anthropomorphic Thinking and Metaphor
Thinking through the formation and role of organizations and society in terms of a
body might seem too literalist or physicalist, the danger being that organizations
naturalized in such a way as to be like other biological processes and entities can always
resist challenge or critique by replying, if they reply, “it’s just the natural order of
things.” However, we need to think of organizations as the primary means for the
increasing of one’s own embodied power so we can also think about people in society in
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a way that connects the personal to the social, bodies to structures. In the varied
discourses surrounding race, racism, and racialization, it is typical nowadays to hear talk
of institutional, structural, cultural, or systemic racism, which are to be distinguished
from personal bias, acts of bigotry, stereotyping, and other forms of racist prejudice.
While these distinctions are real and important, we also need to show how racism, even at
a structural and institutional level, does not lose its embodied and personal character,
although these characteristics are transformed when cast at an organizational level.
Following Rahner, organizations and social bodies bear the imprint of concupiscence just
as concupiscence shows up in the lives of individuals. To understand how this is so, we
need to take a quick detour through the world of cognitive linguistics to understand how
our minds think about bodies and organizations in such an interconnected way.
What has been described above, namely, the thinking of organizations in terms of
the human body and its members, is an example of anthropomorphism. In
anthropomorphic thinking, humans think and talk about something in their world of
experience in human terms and with the human form in mind. The classic example of this
type of thinking is found in theology, where God is described in anthropomorphic ways:
God hears, God regrets, God walks in the garden, God flares his nostrils in wrath, God
speaks, God fights like a warrior, etc. In these cases, and in numerous others, God is
depicted in human form, in human ways, doing human things. This thinking seeks to
understand the less well known, in this case God, with something more known, human
experience. Anthropomorphic thinking, as we have seen, also appears in our talk about
society and social organizations. We speak of the body politic, corporations (again, from
the Latin corporare, “to embody”), members (French, membre, classical Latin membrum,
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limb, part of the body), eyes of society, military arms, brain trust, brain drain, hands (as
in, “Fallujah fell into the hands of U.S. forces”), military posturing, and mobilization
(relying on human motility for comparison). The way we talk about people getting
together and doing things together takes the embodied, sensorimotor experience of
humans as its basic reference.
A common response to this kind of thinking is that these notions are mere
metaphors, that obviously the army as a collective doesn’t have real hands, corporations
are not actual bodies, and the law truly doesn’t have eyes. These analogies stem from a
primitive mind and represent an outmoded, or a poetic, way of thinking. But this is to
miss the point and the unique way of thinking that anthropomorphisms represent.
According to cognitive linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, the work of
“matching and aligning the elements of two domains, finding the common schematic
structure that motivates an analogy between them, are now recognized as formidable
feats of imaginative work to which the current state of computational modeling cannot do
justice.” 293 The everyday analogies of organizations as bodies and related themes are
“completely taken for granted by human beings at the conscious level… [and] seems like
no work at all.” 294 Psychologists, neuroscientists, and cognitive linguists now discover
that analogy, “as a cognitive operation, [is] intricate, powerful, and fundamental.” 295 In
standard analogical reasoning, says Fauconnier and Turner, “a base source or domain is
mapped onto a target so that inferences easily available in the source are exported to the
target. We can thus reason about the target.”296 In many examples cited above, the source
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or domain is the experience of a human body, which gets mapped onto the target domain
of social and community life. This conceptual process gives us insight into social
organizations and the ability to reason about the nature of institutions and social life.
Theologian Robert Masson has done a great deal of work in reading and
synthesizing much of the work in the burgeoning and diverse field of cognitive
linguistics. As he explains, cognitive linguistics “conceives metaphor and related
figurative language as conceptual mappings grounded in the neural mapping of the brain
itself.” 297 Following the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Masson argues that
standard, or popular, accounts of metaphor suggest that metaphors are, 1) a mere matter
of words, 2) based on similarity, 3) just a feature of poetic or rhetorical language, 4)
deviations from the proper usage, and 5) at best only substitutes for literal language. 298
Yet cognitive linguists have shown that these standard assumptions are false. Instead,
“evidence indicates to the contrary not only that metaphors can make proper and
irreducible truth claims, but that nearly all truth claims, at the very least, presuppose
some underlying metaphorical or figurative conceptualization.” 299 As Steven Winter
aptly states, “all thought is irreducibly imaginative.” 300 By this he means that “meaning
arises in the imaginative interactions of the human organism with its world, and these
embodied experiences provide both the grounding and the structure for human thought
and rationality.” 301 If these statements were applied to the specific case of looking, then
the way we think is directly influenced by the way we see, and the way we see is directly
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influenced by the way we think; but both seeing and thinking are related to our body
positions in the world and in social life. Similarly, the way we experience our bodies
interacting with the world and other people impacts how we understand and experience
social bodies. Zoltan Kövecses, another prominent cognitive linguist, claims that “the
metaphors we use to understand… intangibles [time, inner life, mental processes,
emotions, abstract qualities, moral values, social and political institutions] may become
crucially important in the way we actually experience the intangibles in a culture.” 302 To
give an example, if a primary conceptual metaphor by which we understand a nation is as
a body politic, then this metaphor, which is based on our embodied experiences, might
actually shape how we experience the various elements and institutions that make up
society.
So when we speak of the eyes of the law, the head of government, a body of
troops, or the hand of God, although these are all metaphors, they are all attempting to
speak truly and faithfully about diverse human experiences so it connects the personal to
the social, the embodied to the more abstract or even spiritual. We can experience – feel,
sense, be aware of, and know – the eyes of society, the public eye, the eyes of the law,
and the strong hand of government. These experiences of larger bodies with their eyes
and hands cannot be simply reduced to what we encounter on a person to person basis,
nor can they be completely severed from it. Someone can feel used or manipulated not
just by a person but by a system. For example, in precarious situations, falling into the
hands of the police could mean more than simply being cuffed by an individual police
officer; it could also mean to be in the power and at the mercy of an entire system, the
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Man, who was historically created by and for white men and “their” women. What is
scary might not necessarily be the individual officer, although this is sometimes the case,
but who or what backs them and who or what they represent. Similarly, one might
experience the eyes of the police, or the FBI, or ICE, without referring to or pointing to
the eyes of an individual officer. There might be something in the air, something
atmospheric, or even a vibe or feeling that one gets from being watched or monitored.303
Anthropomorphisms are not primitive thinking but are rather a way for humans to
understand realities in the world, as they come to them, out of their own personal and
embodied experiences. As seen in the previous section, a basic anthropomorphic
metaphor used for power both in our everyday thinking and speech is the hand. If power
is the ability to take matter/s into one’s own hands to secure one’s substance, then we
must consider not only the seeing aspect of “take” in the definition, but also its handling
aspect. One not only sees the world a certain way, processes it, and imagines what it
could be, thereby “taking it all in,” but also desires and attempts to impose their own
image of the world on reality and make it actual. The ability to do this is power; power,
because in this way humans display their creative spirit, ingenuity, and will to live, but
also because they attain a certain degree of control over themselves and their worlds. To
have power means to secure life in the broadest sense for oneself as a person and group.
At this most basic level, power is the ability to keep on being able, to keep on having
enough for life, to live a unique mode of being human. Negatively put, to be in the grip
of addiction, or of disease; to be in the hands of another person or group; to suffer at the
hands of another person or group; all these phrases refer to the experience, no matter how
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short or long, of powerlessness. To grasp an idea; to get a grip [on things, on oneself, on
reality]; to comprehend [from the Latin comprehendere meaning to grasp or seize]; to
hold on to life in the face of death; to take in a view; all these ways of speaking reveal
how our primary sensorimotor experiences of grabbing, holding onto, and touching
ground and imbue our conceptual frameworks and linguistic articulations when we think
of power in our lives. They also speak to how hands are a vital and basic way for humans
to gain and maintain power over their worlds and everything that makes up these worlds.
To get ahold of something means that one can use it for one’s individual or collective
advantage. Yet to grab life by the horns, it is vitally important to see where life is, to
visualize its possibilities. A major way that humans have control and power over their
worlds and other people is through using their eyes, their power of vision and perception,
as hands.
Power, then, is the ability to take, and the actual taking of, matter/s into one’s own
hands to secure one’s substance. This power can be exercised on the level of an
individual with their body but also through extensions of themselves via technology or
organization with other people. Human power is directly related to this ability for persons
to anthropomorphize themselves in the world (self-anthropomorphization). Several points
related to this basic definition should be clarified now. First, when someone loses the
ability to directly or indirectly secure their substance, their very life, they are in a
powerless situation. When someone can indirectly secure their substance, for example, by
relying on someone else or a group practice, then they have relatively more power. When
someone can both directly and indirectly secure their substance, they have even more
power. Again, to take something should be understood both in terms of a reading,

98
understanding, interpretation, or view of reality (“eyes”), and a concrete appropriation or
possession of reality (“hands”). Matter/s means both material reality, matter, like soil,
land, water, fruit, trees, atoms, or oil, and also matters in terms of circumstances or life
situations. In the definition, the phrase one’s own should not be understood in a purely
individualistic sense. One’s own can refer not only to a single person, but also to the
group of people this person identifies with, feels with, and shares a common life with. As
we have seen, white power is the restriction of one’s own to those who are perceived as
“white” and the exclusion of the nonwhite other as not common and not a part of one’s
life and what one considers to be one’s own. It follows that one’s own can be construed
as limited to a certain family, tribe, city, region, nation, or hemisphere, or it can include
all people to various degrees. Substance refers to property, wealth, money, relationships,
social esteem, and anything else related to one’s livelihood, and biological life itself.
Substance is one’s “stuff” in the multivalent sense of the word; stuff as in objects, things,
but also as in one’s character (“what kind of stuff are you made of?”) and quality of life
(“that’s the stuff!”). Substance is the somewhat older English word that gathers all these
aspects of life and livelihood into one word. Again, humans organizing together into
groups or using various technologies can serve to extend their corporeal and mental
abilities and capacities to secure and protect their substance. This is precisely what is
meant by self-anthropomorphization, that is, to extend one’s self with its embodied and
sensorial abilities by linking up with other people and various technologies, whether
guns, plows, hammers, political parties, labor unions, militias, or corporations. Selfanthropomorphization is the ability to spread or expand the shape and form of one’s life
into the external world, especially the social world with its many organizations, to realize
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one’s life all the more fully. In terms of the history of white power in the United States,
the self-anthropomorphization of humans has taken shape along racialized lines and has
often excluded or used nonwhite others. People exerting white power attempt to limit the
self-anthropomorphization of nonwhite others, that is, their extension of self and
embodiment through space and time, even as they aggrandize white people and their
communities.
To sum up Part I, white (eye) power is the organized “seeing to” of the socially
constructed terrain of the world and mode of being human in order to secure and
distribute substance along certain prescribed lines, especially the color line. This color
line, following McKittrick, is not just a philosophical idea, but “an urgent geographic
expression of the displacement of difference, a poetics-politics which sites/sights
‘physical extent fused through with social intent.’” 304 Racialized demarcations are made
in the personal and organizational realms and are employed to control access to
substance, broadly construed, whether healthy food, affordable housing, standards of
beauty, lawmaking, etc. By following human eyes and hands with their actions, their
gestures, their power or their relative powerlessness, one can come to understand more
intimately what we call struggles for power that take place individually or collectively.
One can also come to a better understanding of the eye-hand relationship, and how Looks
that kill should be understood as visual power grabs. Our looking is prehensile, that is,
capable of grasping or holding; looks are tactile, sometimes violently so. Looks that kill
can come from individuals or from various social bodies, including the body politic, and
they arise out of an integralist “take” on the world. As a manifestation of concupiscence,
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Looks that kill stem from a lust for power, control, and domination. Looks that kill are a
show of force, an attempt to assert one’s own exclusive claim upon, and vision of, the
world; they are territorial. In Part II we continue to explore this visual violence by
looking at various white figures and groups throughout American history who sought to
control people of color through various practices of looking (“eyecraft”), and the
lingering effects of these practices in contemporary communities.
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Part II: Eye Stems and Legacies
Legacy, n. in extended use, a tangible or intangible thing handed down by a predecessor;
a long-lasting effect of an event or process. 305
Evil is the word! Those who have seen, at first hand, the eerie glow in the eyes of the
racist, those who have heard their peculiar silences as they stand together in the shadows
waiting for the forces within them to reach some mysterious point where inner confusion
and self-hate turn into violent fury – those who have seen this are aware of what it means
to see apparently good and harmless men possessed with an evil so total and so complete
that they prefer not to understand it, or refer to it, or treat it as if it existed. 306
Quiet as it’s kept, whether we are “rioting” or not, most African Americans live every
day with greater or lesser amounts of rage toward white people and the system that gives
them the power and privilege to decimate our lives. I know I do. 307

In Part II we look at historical forms of unjust looks – four “eyes” – that linger in
and around the manifestation of Looks that kill in contemporary life: the overseeing,
patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes. To a greater or lesser degree, the practices
and habits that trained these eyes in the past still influence contemporary practices of
seeing, especially as directed at people of color. The four eyes, or concrete modes of
visuality, are the eye stems, the visual roots, of unjust looks that get thrown or shot at
people today, whether from racists or from organized eyepower like the military or the
police. These eyes with their looks are legacies because they are intangible things handed
down by white American predecessors with tangible effects on our nation and on the
lives of numerous individuals. The four eyes represent white (eye) power in concrete,
historical situations, performing specific functions, which depended on both the eyes of
individuals and the eyes of the body politic or other social bodies for their success.
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Success was implicitly or explicitly defined as the production, maintenance, and
reproduction of the substance of white people (“whitestuff”).
In what follows the four eyes and the figures most associated with them –
plantation overseers and masters, slave patrollers and slave catchers, Ku-Kluxers and
segregationists – are explored chronologically and are all seen as involved in eyecraft, or,
the skillful use of the eyes. Just as in various practices of handicraft a person uses and
trains their hands to work with greater skill and dexterity at a task, so also in eyecraft a
person or corporate group uses and trains their eyes to do efficient and skillful work on
various materials, whether words on a page or, as we will see, human bodies. The
advantage of using the language of eyecraft to describe a central function of these
figures’ eyes is that it helps us to see the interconnection between making and seeing,
laboring and vision, praxis and theory, hands and eyes. The language also helps to
highlight how looking works on others, chiseling meaning onto them, marking them, or
circumscribing them into certain roles, tasks, appearances, or behaviors. By delineating
the eyecraft of various individual and social eyes, we can come to a better understanding
of how seeing is a kind of praxis that works to shape reality according to a particular
vision of the world.
After examining eye forms from the past and the figures who actualized them in
the concrete, we will explore the continuity between these eyes and the policing eye in
contemporary American life, a site/sight of immense public contestation. We suggest that
the watchful eye of the police is an eye which has, at least, been shaped by the very
forces behind the production of the overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing
eyes. This history needs to be recalled and acknowledged so that those who see in the
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police a vital institution for the common good can also come to some understanding of
how other people might not share the same view. Because policing institutions are one
place where the eye and the hand of the body politic issues forth with “force” in society,
they often become the focal point for contrasting judgments on the state of justice in
society. Police actions and behaviors often serve as a litmus test for how just or unjust,
how racist or “color-blind,” the whole American system is. Further, Looks that kill have
been experienced by some people as issuing not just from “bad racists” like Roof, Page,
or Stroman, but from police officers and other figures associated with the criminal justice
system. Local events from Milwaukee in August 2016 fit the pattern found elsewhere
around the nation where antagonism and open conflict between communities and the
police flared up in the aftermath of police shootings and other instances of police
brutality. Was this or that shooting yet another instance of a Look that kills, or was it
simply someone doing their job? Is it somehow both?
Part II addresses these questions by characterizing the contemporary “eye”
complicit in Looks that kill as a spectral eye, that is, an eye experienced as the
convergence and reappearing of the overseeing, patrolling, and cycloptic eyes felt to have
the same material impact on lives today as these eyes had on others in history. Such a
spectral eye does not mean an eye, or way of seeing, that isn’t real or that is solely
immaterial, but an eye that haunts, that appears and vanishes in different historical
moments and at different geographical locations but is generally experienced as the
presence of “someone-looking-to-put-me/us-down.” 308 This spectral eye gives off the
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same vibe as the title to a recent horror movie: It Follows (2015). 309 In Sherman Park,
Milwaukee as in other neighborhoods across the country, the spectral eye, the “It,” that
creepily follows and watches people of color as it watched those in the past, most
forcefully materializes itself in the looks of police officers and others perceived and felt
to be exploiting the community, whether physically, socially, or economically. 310 Before
analyzing the spectral aspect of Looks that kill, however, we need to understand the
production of watching eyes in the past that set the stage for its enfleshed hauntings
today.
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Chapter 4: In White Fields
“However varied the useful kinds of labour, or productive activities, may be, it is a
physiological fact, that they are functions of the human organism, and that each such
function, whatever may be its nature or form, is essentially the expenditure of human
brain, nerves, muscles, etc.” 311
“Nearly sixteen millions of hands will aid you in pulling the load upward, or they will
pull against you the load downward. We shall constitute one-third and more the
ignorance and crime of the South, or one-third its intelligence and progress; we shall
contribute one-third to the business and industrial prosperity of the South, or we shall
prove a veritable body of death, stagnating, depressing, retarding every effort to advance
the body politic.”312
“If you wus out widout a pass dey would shore git you. De paterollers shore looked after
you. Dey would come to de house at night to see who wus there. If you wus out of place,
dey would wear you out.”313

In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Karl Marx states that “the
forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the
present.” 314 For him, the five senses of seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, and smelling
are not simply neutral givens in the constitution of humans, ready-made for immediate
and impartial use, but are produced by human history and culture through concrete
practices and parallel mental constructions. The senses are not just biologically or
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genetically given but are also socially and culturally produced. Building on Marx’s
observation, David Michael Levin claims that “since history is not only the past, but is
also always in the making, our sensibility is an unfinished social task, a current social
responsibility.” 315 The forming of our human senses is both a task and a responsibility.
For Levin, we are responsible for the “collective task” of “the humanization of our
sensibility and the culture of our capacities for perception.” 316 If our modes of perception
are indeed capacities to be developed and not merely automatically given by nature, if
they are sociogenic, then we must continue to reflect on the many ways our senses
become unjust and dehumanizing, whereby we unjustly see, hear, touch (or “handle”),
speak to, and even smell one another. Along these same lines, Levin speaks of the need to
reflect on what he calls “the ethical character of vision” and how the way we see others is
trained in just or unjust ways throughout history. 317 “The full realization of our humanity
in its bodily being,” he says, “is certainly not possible, and not in the end conceivable,
without the full support of a social and political context.” 318 These social and political
contexts, however, have historically produced and distributed the substance of human life
along certain racialized, gendered, classed, and other marked lines, thus training the
senses of millions to receive the world in stereotypical ways: “the conditions of society as
a whole bear in many decisive ways, some of them oppressive and destructive, on the
development of individual predispositions and capacities.” 319 While this determining of
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the individual’s capacities for perception by societal conditions is never total or absolute,
it must be recognized and considered. For, as Steven Lukes claims, “the supreme and
most insidious exercise of power” is precisely “to prevent people… from having
grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that
they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or
because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.” 320 A critical view of
perceptual production in society thus seems a fruitful place to begin a brief history of the
eyecraft that is so important in producing and shaping Looks that kill.
Eye Production
Marx’s statement that the cultivation or production of the human senses is a labor
further challenges us to explore the connection between laboring and looking. What, if
any, is the connection between unjust economic practices or systems and Looks that kill?
We have seen how European and American conquest and subsequent colonization and
settling in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Americas contributed to the factoring of “Negro”
and “slave,” and the “manipulation” of nonwhite hands for use in mines, fields, and
houses. Labor history itself can be understood as a history of asceticism, of a training of
the human senses oriented toward the production of something, toward an object. But in
producing something – and through our methods, means, and learning necessary to
produce this something – we also produce ourselves, our senses, our corporeal and
intellectual comportment toward the world and other humans. How we take matter shapes
our take on matters, and vice versa. As Bryan Nelson teaches about Marx’s take on
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empiricism, “the very organisation of experience is not given a priori, before the subject,
but develops according to the process of the subject’s self-constitution through
experience itself.” 321 The subject is “that which unfolds or emerges from the field of
experience itself,” and can in no way be disconnected from its concrete, embodied
practices, especially its labor. Also, the subject cannot be disconnected from the social
and historical: human subjectivity is “composed not in isolation, generated from thin air,
but against the particular social arrangements which constitute his basic material
productive relations.” 322
Because the senses “are composed through the appropriation of their objects,
which themselves possess a particular history, society, set of human relations, the senses
themselves must be understood as historical.” 323 In his interpretation of Marx, Nelson
distinguishes between the “direct senses” and the “social senses,” what he calls “two
sides” of the senses. 324 Direct senses “represent the passivity of experience as need:
practical, asocial or pre-social, the biology of the sense organs which belong to a natural
history of the species.” 325 Our direct senses have evolved out of “the immediacy of
experience” and point to “the unmediated force or vivacity of sense impressions.” 326 But
the social senses embody a related, though distinct, history. As Marx states, “apart from
these direct organs, social organs are therefore created in the form of society.” 327 Our
senses have “a social, inter-subjective quality as social organs.” 328 Indeed “the human
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eye,” says Marx, “takes in things in a different way from the crude non-human eye.” 329
The fact that humans are both social and historical means that their eyes, their “taking-inof-things” and “take on matters,” are involved in a much more complex process than can
be found in other animals. The processes involved in human seeing cannot be reduced to
physiology, biology, or even neurology; sociogeny is involved. The social organs or
senses of a society thus represent “collective human praxis” in their appropriation of its
objects. 330 It is important to note that the eyes of society are different for each society and
arise out of the form the society takes in its collective practices towards its objects, which
are its very life externalized and objectified. Interestingly, Marx will write that it is in
their immediate praxis that “the senses become theoreticians.” 331 Put differently by
Nelson, “as they appropriate their objects, the senses become the active expression of
their particular historical conditions; they embody and reflect, as it were, the social
character of their appropriated objects.” 332 Embedded in the concrete looks of a person
are all kinds of social ideas and theories that they have consented to whether consciously
or not. 333
It would be wrong, therefore, to say that capitalism is just the organization of
production, for it is also the “organization of experience itself,” and especially the
organization of our sensorial comportment toward matter/s. 334 While on one level, the
direct senses, humans “take in” the world in a similar way across time and cultures, as
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they are all members of the same animal species, on another level, the social senses,
humans under a capitalist system do, in a real sense, “take” the world differently and
experience the world in a way that others not trained and formed by capitalism, or other
systems of production, do not. Capitalism, for Marx, “represents the corruption of the
senses, the deterioration of their social quality, their inability to experience in a human
way” because “as the senses are composed according to the experience of private
property, the diversity of the senses, as the very possibility of experience, is reduced to a
one-dimensional sense of possession, of having.” 335 As Marx bluntly states, “private
property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it,
when it exists for us as capital or when we directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it,
etc., in short, when we use it.” 336 For him, the emancipation of the senses could only
come about with the supersession of private property, in which objects would be restored
as a “truly collective, social object.”337 As Marx says in a revelatory footnote, “In
practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to
the human being.” 338 Under a capitalist system where private property is a major feature,
it is difficult to relate humanly to things because these things are regarded and used in
privatized fashion, thus destroying the social character of these things and so the
possibility of a human sense of them. Whether or not one agrees with his analysis of
private property, our senses are shaped by social practices. The having-character of
senses formed within various capitalist “takes” on matter/s means that having is a crucial
factor in the seeing of those who grow, develop, and live within these societies.
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As we have seen, human eyepower has been used as a coercive and violent force
throughout history to control various human populations to produce certain desired
benefits for some at the expense of others. The subjects considered in this chapter put
their eyes to work to earn a living, or simply to secure their own substance in the face of
the claims of others. However, their eyes also performed the vital social functions of
extracting labor from other humans and controlling their movements to stabilize the
production process. The overseeing and patrolling eyes were not isolated from the rest of
the eyes of white society, but were a part of the general policing of the free and enslaved
black population which sought to subordinate them to an inferior social, economic, and
political status in society. In terms of American overseeing, a racialized eyecraft was
employed in fields of indigo, tobacco, sugar cane, and especially cotton. White fields
would become the preserve of white people, whose visual domination of the productive
activities of the field greatly shaped their own field of vision and gave them a sense of
who belongs where, who matters to what, and who is the master of the field, of its
productive and reproductive processes.
The Overseeing Eye
The history of overseers and their Latinized counterparts, supervisors (from
super, “over,” “above,” and videre, “to see”), allows us to explore how commodities,
whether from fields or factories or corporate offices, are produced in part by someone
seeing to workers and their embodied actions to bring about a desired outcome: profit.
The production of goods occurs because of a prior look or regard that values matter/s in a
certain way, and this matter includes not only raw materials but human bodies. In this
dynamic process people come to be looked at, or considered, with a view to what their
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efforts can contribute to making a product to be sold in the market for profit. In this look
that considers humans as a means to help along making a product, and ultimately a profit,
there is a certain blurring of what Levin calls the “ethical character of vision.” The end
goal of the productive process, which ought to be the life of the human which is
expended as energy to make something, is actually to turn a profit. The drive and
competition to make the most profit possible incentivizes cutting costs throughout the
production process, including the cost of labor. When looking for cheaper labor, or
basically free labor in the system of slavery, the goal of profit has usurped the goal of a
free and flourishing human life. The consideration of people in terms of labor power
alone is a reductionist consideration of them as a means, as an instrumental part of the
process, and not as the very goal of this process. As Marx said about the proletarian, but
which could be equally applied to the enslaved person: “political economy can… advance
the proposition that the proletarian, the same as any horse, must get as much as will
enable him to work. It does not consider him when he is not working, as a human being;
but leaves such consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to the statistical
tables, to politics and to the poorhouse overseer.” 339 This is precisely why people protest
exploitative businesses with the slogan, “People Before Profit!”
One historical profession explicitly charged with putting profit before “people” –
so long as the “people” were somewhat maintained in health and functioning – was the
overseer in the antebellum American South and various colonies around the world.
According to historian William Scarborough, “to the overseer were entrusted the welfare
and supervision of the Negroes; the care of the land, stock, and farm implements; the
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planting, cultivation, and harvesting of both staple and subsistence crops; and many other
responsibilities associated with the management of a commercial agricultural
enterprise.” 340 The “supervision of the Negroes” included the disciplining of enslaved
persons for breaking plantation rules, taking care of their medical needs, ensuring that
they were “properly fed and reasonably clean,” and making “periodic inspections of slave
cabins” to make sure everyone was accounted for and to look for weapons. 341 Finally,
“upon the overseer depended, ‘to a large extent, the security of the whites against
uprisings of slaves.’” 342 Overseers not only saw to the economic security of families
within the white community but also to their security and survival as a social body. As
John Spencer Bassett wrote in 1925, “The planter might plan and incite, and the slave
might dig, plow, and gather into barns: it was the overseer who brought the mind of the
one and the muscle of the other into cooperation. As he did his part well or poorly the
plantation prospered or failed.” 343
William E. Wiethoff hits on another aspect of the overseer’s role when he claims
that “perceptions of overseers were frequently negative, but in response to public concern
over slave revolts, southern legislators fashioned an apparently meritorious public image:
the spy.” 344 In the public’s interest (that is, the interest of the white public), overseers as
spies “were authorized to monitor slave activity, take the initiative to disrupt suspicious
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behavior, and punish offenders on the spot.”345 In the words of Judge David Johnson of
South Carolina, it was “imperative” to require through statute “a white spy upon [slaves’]
conduct.”346 Some overseers seemed weary of this work of surveilling enslaved people,
as did one Alabama overseer who bemoaned that “to make a spy of himself, and to be
clandestinely peeping and prowling about Negro houses when honest men should be
asleep, is, to my mind, a small business.” 347 Yet to the minds of the white community,
someone had to do this business – and a business it was – to secure their life and
property. The “peeping” aspect of overseeing which involved regularly looking through
windows and doorways of the houses and quarters of enslaved persons in order to “check
on them,” meant that the private and intimate spaces of the lives of enslaved persons were
in constant threat of being violated. The whole scheme and experiential mode of living
the private and the public was often denied to enslaved people. 348 White people held for
themselves the prerogative to invade the intimate spaces of black people, including their
bodies, wherever and whenever they chose. McKittrick, in describing the experiences of
black women, notes that in this system of subjection “geographies of whiteness, white
femininity, white masculinity, and white corporeality are, for the most part, rendered
protected and protectable. Slave quarters, plantation homes, fields, kitchens are, for black
women, unprotected – it is in the material landscape, at work, in the home, and within the
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community, where the body is rightfully retranslated as inferior, captive, and accessible
to violences.” 349 Looks that kill often seem disrespectful, rude, or invasive; they are
forcefully intimate and personal. They subject others to the degrading experience of
being treated and used as an object, especially in places meant to act as cover against
outside forces and gazes.
More generally, Nicholas Mirzoeff has described “the ordering of slavery” as “a
combination of violent enforcement and visualized surveillance that sustained the new
colonial order of things.” 350 As he explains, “visuality’s first domains were the slave
plantation, monitored by the surveillance of the overseer, operating as the surrogate of the
sovereign,” or the master.351 The oversight of plantations helped to maintain “a
delineated space in which all life and labor were directed from its central viewpoint
because the production of colonial cash crops, especially sugar, required a precise
discipline, centered on surveillance, while being dependent on spectacular and excessive
physical punishment.” 352 The surveilling and disciplining practices that took shape in
fields would go a long way in shaping the field of vision through which white individuals
and communities saw themselves in relation to nonwhite others, and vice versa. As James
Scott states, “A work party of serfs or slaves in the field under the supervision of an
overseer on horseback is both a discursive affirmation of power relations and, of course,
the process of material production itself.” 353 The symbolic and material power of violent
force was used to impress upon these “others” their subordinate position within the social
order and their functional position in the economic field. White people were masters of
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the field, that is, of the field of experience, the cotton field, the field of vision, and even
the field of battle should rebellion or armed conflict arise. We emphasize the “field” in
these articulations not only to point out their interrelationship, but also to highlight the
spatial and territorial aspects of the overseeing eye.
Interestingly, the philosopher Martin Heidegger also tied the practices of
command and domination to the overseeing eye, a phenomenon he located not in
colonialism but in the imperium of ancient Romans. But his comments give insight into
European and American overseeing eyes, which themselves were tied culturally and
linguistically to Roman law and practices. According to him,
Command, as the essential ground of domination, includes being-superior, which
is only possible as the constant surmounting of others, who are thereby the
inferiors. In this surmounting there resides again the constant ability to oversee.
We say that to “oversee” something means to “dominate” it. This overseeing,
which includes the surmounting, involves a constant “being-on-the-watch.” That
is the form of acting which oversees everything but still keeps to itself: in Latin,
the actio [“activity”] of the actus [“act”]. The surmounting overseeing denotes the
dominating “sight” expressed in the often quoted phrase of Caesar: veni, vidi, vici
– I came, I oversaw, and I conquered. Victory is only the effect of Caesar’s seeing
and overseeing, whose proper character is actio. 354
The overseeing eye commands and dominates a flurry of activity performed by inferiors,
which is contained within its own act of seeing, or, visualizing. The very nature of
overseeing is to have something or someone “under” its eye, whether people, things, or
activities. As a practice of visualization, the overseeing eye greatly shaped white
European and American perceptions of themselves as “being-superior,” a “beingsuperior” that was always protected through the constant social and visual practice of
“being-on-the-watch.” I came, I oversaw, I extracted…
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In the context of plantations, the “central viewpoint” from which life and labor
processes were directed in the field belonged to the eyes of the planter or master and his
surrogate eye, the overseer, who applied technical knowledge and equipment not only to
cash crop production, but also to the surveilling and disciplining of enslaved persons. 355
It was the overseer’s task to position the enslaved person as seeable “in their place,” that
is, the place where white people desired them to be. For the cuffed person, “the logic of
visualization and patriarchal knowledge means that her place and body are seen to be,
and understood as, naturally subordinate to whiteness and masculinity.” 356 It was the
enslaved person’s “seeable presence” that gave white people, especially the masters, a
“sense of place” and a sense of security. 357 In white fields one expected to see black
hands, a site/sight which in the master’s own eyes no doubt confirmed his sense of
power, of accomplishment, of control, and of character as a true gentleman. Overseers
themselves probably aspired to such a vision of life and of themselves.
Overseeing had historical precedents in colonial America both in the North and
the South. Eminent historian Carter G. Woodson noted back in 1918 that, “knowing the
likelihood of the Negroes to rise during the French and Indian War, Governor Dinwiddie
wrote Fox one of the Secretaries of State in 1756: ‘We dare not venture to part with any
of our white men any distance, as we must have a watchful eye over our Negro slaves,
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who are upwards of one hundred thousand.” 358 Later, as we have seen, fleshing out this
watchful eye became the job of the overseer and others like him who would carry out the
socio-visual practice of watching and directing others. Many states enacted laws
requiring an overseer on each planation and in doing so revealed a practical desire to
control and coerce people to produce through such oversight: “following an abortive
slave revolt in St. John the Baptist Parish, the Louisiana legislature in 1815 specified that
there should be one white person in residence on a plantation for every thirty slaves.” 359
It was also legislated that fines of up to $500 were to be given to any offenders. Wiethoff
has traced this history of states requiring oversight of plantations even further back in
time. He notes that “Carolina’s general assembly decreed in 1696 that ‘one or more white
person’ must reside on every ‘plantation or Cow Penn’” or else “absentee owners could
be fined five pounds for each six-month period in which proper supervision was
lacking.” 360 When Georgia legalized slavery around 1750, a planter was required to
“employ ‘one white Man servant’ capable of bearing arms and between the ages of
sixteen and sixty-five for every ‘four Male Negroes or Blacks’” enslaved on a
plantation. 361 Again, failure to comply with this law would be met with fines. Wiethoff
recounts an incident in Alabama in the 1850s when the state ruled against one William P.
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Molett because, even though he was residing “four miles distant” on another plantation
he owned, he had endangered the “peace and good order, and security of life and
property” by not dwelling on his own Mill Place plantation. 362 The eyes of the white
body needed overseers to see to its own substance, and its looks toward others would
continue to demonstrate a sometimes obsessive concern for the order, security, and
property of white people. Not surprisingly, by 1860 nearly 38,000 people worked as
overseers on plantations in the United States. 363
Drawn primarily from “the yeoman or middling classes,” overseers were paid to
professionally supervise, or literally “watch over,” enslaved people to coerce their bodies
to labor with a view to profit. 364 For Mirzoeff, the overseer’s “looking is… a form of
labor that compels unwaged labor to generate profit from the land.” 365 Similarly, Robert
F. W. Allston wrote in 1863 it was “absolutely necessary” to have his overseers “for the
security and proper police of… negroes together with the direction of their labor in
producing.” 366 Another planter on the colonized island of Saint-Domingue noted that the
main job of the overseer was “to never leave the slave for an instant in inaction; he keeps
the fabrication of sugar under surveillance, never leaving the sugar-mill for an instant.” 367
Scott aptly notes the overseeing logic: “those in involuntary service need close
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supervision, inasmuch as any lapse in surveillance is likely to result in a precipitous
decline in the apparent enthusiasm of their performance.” 368 In these systems, what was
needed was an eye, backed with the symbolic threat and actual use of force, that could
keep the “hands” moving and working.
Patty B. Semple, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, described one
Kentucky farmer in antebellum days: “A practical farmer, he insisted that the work
should be properly done, and to keep the indolent, careless Negroes up to the mark
required an immense amount of oversight. His horse was saddled before breakfast, and he
was mounted, and about the farm early and late, knowing the old maxim that the eye of
the master will do more work than both his hands.” 369 Sure enough, “at ‘sun-up’ his
stentorian voice would be heard starting the hands.” 370 Any maxim, like the one
articulated here, is shared wisdom among people who also share a common approach to
life and its tasks. The eye of the master or overseer “works” more than his hands because
its threatening, practical, and directing look starts, moves, or causes other “hands” to
work. In starting these hands with his eye, their labor becomes his own, an extension of
his own body and personality. This is manipulation in its basic form: to direct and control
the hands of another, their actions, as if they extended one’s own. A master or overseer
thus doesn’t have simply two hands, but perhaps four, or a dozen, or a couple hundred.
The above maxim reveals a reduction of the human to equipment that is ready-at-hand to
be used by another for their own desires and ends. 371 Ultimately, the “Negroes” needed to
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be kept “up to the mark.” 372 The forced labor and physical violence endured by enslaved
persons was rooted in a look that did violence to their humanity because they were
regarded and treated as tools. In this context, Looks that kill were dispatched to extract
the labor power of others and put it to use for one’s own practical purposes. Just as “the
care-burdened man in need has no sense for the finest play,” and “the dealer in minerals
sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral…
[because] he has no mineralogical sense,” so the overseer sees the use value of the bodies
of enslaved persons and puts them to good use. 373
Speculating Eyes
It should come as no surprise to find the auction block, like the field, as a site
where the visionary practices of the white community further ingrained a distorted view
of other humans. As Katherine McKittrick notes, domination is “a visible spatial project
that organizes, names, and sees social differences (such as black femininity) and
determines where social order happens.” 374 The auction block, like the field, was socially
and physically produced to shape the sights of white people, to train their regard for black
people in terms of use and exchange value, labor potential, and sexual functioning. Labor
power, for McKittrick, was “secured by the auction block” because “the meticulous
observations of bodies, coupled by the need for healthy working bodies, guaranteed
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(forced) economic advancement and progress.” 375 Also, the forced display of enslaved
people in the fields or on auction blocks naturalized the presence of black people in
certain places, both physically and socially, rather than others: “race becomes attached to
place in detrimental ways because local conditions reify and naturalize identitydifference.” 376 One witness from Florida, Edward Lycurgas, shared his memory of the
site of speculative looks:
They’d bring a slave out on the flatform and open his mouth, pound his chest,
make him harden his muscles so the buyer could see what he was gittin’. Young
men was called ‘bucks’ and young women ‘wenches.’ The person that offered the
best price was the buyer. And dey shore did git rid uf some pretty gals, Dey
always looked so shame and pitiful up on dat stand wid all dem men standin’ dere
lookin’ at em wid what dey had on dey minds shinin in they eyes.377
The violence to the human person, as displayed on a platform, occurred through prodding
and pounding the enslaved person’s body, checking their teeth, squeezing their breasts,
making them jump, and calling them bucks and wenches, or elsewhere, studs, hands, and
help. To use the words of philosopher George Yancy, “Under the pressure of so many
white hands touching, grasping, pulling, tearing, ripping, desiring, threatening, testing,
and examining, the Black body functions as an exotic object placed on display; it is a
spectacle.” 378 The auction block, as a public and communal practice, is a visual ritual
whereby economic security and desire for profit intersected with sexual exploitation and
desire, thus normalizing the dehumanizing looks of those persons in bondage and other
free people classified as “black” or “Negro.”
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The white buyers valued economic productivity and sustainability; they checked
men for muscles and strong breeding potential, and they valued women not only for their
physical strength for work in the fields, but for their reproductive capacities and as
objects with which to gratify their own desires for sex and power. As McKittrick notes,
“the feminine flesh is not just blood, muscles, hair, skin; it is also womb, breasts, the
space between the legs.” 379 Through the scrutinizing looks of white buyers, sellers,
doctors, and even sex predators and traffickers, “the black female purchased on the
auction block is rendered a public, rape-able, usable body-scale.” 380 The following was
related in 1937 by Richard Macks in Baltimore, Maryland, and shows not only the
connection between auction block practices and sexual exploitation, but also black
women’s resistance to such degradation:
The slave traders would buy young and able farm men and well-developed young
girls with fine physique to barter and sell. They would bring them to the taverns
where there would be the buyers and traders, display them and offer them for sale.
At one of these gatherings a colored girl, a mulatto of fine stature and good looks,
was put on sale. She was of big spirits and determined disposition. At night she
was taken by the trader to his room to satisfy his bestial nature. She could not be
coerced or forced, so she was attacked by him. In the struggle she grabbed a knife
and with it, she sterilized him and from the result of injury he died the next day.
She was charged with murder. Gen. Butler, hearing of it, sent troops to Charles
County to protect her, they brought her to Baltimore, later she was taken to
Washington where she was set free… This attack was the result of being
goodlooking for which many a poor girl in Charles County paid the price. 381
The overseeing eye buttressed these speculative and violating looks that sought to
position the enslaved person as a useful and gratifying object within the white field of
vision and experience.
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It is important to emphasize here that regulation of the social condition and labor
of enslaved persons occurred both through legislation and concrete practices of vision
given off by many figures on behalf of the entire white community. The eyecraft of
overseers, masters, auctioneers, slave traders or speculators, patrollers, and slave catchers
were all involved in the work of maintaining the field of economic profitability and the
concomitant subordination of racialized others. These looks were buttressed by legal
norms, informal habits and customs, and both the threat and use of violent force.
Consider these comments by travelers to the South in the 19th century that Scarborough
weaves into his own description:
the overseer could always be distinguished by his badge of office, a whip, “which
is ever in his hand.” He could usually be seen riding back and forth through the
fields, whip in hand, inspecting the work of the Negroes. The presence of an
overseer in the field had a pronounced effect upon the exertions of slaves working
under his watchful eye. One observer… noted the following scene: “I passed the
hoe-gang at work in the cotton-field, the overseer lounging among them carrying
a whip; there were ten or twelve of them; none looked up at me. Within ten
minutes I passed five who were plowing, with no overseer or driver in sight, and
every one stopped their plows to gaze at me.” A visitor to a Louisiana sugar house
during the grinding season found the overseer holding “a short-handled whip,
loaded in the butt, which had a lash four or five times the length of the staff.” The
overseer took no notice of his visitors but eyed the slaves, “quickening the steps of
a loiterer by a word, or threatening with his whip, those who, tempted by
curiosity, turned to gaze after us.” 382
This description is filled with references to concrete visionary practices. Notice how the
“watchful eye” of the overseer is said to have a “pronounced effect upon the exertions of
slaves.” His vision causes others to work harder, to sweat. This overseeing eye had the
power, through the threat of violence and actual violence, to cause energy to be expended

382

See Scarborough, Overseer, 8. Italics mine. The quotes are taken from A. De Puy Van Buren, Jottings of a Year’s
Sojourn in the South (Battle Creek, MI: Review and Herald Print, 1859), 151; Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the
Back Country (New York: Mason Brothers, 1860), 176; and Joseph Holt Ingraham, The Southwest (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1835), I, 237.

125
by another human, energy which might not always be replenished by the fruit of their
labors. Such a look that causes life to go out of another against their will is a Look that
kills.
Eying enslaved persons might “quicken” their steps, but too much quickening of
their steps could lead to exhaustion and even death, an unquickening of life. Ninety-year
old Mary Ella Grandberry from Alabama recalled: “De oberseers was terrible hard on us.
Dey’d ride up an’ down da fiel’ an’ haste you so twell you near ‘bout fell out. Sometimes
an’ most inginer’ly ever’ time you ‘hin’ de crowd you got a good lickin’ wid de bull
whup dat de driver had in de saddle wid him.” 383 Yancy has explored how white
oversight of enslaved persons was meant to “get the Black body to internalize the white
oppressive gaze… [so that] the enslaved Black body would behave in subservient ways in
the absence of actual surveillance by the white oppressor.”384 He cites Frederick
Douglass’ own description of the tactics of Edward Covey, “the quintessential
overseer/overgazer,” regarding enslaved persons: “one half of his proficiency in the art of
Negro breaking consisted, I should think, in this species of cunning. We were never
secure. He could see or hear us nearly all the time. He was, to us, behind every stump,
tree, bush and fence on the plantation.” 385 The overseeing eye is a seemingly omnipresent
and breaking eye, one that sought to deny distinctly human aspirations, movements, and
potentiality to fit others into certain prescribed actions and roles, much like someone
breaks in a new shoe or breaks a horse for human use. As a breaking eye, the overseeing
eye attempts not only to break in others, but also to break down the spirits and will to
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resist in others it wants to manage and control. This eye, as a mode of Looks that kills,
violently demands submission.
The overseer also had some power to control who or what enslaved persons might
be curious about. His job was to make sure their concern was the ground and what grows
from it, and especially not other white people. As bell hooks exclaims, “the politics of
slavery, of racialized power relations, were such that the slaves were denied their right to
gaze.” 386 While the travelers in the paragraph above could gaze upon enslaved people
with immunity, persons in bondage had to wait for the overseers to be out of sight before
looking upon their onlookers. Both the overseer and the onlookers saw the enslaved
people through what Maurice O. Wallace has called a “picture-taking racial gaze” that
“fixes and frames the black subject within ‘a rigid and limited grid [better: field] of
representational possibilities.’” 387 For white onlookers, black people only took on
meaning and value, and could only show themselves, in certain contexts and in
prescribed places. Finally, in the quoted passage is the notion that gazing upon others is a
“temptation” for enslaved people, but for white people a natural prerogative that required
no reflection or justification. The onlooking and overseeing eye can roam over the entire
field of vision, imbuing what falls within its line of sight with its own values, names, and
meanings. After this “taking stock” of the field (an actual field or socio-political
“terrain”) is systematized, the overseeing eye directs and manages whatever and whoever
is within this field for its own good. This eye determines who goes where and attempts to
hold them in that place. As Yancy states, “within the context of white racist America,
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whites inherited the privileged status of being the ‘lookers’ and gazers, with all the power
that this entailed.” 388
Ultimately, the overseer’s task was to ensure that enslaved people put their eyes to
the ground and their hands to the task, and to prevent them from seeing eye-to-eye with
white people. It was much easier for overseers to look down on others from a horse, and
“keeping down” the gazes of enslaved persons was the first concrete step in “keeping
down” black populations from rising in revolt. Alec Bostwick, a formerly enslaved
person from Georgia, remembered one overseer who “got de slaves up wid a gun at five
orclock an’ wukked ‘em ‘til way atter sundown, standin’ right over ‘em wid a gun all de
time. If a Nigger lagged or tuk his eyes off his wuk, right den an’ dar he would make him
strip down his clo’es to his waist, an’ whup him wid a cat-o-nine tails.” 389 The white
community believed that such visual and physical discipline would ensure their security
and economic prosperity. During times of insecurity, visual tactics would be emphasized
to keep free and enslaved persons “down.” Following Denmark Vesey’s attempted
insurrection in 1822, a South Carolina lawyer and editor wrote in a pamphlet that, “we
regard our Negroes as the Jacobins of the country, against whom we should always be
upon our guard, and who, although we fear no permanent effects from any
insurrectionary movements on their part, should be watched with an eye of steady and
unremitted observation.” 390 The same man, Edwin C. Holland, later wrote that, while it
was impracticable for a slave insurrection to succeed, “it is nevertheless indispensable to
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our safety to watch all their motions with a careful and scrutinising eye – and to pursue
such a system of policy, in relation to them, as will effectually prevent all secret
combinations among them, hostile to our peace.”391 A similar sentiment was expressed
following Nat Turner’s rebellion in Southampton County, Virginia in 1831. In his preface
to Nat Turner’s Confessions, Thomas R. Gray admonished his readers that, “each
particular community should look to its own safety, whilst the general guardians of the
laws, keep a watchful eye over all.” 392 Lawmakers and law “guardians” worked in
tandem; various laws were enacted by white communities following these events to keep
free and enslaved people from meeting together without white supervision, and some
made it unlawful for black people to be taught reading and writing. A steady, observing,
unblinking, and watchful eye (of the law, of the overseer, of society) would ensure that
the eyes and hands of enslaved people were on their work and not at the throats of white
people.
Coercive practices that directed members of black and brown bodies when to
move, how to move, and what to move toward led many enslaved persons to act in
certain ways rather than others when in the presence of white people. “Reduced to the
machinery of bodily physical labor,” says hooks, “black people learned to appear before
whites as though they were zombies, cultivating the habit of casting the gaze downward
so as not to appear uppity.” 393 If the “slaves” were permitted to look or stand, it was only
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to look or stand in fear. The field of vision was dominated by the white gaze, which
meant that whatever or whoever appeared within this field appeared only with the
meanings and values of the white community inscribed upon them. As political
philosopher Judith Butler has said: “The visual field is not neutral to the question of race;
it is itself a racial formation, an episteme, hegemonic and forceful.” 394 For her, the “field
of visibility” is “racially saturated,” or bathed in an excess of white, racially-infused
looks which structure “what can and cannot appear within the horizon.” 395 The looks of
the overseeing eye were therefore “not a simple seeing, an act of direct perception, but
the racial production of the visible, the workings of racial constraints on what it means to
‘see.’” 396 Yet this white control of the field through meaning-laden vision had its blind
spots; the overseer was not omnipresent. In these gaps in vision, at the peripheries of the
overseeing eye, enslaved people dared to look back.
As hooks explains, “even in the worse circumstances of domination, the ability to
manipulate one’s gaze in the face of structures of domination that would contain it, opens
up the possibility of agency.” 397 According to her,
spaces of agency exist for black people, wherein we can both interrogate the gaze
of the Other but also look back, and at one another, naming what we see. The
“gaze” has been and is a site of resistance for colonized black people globally.
Subordinates in relations of power learn experientially that there is a critical gaze,
one that “looks” to document, one that is oppositional. In resistance struggle, the
power of the dominated to assert agency by claiming and cultivating “awareness”
politicizes “looking” relations – one learns to look a certain way in order to
resist.398
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One embodied example of an oppositional, resisting look is the “eye roll” that was used
by some enslaved people to challenge or critique, even in such a small and subtle way,
overseeing domination. As described by Simone Browne, “in a June 14, 1783, runaway
notice in the Royal Gazette that offered ‘twenty dollars reward’ for sixteen-year-old
Sam… Sam is described by the subscriber as ‘five feet high, slim made,’ and ‘remarkable
in turning up the white of his eyes when spoke to.’ Sam’s bold refusals, or his facetiness,
are agential acts, at first ocular, looking back – to at once return and dismiss the gaze
with the gesture of the eye roll – and then to go missing or steal himself and make his
own place.” 399 Such a place, “his own place,” would have to be hidden from the
site/sights of white masters and overseers, either underground, in a garret like Harriet
Jacobs, or away from the reach of the slave catchers’ line of sight and the technological
extension of the white gaze, the newspaper advertisement, which was used to activate,
mobilize, and train the eyes of more white people in more distant locations.
Nevertheless the “woods was full,” as Lucy Chambers and Gill Ruffin, both
formerly enslaved, agreed: the woods, swamps, native and maroon communities, the
Underground Railroad, and other sites/sights developed on the peripheries and within the
cracks and blind spots of white fields that would become places of refuge from Looks
that kill. 400 For example, after being “whipped almost to death by the ‘Pader Rollers’”
because he was off the plantation without a pass, the uncle of Celestia Avery “stole off to
the depths of the woods where he built a cave large enough to live in.” 401 As she tells it,
“A few nights later he came back to the plantation unobserved and carried his wife and
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two children back to this cave where they lived until after freedom… No one was ever
able to find his hiding place and if he saw any one in the woods he would run like a
lion.” 402 Invisible geographies like the one created by Uncle Williams often developed
“through human networks rather than scientific/cartographic writings,” provided routes
for fugitives and, in the words of Frederick Douglass, gave them “invisible agency.” 403
Because of this, white communities aggressively sought to fill in these gaps in vision off
the plantations through the local organization of slave patrols, the utilization of slave
catchers or hunters, and the continued development of the eyes of the law that saw to the
return of “fugitive slaves” to their owners.
The Patrolling Eye
Along with overseers the group of Southerners most responsible for watching
enslaved persons was the slave patrol. 404 First officially created in South Carolina in
1704, historian Sally Hadden notes that by the revolutionary era “the main contours of
patrols became evident.” These contours included: “except in urban areas, patrols served
as separate groups, apart from militia, constables, and sheriffs. They hunted runaways,
looked for weapons and stolen goods in slave cabins, questioned slaves they met on the
road, and broke up slave meetings.” 405 They were also occasionally charged with the duty
“to suppress illegal nighttime business deals between whites and slaves.” 406 Still, slave
patrols were primarily tasked with controlling the movements of enslaved persons, who
in the eyes of the white community needed to be policed and controlled to ensure that
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agricultural production went its normal course. People in bondage needed to be planted
on and rooted in, just like seeds and plants, the fields and plantations they worked, as any
excessive movement – uprootedness – among those enslaved could bring about a crisis to
the production process and hence to communal well-being. Dennis Simms, a formerly
enslaved person who grew up on a tobacco plantation in Maryland, had this to say in
1937:
when we behaved we were not whipped, but the overseer kept a pretty close eye
on us. We all hated what they called the ‘nine ninety-nine’, usually a flogging
until fell over unconscious or begged for mercy. We stuck pretty close to the
cabins after dark, for if we were caught roaming about we would be unmercifully
whipped. If a slave was caught beyond the limits of the plantation where he was
employed, without the company of a white person or without written permit of his
master, any person who apprehended him was permitted to give him 20 lashes
across the bare back. 407
The overseeing eye worked in tandem with both the patrolling eye and the eyes of white
society in general. 408 Note how “any person” who apprehended an enslaved person
“beyond the limits of the plantation” could apprehend and punish them to keep them in
their place. The patrollers were simply another formal instantiation of the eyes of the
community whose task was to seek those enslaved persons illicitly beyond plantation
limits before they left the local area. This task of looking for beyond-the-limits, beyondthe-field, enslaved persons provided an important social service, while also providing
monetary reward for some patrollers. 409 Historian Gladys-Marie Fry explains the white
rationale for patrols: “unsupervised slave excursions from one plantation to another might
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also result in unnecessary fights and brawls among slaves, thus endangering the life and
limb of valuable property. Further, the efficiency of the slave would be greatly reduced
because of the loss of sleep and energy from his aimless carousing.” 410 What was most
important in the slavocracy was that human energy be preserved and used only in ways
that would be profitable and beneficial to white life and property. As Belle Buntin told
interviewers in the late 1930s, “If you was out after seven o’clock the patrollers git you.
They would beat and take you home. Some masters say to them ‘You done right,’ and
some say, ‘You bring my hands home; I’ll whoop them myself.’” 411 While a bizarre
expression, “bringing my hands home” was precisely what the patrolling eye was tasked
to do; hands needed to be firmly attached and directed by the master’s and overseer’s
gaze were white life and property to be maintained.
Patrollers monitored and circumscribed the movements of enslaved persons so
they would be contained within the purview and managing power of the white
community, and thus rendered predictable, stable, and profitable. According to Wiethoff,
“the size and frequency of patrols varied, though legislators typically sought from three to
six members to patrol their counties once every two weeks.” 412 Such regulation meant
that patrollers were conspicuous and a regular feature of Southern life. As we read in the
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass (1845), “at every gate through which we
were to pass, we saw a watchman – at every ferry a guard – on every bridge a sentinel –
and in every wood a patrol. We were hemmed in upon every side.” 413 This
circumscribing surveillance brought peace of mind to the white community and arrested,
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or brought to a standstill, any unwanted movements among enslaved people. Unseen or
erratic movements among them were feared as a threat to the white community; “hands”
missing from the fields could cause financial disaster, and enslaved or free black people
massing together could cause rebellion and subsequent death to white people. 414 The
logic of the overseeing and patrolling eyes was clear to at least one formerly enslaved
person, who recalled that “if slaves stayed in deir places de warn’t never whipped tar put
in chains.” 415 But, if they tried to get off their place, “our oberseer would put chains on
dere legs wid big long spikes ‘tween dere feets, so dey couldn’t git away.” 416 The
patrollers were the routinized, legalized, lethalized, and embodied appearance of the
white gaze, of Looks that kill, a gaze encapsulated in a warning that appeared in the
South-Carolina Weekly Gazette (1783), but which would have been understood by any
white Southerner for years to come: “keep a strict eye over your black walking
property.” 417 Yes, this “property,” unlike furniture with legs, could get up and move.
One strategy used to train white eyes, especially the eyes of patrollers, to see their
“black walking property” was to sometimes require enslaved persons to wear badges, as
happened in large towns such as Wilmington and Charleston, and through various curfew
laws. According to Hadden, “a slave’s failure to wear the badge could result in
punishment, incarceration, and fines for the slave owner.” 418 Badges, much like branding,
visibly marked the bodies of the enslaved and allowed white eyes to keep a close watch
on them and to regard them superficially as property, less than, and whose only worth
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resided in their function within a social and economic system of subordination. One
interviewee in the 1930s, Dennis Simms, recalled that, “Sometimes Negro slave
runaways who were apprehended by the patrollers, who kept a constant watch for
escaped slaves, besides being flogged, would be branded with a hot iron on the cheek
with the letter ‘R’.” 419 Such a branding, a readily visible identification, served to more
easily target, identity, and secure enslaved people if they ran away. One slaveholder in
North Carolina, Micajah Ricks, advertised for a runaway enslaved person: “A few days
ago before she went off, I burnt her with a hot iron on the left side of her face; I tried to
make the letter M, and she kept a cloth over her head and face, and a fly bonnet on her
head so as to cover the burn.” 420 Marks proved notoriously difficult to conceal, especially
if the mark was made on one’s face, or, if the mark was one’s own skin color.421 These
practices not only brought economic stability to the white community, but also
psychological security. Badges and brands were marks that, according to Colette
Guillaumin, “expressed (and imprinted) the fact of belonging to a definite social
group.”422 As she explains it, “characteristics of the mark vary, and its indelibility, as
well as its more or less close proximity to/association with the body, is a function of: (1)
the assumed permanence of the position that it is a sign of; and (2) the degree of
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subjection that it symbolizes.” 423 For example, marks directly on the body were “a sign of
the permanence of the power relationship,” while the mark of status “is inscribed in a
reversible fashion when it signifies contractual subordination.” 424 Even clothing and
dress, which are easily capable of change, serve as marks of belonging to a particular
social station or “place in social relations.” 425 White control of enslaved persons and their
movements was greatly aided by various marks beyond skin color, which was itself used
as a “natural” marker to point out a social group for exploitation and control.
Mobilizing Eyes
In another historical moment, that of Jewish people under Nazi Germany, badges
were also used to make sure that the German community made social and racial
distinctions among themselves through the way they looked at each other.426 As Boaz
Neumann explains in an excellent article, “The Phenomenology of the German People’s
Body (Volkskörper) and the Extermination of the Jewish Body,”
techniques of observation were central to racial practice. They sought to mobilize
the eyes of all Germans… [but] at the same time, the Nazis were not satisfied with
simply training the German-Nazi gaze. Expression of Nazi angst over the Jews’
loss of their corporeal otherness is found also in the growing obsession to mark
them by various means, including yellow stars. In exposing Jewish bodies to the
German gaze, the yellow star also exposed the Jews’ bodies to themselves… Jews
forced to wear the yellow star avoided going out in public as much as possible…
When Yitskhok Rudashevski espied from his window a group of Jews donning
their patches, he was pained to see how they were stared at. He experienced the
yellow star as something ‘burning’ him, branding him. He could not, in fact, bear
it. ‘I felt a hump, as though I had two frogs on me.’ After being forced to wear the
yellow star, Klaus Scheurenberg wrote, ‘I felt terribly ashamed… It seemed to
weigh many stone… I had the feeling that everyone was staring at me. But they
423
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weren’t; I was feverish, as if naked!’ The yellow star imprisoned the Jewish body
within itself… The Jew was once again a Fremdkörper [“foreign body”] in the
eyes of the Nazis, as well as in his own eyes. All that was left to do was to get rid
of him. 427
The psychological and physical violence entailed in such a Nazi “mobilization” of the
eyes of Germans is clearly a Look that kills. The quotation also reveals the social and
ethical character of vision, that eyes can be trained by social forces and institutions
beyond the interpersonal.
The sinister look of “the German-Nazi gaze” toward Jewish people is brought out
even more completely in conversations between top Nazi officials as they debated
whether to put Jews in ghettos or simply force them to wear insignias. As early as 1935
there is record of Adolf Hitler stating to members of his party that Jewish people would
be placed “into a ghetto, enclosed in a territory where they can behave as becomes their
nature, while the German people look on as one looks at wild animals.” 428 By displaying
Jewish people in a rundown and dirty environment, Germans might see Jewish people in
such a place as inherently impure, morally dangerous, and inferior. The negative
conditions of a place would cause negative moral evaluations of the people living there.
As McKittrick aptly notes, “who we see is tied up with where we see.” 429 In his book on
the ghetto in history, an idea applied in history to both Jewish and African American
neighborhoods, sociologist Mitchell Duneier points out that “when discussing ghettos
with his Nazi ministers early in his reign, Hitler referred to ghettos as zoolike places in
which to display Jews.” 430 If there was no “natural” way for Germans to see Jews as
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socially inferior, as diseased, or as morally decrepit, then it was necessary for the Nazis to
force Jews to appear as poor and less than human by providing them with poor and less
than human living conditions.
In the November 12, 1938 debate among top officials over insignias versus
ghettos as the preferred means to control and keep an eye on the Jewish population in
towns and cities, Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Nazi security service, proposed that
“Jews should be forced to wear an insignia to make it easier for the police to keep an eye
on them.” 431 Field Marshal Hermann Göring objected, seeing the insignia as a way to get
around the ghetto, to which Heydrich replied: “We don’t want to let the Jew live in the
same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks
or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful
eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where
I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.” 432
Because uniformed agents were limited in their surveilling capacities, Heydrich believed
it was necessary to train and utilize the eyes of the entire German population to make sure
that Jews “behaved” themselves and stayed in their place. While this debate never
reached a definitive conclusion, Duneier notes that the Nazis embarked on “the next-best
thing: a dramatic social marginalization of Jews in German society. The idea was to
isolate and demoralize Jews by preventing them from entering the daily routine of
German life until a better solution could be found.” 433 Consider this description of the
measures taken by the Nazis in 1938-1939: “Jews were segregated in special ‘Jew
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houses’ located alongside the Christian population. They were forbidden to enter German
theaters, share train cars, or bathe with Germans on beaches and resorts from the fear that
touch pollutes. They were also prohibited from purchasing fruit or candy when entering
shops.” 434 To arrest the movements of Jews, regulations prevented them from having
driver’s licenses or owning cars, and from going into governmental districts, public
squares, and hospitals. They also could not send their children to German schools. 435 As
explored in the next chapter, the parallels here to the visual workings of Jim Crow
America are remarkable.
Eventually ghettos with their attendant barbed wires did go up, especially in
Eastern Europe, and almost overnight. Duneier argues that it was barbed wire in
particular that “enabled the Nazis to make good on Hitler’s earlier wish to display Jews
as wild animals.” 436 He refers to one report from May 1942 sent to the Polish government
in exile, which reads: “every day large coaches come to the ghetto; they take soldiers
through as though it were a zoo… Often soldiers strike out at passers-by with long
whips… They set up genre pictures (old Jew above the corpse of a young girl).” 437
Again, the Nazis desired Jews to appear in certain ways – as animal-like and sub-human,
parasitic and murderous – to justify their repressive practices. Jews would be made to
appear in public, not according to their own free self-expression, to the look they gave
themselves, but as a type or “genre picture” that matched Nazi imaginations and which in
circular fashion justified Nazi views. This forcing of Jewish people to appear in public,
before the gazes of others, as matching the stereotypes that were generated by Nazis had
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their intended effect. As one German soldier stated, “their appearance is the best visual
education that our people could receive on the Jewish question.” 438 Another claimed that
“only after he and a group of his peers had visited the Jewish quarter in Krakόw did they
realize the importance and necessity of the racial laws of their führer.” 439 By being made
to appear in a certain way and within a certain environment, stereotypes and negative
ideas about Jews were naturalized and thus made to appear as the way things naturally
were rather than as violently produced by larger social forces and agencies. As David
Sibley states, “power is expressed in the monopolization of space and the relegation of
weaker groups in society to less desirable environments.” 440 The German population’s
visual education, therefore, was to literally see poor, unclean, and starved Jews in an
inhumane environment fit for animals, thus confirming the imagined type and justifying
the punitive measures to protect oneself or one’s race against this type. In the words of
Sylvia Wynter, who in her context was speaking of black faces, Jewish faces were “made
seeable only through the prism of its negative signifying function.” 441
A similar mobilization of the eyes of white people took place in the American
South and was enforced by slave patrols. According to Hadden, “in city patrolling, one
can see most prominently the distinctive Southern pattern linking race and slavery with
public authority and control.” 442 Usually appointed by militia captains or county courts,
patrollers had the legal sanction to question and detain any suspicious persons and to
inspect the fields and houses of local community members. This sometimes led to
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conflict between planters and patrollers because the former wished to exercise power and
control, in paternalistic fashion, over “their own,” without outside interference, while
patrollers represented the powers of a larger civic community. However, for enslaved
people in the American South, the patrolling eye was one more instantiation of the white
hegemonic gaze that marked their very skin and flesh with racialized and social
valuations even without patches or badges, although the latter did help white authorities
distinguish between free and enslaved black people.
Offing Eyes
White eyes like the patrolling eye frequently factored black people and their
bodies as off when they weren’t on the plantation or in designated sections of towns; they
pointed to and marked them out as spatially and socially off their proper place and
associated this offness with corresponding mental and moral states: wrong, abnormal,
odd, and “not in one’s right mind.” Unable or unwilling to comprehend the reasons their
“walking property” would go up and off, many masters and overseers resorted to the
logic that they must not have been in their right mind, that they didn’t know what was
good for them. Sure enough, to be off (spatially, mentally, socially) meant, for the
enslaved person, the threat of being offed by a Look that kills, whether shot by a
patroller, a slave catcher with the help of a bloodhound, or a random member of the white
community. 443 As Spencer Barnett from Holly Grove, Arkansas recalled, “When I was a
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little boy I could hear men runnin’ the slaves wid hounds in the mountains. The landmen
paid paddyrollers to keep track of slaves. Keep em home day and night.” 444 Enslaved
persons could only mitigate the marked, threatened status of offness when they returned
to their “natural” place in space and society: obediently on the plantation. However,
being on the plantation proved yet again that the condition of offness that had supposedly
been spatially and socially resolved in the return was actually a legally, socially, and
violently enforced state that could also be passed down from generation to generation
through slavery. White eyecraft had, in a deeper and long-lasting sense, marked black
people and their bodies as off, as missing the mark of humanity, of intelligence, of moral
goodness, of beauty, and of orderliness. Ironically it was this purported offness that
justified keeping enslaved people on plantations and farms. Being off so as to be on; this
is precisely the condition of one rendered extraneous and alienable, to be better subjected
to the will of another: “Capture and the slave trade set in motion a process through which
the captive was rendered extraneous and thus prepared for his or her state as absolute
alien in the society into which he or she was delivered.” 445 Enslaved people could be
fugitives to full humanity and “society,” but not to the eye of the master, who did his best
to close the distance between his eye and his “property.” Proximity of eyepower brought
control and stability, while remoteness of eyepower brought insecurity and instability.
Aggressive looks from patrols, slave catchers, and other white people were often
concretized in shots being fired or in lashes being given to out-of-place people. As we
read in an account from the Federal Writers’ Project: “every member of the patrol was
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required to carry a pistol while on duty. They were required to arrest all slaves found
outside their master’s domain without a pass, or who was not in company with some
white person. He was empowered to whip such slave with twenty lashes. He also had
power to search for offensive weapons and fugitive slaves.” 446 The patrolling eye tracked
down enslaved persons not only locally in slave patrols, but also along border states and
in the North in the person of the slave catcher. As Hadden explains, “Unlike patrollers
who functioned as officials of the county or state, slave catchers were not appointed by
their local communities; they merely advertised their ability to capture runaway slaves,
and masters hired them for short-term jobs, typically paying ten, fifteen, or twenty-five
dollars for capturing a runaway.” 447 It was necessary for the white community to have
access to trained eyes outside their own immediate area, and slave catchers filled the void
in vision. 448 In these situations, white eyes were the hunters, the predators, and enslaved
people were the hunted, the prey.
“Slaveholding domination,” according to Grégoire Chamayou, “does not arise
from an open struggle but rather from a relationship, which is dissymmetrical from the
outset, of manhunting. Here, even before operations begin, the hunter is already in a
position to be the master. He knows his power and his material supremacy. The prey,
taken by surprise, is not in a position to confront a group of hunters. At first, it has no
choice but to flee.” 449 The dynamic of manhunting that occurs in the tracking and hunting
down of runaway people produces “radical anxiety” in those hunted because they are
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“constantly on the watch.” 450 Consider this excerpt from Olaudah Equiano’s account of
being tracked as he hides in a forest: “[I] began to consider that, if possibly I could escape
all other animals, I could not those of the human kind… Thus was I like the hunted deer:
‘Ev’ry leaf, and ev’ry whispering breath / Convey’d a foe, and ev’ry foe a death.’” 451
Through patrolling and slave catching practices, training white eyes on black people
became both a personal and national habit; it became both routine and normalized to view
and mark nonwhite people as out of place and therefore as “off.” 452 For Chamayou,
manhunting was “a means of ontological policing: a violence whose aim is to maintain
the dominated in correspondence with their concept, that is, with the concept that the
dominant have imposed on them.” 453 White eyes controlled both the bodily and social
movements of black people, and the “concept” imposed on them, which can be taken to
mean their forcibly-positioned state/place in society with its associated meanings, values,
and affects. This is a factoring eye. As Claude Meillassoux explains, “Otherness,
combined with the class relation which developed with exploitation within the slaveowning society, provoked a racist reaction to slaves. This is because both somatic traits
(ugliness, heaviness) and character traits (stupidity, laziness, shiftiness) were always
associated with the state of the slave.” 454
With the demise of official slave patrols, maintaining such a “racial hierarchy”
was passed on to various policing organizations or more informal vigilante networks such
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as the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camelia, or the White League. 455 In the
memories of formerly enslaved people and their children, there was not always a clear
dividing line between patrollers and Klansmen, just as there was not always a clear line
separating slave patrols and later police. Wiethoff himself notes that many “former slaves
failed to distinguish between a prewar patrol and a postwar Klan.” 456 Perhaps this is
because their looks and the vibe they gave off was so similar: “de white folks were the
‘Paddle-Rollers’ and had masks on dere faces. They looked like niggers wid de devil in
dere eyes.” 457
The testimony of Albert Brooks, a free Richmond stable keeper before the Civil
War, demonstrates the continuity between slave patrolling and policing functions in the
South: “it was Mayor [Joseph] Mayo who in former days ordered us to be scourged for
trifling offenses against slave laws and usages; and his present police, who are now
hunting us through the streets, are the men who relentlessly applied the lash to our
quivering flesh.” 458 Hadden herself explains that “in the South, the ‘most dangerous
people’ who were thought to need watching were slaves.” 459 Further, “the history of
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police work in the South grew out of this early fascination, by white patrollers, with what
African American slaves were doing. Most law enforcement was, by definition, white
patrolmen watching, catching, or beating black slaves.” 460 Mirzoeff, in describing the
history of Haiti after the revolution, has noted a similar passing of the torch, of the
powers of white visuality, from individual overseers and masters to various policing
organizations. For him, “the functions of plantation oversight that foreshadowed panoptic
discipline were thus directly transferred to the police, but with no pretense that moral
reform was intended.” 461 The result was that “the state of exception was no longer
localized to the plantation, as it had been under slavery, but was nationalized and enacted
under the supervision of the police.” 462 After the Civil War, African American
communities would no longer be watched and policed primarily by overseers and
patrollers, but by more formal policing organizations and the eyes of vigilantes. Fearing
that the eyes of the white body politic, itself being “taken over” by black members, could
no longer secure their own substance (their honor, manhood, womanhood, position in
society, economic success, “whitestuff,” etc.), many white people would organize their
eyepower in new and alternative ways to see to the new threat.
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Chapter 5: White as a Ghost
“Ancient maps of the world – when the world was flat – inform us, concerning that void
where America was waiting to be discovered, HERE BE DRAGONS. Dragons may not
have been here then, but they are certainly here now, breathing fire, belching smoke; or,
to be less literary and biblical about it, attempting to intimidate the mores, morals, and
morality of this particular and peculiar time and place.” 463
“Their God is their stomach.”464
“Raght atter de war de Ku Klux got atter de colored folks. Dey would come to our houses
an’ scare us mos’ to death. Dey would take some of de niggers out and whup ‘em and
dose dat dey didn’t whup dey tied up by dere fingers and toes. Dese Ku Klux would come
to our windows at night an’ say; ‘Your time ain’t long acomin’. De Ku Klux got so bad
dat dey would even git us in de daytime. Dey tuk some of de niggers an’ throwed ‘em in
de river to drown. Dey kep’ dis up ‘twell some folks from de North come down an’ put a
stop to it.”465
“All his eye-roots crackled in the flames.”466

Historians frequently reference the fact that the Ku Klux Klan has made three
major appearances in American history: first, in the years immediately following the
Civil War up through the early 1870s; second, in the years following World War I up
through the 1920s; and third, in the decades of the civil rights movement, the 1950s-60s.
Each appearance had their own distinct approach to social issues, ethos of hate, terror
activities, looks, and targets. The Klan of cross burnings and white robes so much a part
of popular American culture today stems mainly from the “Second Coming” of the Klan
in the 1920s when it reached the height of its power across the nation. However, the first
appearance of the Klan was primarily a rural and small-town Southern phenomenon that
drew much of its mystique and costume from modern trends in popular culture. This Klan
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targeted local freedpeople and their white allies, especially those who were members of
Union Leagues or the Republican Party. African Americans made significant gains in
terms of holding public office and economic influence, a fact bitterly resented by many
white people and the “secret fraternity” seeking to bring about redemption of the former
Southern way of life. 467 Klan activities were quickly quelled, however, due to the passage
of a series of Enforcement Acts by Congress in 1870-71 following the ratifications of the
14th and 15th Amendments; intense federal prosecution of their crimes; and using the
federal army as a policing force in the defeated South. Yet the Klan’s disappearance was
also due to the reality that by the end of the 1870s Reconstruction had ended and the Klan
and other southern leaders had achieved their goals of the “electoral disfranchisement and
economic subjugation of black people.” 468
The Klan of the 1920s found its inspiration from D. W. Griffith’s film The Birth
of a Nation (1915), which depicted freedpeople and “carpetbaggers” as “running amok,
assaulting white women, and threatening white power,” and its greatest centers of
influence were the states of Indiana and Oregon. 469 This public, mass-oriented Klan
relied on a business model replete with advertisements, membership campaigns, and
various forms of media to spread its views. While African Americans were still a target
for this Klan, Jews and Catholics became prominent targets for their hate due to their
presence in the North and their perceived “foreignness” and roles in several conspiracy
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theories popular at the time. 470 The Klan also targeted immigrants and bootleggers for
their role in staining American life with foreignness and immorality respectively.
Scandals involving top Klan leaders eventually doomed this iteration of the group that
considered itself the moral police of white America. Finally, the Klan of the civil rights
era organized to resist the fight for social and political equality for African Americans
and other people of color. This Klan articulated itself along segregationist lines and
resorted to acts of violence and intimidation, especially bombings, to stop “integration,”
which for them meant not only social equality between blacks and whites, but also the
disturbing prospect of interracial sex and intermarriage.
In terms of the original Ku Klux Klan, Sally Hadden claims that “the Klan’s reign
of racial terror in the late nineteenth century emphasized the most extreme elements of
earlier slave patrol behavior.” 471 She describes the early formation of the group after its
first meeting in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865: “claiming boredom, six young men created
the club (they said) to play pranks on local freed men; club members rode around dressed
as ghosts to scare former slaves.” 472 Even in the days of masters and overseers it was
sometimes a tactic for these figures to tell ghost stories or even dress up as ghosts to scare
slaves into staying on the plantation. As Fry, who has explored this phenomenon in Night
Riders in Black Folk History, states, “the master or his guards could be in only one place
at any given time, but a ghost could appear any place at any time in a kind of all-seeing
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capacity.” 473 Continuing the use of this “supernatural” visual power, as early as 1867 the
Klan had transitioned to “systematic brutality” and its members “routinely resorted to
violence – beating, lynching, and shooting – to punish freedmen for their political
convictions and to prevent the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 474 For
Klansmen, the eyes of new federal laws no longer saw or regarded formerly enslaved
people as they did, and this reality pushed them to take matter/s into their own hands.
They were determined that their view of things would win out over the changes taking
place in their midst.
The Klan and their supporters also had an economic incentive to their actions, as
explained by historian William Peirce Randel: “if idle Negroes could be frightened…
perhaps they could be persuaded to resume work, and something like the prewar balance
could be restored – the plantation system that kept the Negroes subservient and at work,
producing the income that white men had been accustomed to.” 475 Williams, describing
the similarities between the roles of the patrollers and that of Klansmen, explains that
“like the slave patrols, the Klan was organized locally, operated mostly at night, drew its
members from every class of White society, enforced a pass system and curfew, broke up
Black social gatherings and meetings, searched homes, seized weapons, and enforced its
demands through violence and intimidation.” 476 For Hadden, “whites who had once
mistrusted their slaves but controlled them through physical intimidation now sought to
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control the freedmen in order to diminish their fears. Terror was the key.” 477 The
terrorizing disguises and ghostly appearance of the Klan was a manifestation of the white
hegemonic gaze stripped of all legal trappings. Looks that kill were exposed for what
they truly were, and still can be: monstrous.478
The Cycloptic Eye
To come across a monstrous eye is to come across a devious, strange, hideous,
frightening, abnormally formed, and seemingly inhuman, wicked eye. This monstrous
eye is white eyepower backed by violent force and intimidation. 479 In an entry that
appeared in The Christian Recorder, the official newspaper of the AME Church, on
November 7, 1868, we read the following description:
What is the origin of the “Ku Klux Klan?” It will be observed that the official
announcements are always in the name of the “Grand Cyclop.” This name
“Cyclop,” led the writer to the following reflection, and, as he believes, just
conclusion: Cyclops is from Cyclopea - kuklo in Greek, circules, meaning “a
circle”… The Cyclops inhabited the western part of Sicily, ever kept their bodies
mystically covered, their faces concealed in masks, in the center of which was but
one hole, so that they were thought to have but one eye in the center of the upper
part of the faces, by the terror stricken people. They were believed to be all
powerful, and went about taking human life, destroying and devastating all kinds
of property, fortifications, and even whole cities and communities… Now take all
the facts in connection with this most dangerous organization, their manner of
dress, being covered with sheets and masks; and of assembling, whether indoors
or mounted on horseback, in a circle; they only recognizing the rights of white
men; carrying always glittering weapons; shooting in the dark by volleys,
representing lightning and thunder, and you cannot fail to recognize the true
origin, intent, and the meaning of the “Ku Kuk Clan.” 480
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This fascinating breakdown of the cycloptic nature of the Klan moves us to consider the
eye of the white racist and hegemonic gaze in its monstrous mode in terms of the
mythical Cyclopes. This monstrous eye is a cycloptic eye and Looks that kill are scare
tactics. 481
Like the famous Cyclops from Homer’s The Odyssey, the cycloptic eye is lawless,
or better, a law unto itself. As we’re told in the story, they’re a “lawless and prideful
people… They live near crests of high mountains in hollow caves and each man lays
down laws for his children and wives. No one Kuklops cares for another (oud allelon
alegousi).” 482 The surrounding community puts little to no restrictions on this eye that
devours flesh and feeds on blood, as it can operate outside the bounds of the law and in
relative isolation; it carves out the space and presumes the freedom to take matter/s into
its own hands. It can do what it wills and desires with little external check on its power,
not even from the gods: the “Cyclopean disdain for neighbors is an expression of their
contempt for Zeus and the civility he oversees.” 483 The cycloptic eye stems from an ethos
of rugged individualism, where the independence and self-autonomy of the law-giving
father figure in his cave is esteemed above all else. It believes itself to be the absolute
source and goal of authority and power; all things in the world are referred solely to
itself. In this sense, the cycloptic eye can be considered a concupiscent eye,
concupiscence being described in its negative form by theologian Leo Scheffczyk as the

481

There was tremendous speculation at the time as to where the name “Ku Klux Klan” originated. Some thought that
the sounds of the three words resembled the “cocking and discharging of rifles and shotguns,” others deriving the name
from ancient Scottish clans, or from a Hebrew term found in an old Jewish work, or from Mexican mythology
(Cukulcan, the god of light). Fry states that “the most commonly accepted origin of the term is that Ku Klux was
coined from the Greek word kuklos, meaning a circle… ‘a circle of friends.’” An overlooked theory, which Fry
considers to be on to something, is the connection with the word “Clocletz, the name of a phantom Indian chieftain
whom the Georgia Blacks believed led his skeleton followers over the swamps and savannas of Georgia.” See Fry,
Night Riders, 117-122.
482
Homer, Odyssey 9.105-115.
483
Rick M. Newton, “Assembly and Hospitality in the Cyclôpeia,” College Literature 35.4 (Fall 2008): 18.

153
“the will to self-preservation… raised to the status of an absolute.” 484 This eye desires its
own self-preservation, its own being and security, at all costs, and the world around it is
forced to cater to these base needs. It is fitting that in later tradition the Cyclopes are
known as “builders of walls,” for example, “those of Argos, Tiryns, and Mycenae.” 485
They must protect their territory and expel (or eat) all their guests.
In terms of Looks that kill, the cycloptic eye is a concrete mode through which
white people, whether Ku Klux or not, have sometimes seen nonwhite others. As
described by George Yancy: “reproduced through circuits of desire and power, and
through embodied, habituated forms of racism, whiteness… strives for totalization; it
desires to claim the entire world for itself and has the misanthropic effrontery to
territorialize the very meaning of the human.” 486 The cycloptic eye is territorializing
because protects its own turf, and also terrorizing for those who threaten its domestic
space and dominant mode of being human; as we have seen, it even territorializes the
bodies of others. This eye seeks to totalize, to bring everything within its orbit, and flows
out of the monstrous and cycloptic nature of totalizing systems, as described by Enrique
Dussel:
Totality, the system, tends to totalize itself, to center on itself, and to attempt –
temporally – to eternalize its present structure. Spatially, it attempts to include
within itself all possible exteriority. Having an infinite hunger, the fetish attempts
to install itself forever in an insatiable cannibalism [antropofagía]. Face-to-face
proximity disappears because the fetish eats its mother, its children, its siblings.
Totalized totality, Cyclops or Leviathan on earth, kills as many alien faces
(persons) as question it until finally, after a long and frightful agony, it sadly
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disappears from history, not without first sealing its final days with innumerable
injustices. 487
The man-eating eye oversees its flock and cave “stock” exclusively for feeding on it, as
in the expression: feast your eyes! There is no “face-to-face proximity” with others, no
enriching relations with guests, because the cycloptic eye disappears these others in its
aggressive accumulation and protection of its stuff, that is, its substance.
The Cyclop’s eye is not concerned with the world around it – the animals, the
land, the plants, the people, etc. – as it is, or for any of its transcendental qualities
(beauty, truth, goodness, etc.), but only for the substance, sustenance, and gratification it
can get out of it. It is difficult to imagine any contemplative life for the Cyclopes; as
monsters, they have no heart and soul, even though they talk about the gods and even call
upon them occasionally. 488 Klansmen, as will be seen, were good churchgoers. But the
cycloptic eye is not contemplative in any sense. Rather, it is fit for the active life: its
single, monocular eye is geared for a razor-sharp look, a beam or a ray, that is finely
tuned for the practical work of cutting, crafting, drilling, or killing. Binocular vision, by
contrast, is the creation and integration of two views from two sources, adding depth and
dimensionality to vision and therefore to the world it sees. The cycloptic eye sees without
depth, without the richness of dimensionality, content as it is with appearances and the
posing of reality as a uniform slab for its own self-imposition.
As was pointed out above in the paragraph from The Christian Recorder, both the
Cyclopes and the Klan are associated with the circular and the circumscribing. Just like
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the patrolling eye that circumscribes, or moves around, black communities to choke its
movements and activities, so also the Klan assembles in circular formation. A circle is the
position best suited for attack on horses, as when a group in battle encircles an enemy,
and it is also well suited for a defensive position, as in the colloquialism, circling the
wagons. The Klan collectively gave a Look that sought to encircle the black community
to keep them in place, to contain and separate them from the white community and from
access to political and social power. Along with circumscribing, the cycloptic eye
represents a totalizing eye, an eye which sees no value in the other except the moral
imperative to put down or destroy. In its obsession with maintaining a grip on access to
and control over the substance of life, it pegs the other it deems a threat or rival in more
ways than one. To refer again to Dussel on totality, the cycloptic eye kills alien faces.
The Ku Klux Klan initially emerged on the local and national scene “as a solution
to the problem of southern white defeat.”489 The cycloptic eye that gained concrete visual
power after the Civil War came primarily from those men who, according to historian
Elaine Frantz Parsons, “were not at all certain that they could maintain their grip on
resources and power in the South after losing the war.” 490 They intimidated, threatened,
and killed because they themselves felt threatened, as if their values, vitality, manhood,
and way of life were being crushed into the ground. 491 Originally, however, the Klan was
not a group who simply wanted to restore the past in a fix of nostalgia, but were looking
for new ways to live out their values and secure their substance within rapidly changing
social and political conditions. Further, the original members of the Klan in Pulaski were
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not, as imagined, from the lower classes of white society, but were instead, as one local
recalled, “the nicest and most cultured young men in the town and country.” 492 They
knew Greek and Latin, practiced law and other prominent professions in town, and none
of them were plantation owners. For Parsons, “the Ku-Klux’s ideas, structure, and early
energy came from professional young men living in the Upper South, in town, inhabiting
an intellectual universe in which northern ideas and institutions played an important
part.” 493 Later, members claimed that the Klan was not initially formed for racial conflict,
but instead for entirely social and entertainment purposes. Some members of the Klan
were musicians and participated in the American minstrel tradition, whereby white
entertainers “blackened up” their faces to act out crass, stereotypical roles of African
Americans or to sing folk songs for similar effect. Yet the Klan was, according to
Parsons, distinctly “modern,” that is, stemming from social relations beyond local
contexts of interaction; having “a sense of discontinuity and rupture with the structures of
the past;” having a “secular framing” parallel to a break with a providential view of
history; and involving “a search for a role that indicates no expectation of secure
status.” 494 Out of the chaos left in the wake of the Civil War, the Klan promised order to
both white men’s psyches and to “their” world.
Interestingly, scholars have repeatedly connected the Klan’s early formation with
the modern experience of boredom, and Parsons adds that the words the men who created
the Klan used to describe their own motives was “restlessness” and “longing.” 495 Along
with boredom, the experiences of restlessness and longing cast the early formation of the
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Klan in the vocabulary associated with concupiscence, that constant longing to integrate
the pluralist aspects of one’s reality into a coherent frame that can be overseen and
controlled from a central viewpoint. It may be surprising to hear that boredom is a crucial
aspect of the modern experience of concupiscence, yet boredom too evinces the
experience of no longer being satisfied with one’s life and its prospects, one’s cultural
expressions, or one’s values. Boredom is, in its own way, the flipside to restlessness and
longing, their very negative. As Parsons explains, “if boredom emerges ‘whenever the
promise of political emancipation is frustrated’ and ‘marks the discrepancy between the
actual and the imagined,’ those young and able Pulaski men, defeated soldiers and civic
boosters with precious little to boost, were prime candidates for the very modern
experience of boredom.” 496 Boredom reigns in the “discrepancy” between the real and the
ideal, between the actual and imagined, between the intense longing for more and the
constraints of one’s present. 497 “Boredom,” argues Parsons, “often expressed the failures
of the much-touted new regime to deliver satisfaction: the thwarted promise of science to
give human beings control over nature and of the era’s political revolutions to give
individuals agency within their societies.” 498 The Klan was a way to channel the agencies
and energies of white men denied, or at least felt to be denied, by the newly reconstructed
social and political institutions of the South. As Parsons puts it, “The Ku-Klux served to
alleviate the restlessness of southerners as it had that of the Pulaski founders by reframing
problems in a way that made meaningful action seem possible.” 499 It was a group
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organized to take matter/s into its own hands, to secure its grip on the levers of social
control and reproduction, which included stopping organized groups of free black men
and women, especially militias or unwanted political organizations. 500
Parsons sums up the goal of many white people during Reconstruction by noting
that, “Continuing a long tradition of surveilling and preventing slaves’ congregation in
groups, whether for religious, social, or other purposes, postwar white Democratic
southerners were convinced that any meeting of freedpeople and their white allies was in
itself an impediment to their efforts to reassert their monopoly on power.” 501 Organized
expressions of white racial violence, even when exaggerated in terms of their
organizational efficiency or numbers, thus tracked and targeted organizations, especially
militias, that incorporated black members. Attacks on the actual bodies of black people
were also attacks on the social bodies of which they were a part. What was important for
white people was to limit the self-anthropomorphization of black people through
organizing themselves and through the technological extensions of themselves. The goal
for Klansmen and other sympathetic white people was to prevent freedpeople from
forming bonds that would increase their own ability to take matter/s into their own hands,
and especially from increasing their arm and eyepower through acquiring, and training
with, guns. 502 The reason for this basic concern is, as Parsons claims that, “the act of
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organization itself, for any purpose, was civilly empowering.” 503 She quotes Walter
Johnson to the effect that, “Collective resistance is, at bottom, a process of everyday
organization, on that… depends upon connections and trust established through everyday
actions.” 504 And so it was a central goal of the Klan to undermine “black organization in
part by claiming, and attempting to demonstrate, that freedmen’s organization was false,
corrupt, inappropriate, or hollow.” 505 Klansmen “wanted to destroy whatever
organizational structures freedpeople had managed to build, and expected that in doing so
they would reveal that freedpeople lacked the solidarity and integrity to make these
associations legitimate and robust; they would thus mark freedpeople as incapable of true
civic association.” 506 The end result of this marking was that “the visible organization of
the Klan was meant to highlight and contrast with black disorder.”507
White people were portrayed as orderly and black people as disorderly, even as
Klansmen pulled people from the privacy of their homes at night, marched them to
isolated places in the yard or the woods, and (un)ceremoniously dealt with them. This
method of taking solitary individuals off to isolated spots to threaten, beat, or kill them
was, according to Parsons, also symbolic: “The isolated victim was not just practically
but experientially completely outside and beyond hope of rescue by his friends.” 508 Here
again the place of the crime signified the place in political life that Klansmen desired to
relegate black people and their allies: outside. Their own organized attack was “a ritual of
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exclusion, in which the subject was excised from the body politic.”509 Cut off from
friends and organizations who might rally to their defense, the Klan’s targets were cut out
of the body politic by the cycloptic eye, an eye trained to be excisive, excessive, and
exclusionary. Upon finding free black people in their “cave,” that is, in the domestic,
social, and political space believed to be reserved for their dominant self-assertion alone,
they committed acts of inhospitable violence to preserve their substance. Scholars have
pointed out that the Cyclops story “is an exercise in non-xeneia,” or, “a hospitality-scene
gone awry.” 510 As one witness from Union County, South Carolina recalled in a memoir:
“Throughout the County there were several Klans, and each Klan could make its own
raid. They undertook to govern all things at their own sweet will.” 511
Performing Looks
In terms of white manhood, the Klan’s “performance was, in part, an expression
of white Southern men’s sense of disempowerment and failure as patriarchs after the
war.” 512 Because men at the time were “expected to protect and sustain dependents,” it
was hard for many white men to deal with the fact that they could not do this during the
war and in its aftermath. Further, “many southern white men had grounded their
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manhood on their right to inflict unmanning violence upon slaves.” 513 This “unmanning”
and re-manning violence would show itself most explicitly in sexual violence done to
black women, and in numerous acts of castration that often preceded the execution of
black men. 514 These ritual and performative acts of violence against freedpeople and their
white allies was a way for white men to feel like they were still the masters of social,
political, and sexual forces in life, and they presented this violence “as constructive of a
new and stable southern social order.” 515 The form in which their racialized violence was
presented “was drawn self-consciously from the newest trends, from popular
entertainment to contemporary forms of organizational structure.”516 Klan costuming and
disguise drew heavily on popular carnival scenes, minstrelsy, masquerade balls, and
sensationalist fiction, such as detective novels, so popular at the time. Their bizarre
costumes thus presented a certain look that infused their looks of others with an unsettling
character. Their disguises spread terror through the grotesque character of their makeup
coupled with the odd behavior of the people donning them: “Ku-Klux attackers
sometimes committed violence in a comic mode, self-consciously wearing costumes or
employing formulas from the minstrel stage not only to confuse, frighten, and demean
victims but also to obscure accounts of their deeds.” 517 Their costumes varied from red
flannel pants with white stripes along the seams, to masks made with squirrel skin, to
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papered hats, to white gowns, to ribbons and tassels, to horns stuffed with cotton, to
women’s clothing, and to cows’ and mules’ tails or mules’ ears. 518 According to Parsons,
and which should be expected by now, “The favorite animal feature… was that most
phallic of accessories, the bull’s horn.” 519 The look of the Klan, just like its violent
actions and its perverse looks, was intentionally portrayed as beastly and manly, a mix
that confused and terrorized its victims as it fascinated white audiences around the
country. Their looks gave the cycloptic eye a satyric vibe.
The cycloptic eye avoided a face to face encounter with others it regarded as a
threat to its own territory. By using various disguises to cover their identities and remain
anonymous, Klansmen tried to enact what Jacques Derrida has called “the supreme
insignia of power: the power to see without being seen.” 520 The faceless Klansmen took
on the appearance of ghosts, “moon-men,” “denizens of hell,” “outlanders” or foreigners,
animals, Native Americans, and blackface performers, carrying out their brutal activities
in strange fashion. 521 As ghosts of the returning Confederate dead and “no longer limited
by mortal flesh… [they] could follow freedmen anywhere, appearing at any time, any
place.” 522 Like the Cyclopes, they “kept their bodies mystically covered, their faces
concealed in masks,” and in this anonymity they thundered around town and shot fire like
the dragons they claimed to be. Following popular minstrel and carnivalesque traditions,
Klan activities and dress showed “that while the threatening black, Indian, or beast had
not been truly civilized, he had been captured.”523 Klansmen could safely “mobilize
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savagery for their own purposes.” 524 Whether from hell, Shiloh, or the moon, the Klan
desired domination of the social and political terrain, and it would do so in part by
appropriating the other for itself through their violent performances.
Reduxing Eyes
In her book The Second Coming of the KKK, historian Linda Gordon teases out
several features that distinguished the reformed Klan of the 1920s from its earlier
manifestation, and which also helps us to see a transformation in the cycloptic eye as we
move into the Jim Crow era of American history. 525 According to Gordon,
[the] “second Klan”… differed significantly from its parent. It was stronger in the
North than in the South. It spread above the Mason-Dixon line by adding
Catholics, Jews, immigrants, and bootleggers to its list of enemies and pariahs, in
part because African Americans were less numerous in the North. Its leaders tried
to prohibit violence, though they could not always enforce the ban. Unlike the
first Klan, which operated mainly at night, meeting in hard-to-find locations, the
second operated in daylight and organized mass public events. Never a secret
organization, it published recruiting ads in newspapers, its members boasted their
affiliation, and it elected hundreds of its members to public office. It was vastly
bigger than the first Klan, claiming, in what was almost certainly an exaggeration,
four million to six million members.” 526
Despite these differences with its predecessor, the second Klan shared a similar concern
with manliness and the maintenance of social hierarchies, and most crucially shot a
similar look at those perceived as others. A new target would be “non-Nordic” people,
especially Catholics and Jews. “The second Klan,” says Gordon, “took off by melding
racism and ethnic bigotry with evangelical Protestant morality.” 527 This was simply the
cycloptic eye in a different guise, shaped to meet the needs of a new age of American
history. As Klan leader Hiram Evans would state in 1926, “We are demanding, and we
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expect to win, a return of power into the hands of the everyday, not highly cultured, not
overly intellectualized, but entirely unspoiled and not de-Americanized, average citizen
of the old stock.”528
Gordon herself lists six main ideological components of the second Klan: racism,
nativism, temperance, fraternalism, Christian evangelicalism, and populism. Due to the
constraints of Northern law, economy, and society at the time, the Klan attempted to
legitimize itself by avoiding blatant acts of violence against African Americans that could
be pinned on them, and instead focused on economic boycotts and electing pro-Klan
officials to public office. 529 Some Klan publications insisted that the Klan had no
problem with black people if they stayed in their place. A bigger concern, following new
waves of immigration from southern and eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th
century, was preserving “American” identity from perceived foreignness. As Imperial
Wizard Evans wrote, “the Negro is not the menace to Americanism in the same sense that
the Jew or the Roman Catholic is a menace.” 530 Following other conservative groups
such as the American Protective Association (APA), the Klan opposed the immigration
of “Romanish” and Jewish people and advocated for the deportation of all “non-Nordic”
peoples: “The country should expel ‘certain types and races which will not in a hundred
years of residence here be anything but a menace. They should be kept out – and put
out.” 531 One reason the Klan and others gave for why immigrants, especially Catholics,
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should be kept out was because they were considered the “source of all the social vices,”
especially drunkenness. Liquor was associated with loose morals, prostitution,
corruption, and all other kinds of social problems throughout the Progressive Era. The
Klan polished up its public image by supporting good, conservative, and Christian virtues
such as temperance. As famed lawyer Clarence Darrow put it in 1924: “The father and
mother of the Ku Klux is the Anti-Saloon League. I would not say every Anti-Saloon
Leaguer is a Ku Kluxer, but every Ku Kluxer is an Anti-Saloon Leaguer.” 532
By gaining the backing of local Christian leaders, the Klan could mainstream its
message and appeal to a broad audience. As a form of populism, the Klan made the
“claim to be the authentic voice of ‘the people,’ and a manifestation of ‘the people’s’
will.” Their targets were, therefore, inauthentic, disloyal, corrupt, or impure; in other
words, not “100%.”533 Hiram Evans’ own position essay, “The Klan’s Fight for
Americanism” (1926), reveals this positioning of the Klan as speaking for, and
representing the “vital” spirit of the American people: “the Klan has shown a power to
reform and cleanse itself from within, to formulate and vitalize fundamental instincts into
concrete thought and purposeful action, to meet changing conditions with adaptability but
without weakness, to speak for and to lead the common people of America.” 534
According to Gordon, “Populist rhetoric often asserts that the nation is being stolen by
those who do not represent the people; that the people are being robbed of their
birthright.” 535 The Klan, like other populist movements, claimed “a unique authenticity
that… evokes a mythical, doctrinal, ahistorical concept of ‘the people,’ a concept that
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often demands racial ‘purity.’” 536 Populism in another sense could be understood as a
form of social integralism, a theme which has continued to surface throughout this study.
As integralists, populists are “illiberal, uncomfortable with diverse opinions, and
disinclined to protect dissenters.” 537 Further, in “imagining the existence of one genuine
nation” they also “call for the people to be undivided in their will.” 538 For integralist
individuals and movements, there can be no dissent, no division, and no pluralism
allowed in social and political realities. The Klan, like all other integralists, “formulated
and imposed a singular set of beliefs.” 539 According to Gordon, the result is that populists
like Klan members are often “hypernationalist, hostile to internationalism and
cosmopolitanism.” 540 Klan leader Evans would himself claim that, “The whole history of
the world… has been one of race conflicts, wars, subjugation or extinction. This is not
pretty, and certainly disagrees with the maudlin theories of cosmopolitanism, but it is
truth. The world has been so made that each race must fight for its life, must conquer,
accept slavery or die.” 541 Such a survival-of-the-fittest view of the world can only deal
with otherness through its assimilation or elimination. Evans’ comments reveal that the
kluxing eye cuts down the social realities of a nation or community to its own size; its
own self-image becomes the measure of all things social and political. The Klan
professed to have eyes to see who was really America’s own, “the people,” and who were
the pretenders, imposters, interlopers, or “aliens” that threatened genuine Americanness
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as defined by their popular imaginings. The Klan assumed the prerogative of determining
who looked American, who behaved American, and who should be regarded and dealt
with as “Un-American.”
Clearly, one thing that distinguished the Klan of the 1920s from its predecessor
was its focus on Americanism and its nationalist vision. The original Klan was, mostly,
more localized in its concerns and actions, and, as former Confederates, despised federal
government and military “interference” in their lives. Yet the roughly fifty years between
the two Klans would see the increasing influence of national media organizations, the
expansion of the federal government, the growth of American imperialism abroad
(especially in the Philippines), and a surge of nationalism because of World War I. The
rhetoric of the 1920s Klan was cast in a nationalist mode even as it later advocated for
states’ rights and decried federal government interference in its “way of life.” The Klan’s
views and actions toward nonwhite, non-Protestant, and non-American others can best be
understood not simply as “racist” but as “nationalist.” These “others” were for them, as
the imaginary figure of the Muslim terrorist or “illegal alien” is for many people today,
the other that continuously threatens our desire to feel in control of our
environment. It generates in us a very particular set of affects associated with the
threat of loss of sovereignty. The more an object’s ungovernability endures, the
more it haunts and threatens us. It puts us face to face with our vulnerability and
the limitations of our sovereign power and makes us desire to govern it even more
intensely while at the same time fearing that it will be forever ungovernable. 542
Then, as now, a major way to seek out and govern the “ungovernable” was through the
mobilization, organization, and technological enhancement of eyepower.
The “All-Seeing” Eye
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What is of special interest for our purposes is the self-conscious adoption of eye
power language and imagery by Klan members throughout the 1920s, a phenomenon
which can be noticed even in the titles of Klan newspapers at the time: The Imperial
Night-Hawk, Watcher on the Tower, and Searchlight. The self-presentation of the Klan as
a watching eye enhanced their audience’s sense of the expansive scope of the Klan’s
activities and interests, and intimidated people into behaving as the Klan saw fit. In a
letter to the Giddings News editors in 1922, a local Klan chapter ended a brief message
with the words: “The eye of the ‘invisible’ hath seen. We see all, hear all, and know all.
We were here yesterday, are here today, and will be here forever.” 543 Klan intimidation
tactics required masquerading as divinity, as eternal, omnipresent, and omniscient.
Further, Christian language, imagery, and the social and moral influence of
churches around the nation were utilized to spread the message of the Klan. A
representative article appeared in the Tyler American on May 26, 1922, which reported a
large gathering at Grace Baptist Church where a pastor, A. S. Poindexter, preached on
“The Ku Klux.” 544 During the sermon, Poindexter recalled witnessing a Klan parade in
Tyler, Texas where Klansmen held up placards with their values written on them: “Social
Purity and Chastity”; “Race Supremacy”; “One Flag, One Bible, One School”; “Protect
Our Women”; “Good Treatment of Good Negroes”; “Bootleggers, It’s Your Move;” and
“Married Men Spend More Time at Home”; all of which the preacher agreed with, at
least in principle. In his words, “The Ku Klux stands for supremacy of the White race.
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Shall I oppose them? If I do, what shall I stand for? It will be either equality of the negro
or the supremacy of the negro. I can do no other than to advocate the SUPREMACY OF
THE WHITE RACE and stand with the Ku Klux Klan on that principle.” In the same
issue, “the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Lodge No. 242 of the city of Marietta, Okla.,”
expressed their gratitude to Rev. Hub DeLay for “a successful four weeks revival” that
was attended by more than a thousand people in Tyler, Texas. 545 In the middle of
DeLay’s final sermon, “three members of the Ku Klux Klan entered and marched down
the aisle and deposited a letter upon the altar containing a liberal donation in cash. When
they turned and started out, the congregation applauded them.” 546 The Marietta Klansmen
appreciated DeLay’s pastoral work and stated their own allegiances: “We stand for the
tenets of the Christian religion. We uphold Christian purity and Christian righteousness
for which the preachers and all good praying men and women in the churches stand. We
not only uphold and believe in constituted Law, but hereby pledge the entire support of
the Marietta Klan in the support of the Law, and will stand behind the officers county and
city.” The statement then warned: “Husbands, look after your own home and let other
men’s homes alone. Gamblers beware. Bootlegger and whiskey venders beware.
Adulterers beware. Automobile night riders beware, both young and old. The Knights of
the INVISIBLE EMPIRE are holding their burning eye upon you and your conduct.
BEWARE. God ever bless all the forces of righteousness operating in our town and
community.” 547 Here the threat of a “burning eye” makes “immoral” persons fear for
their lives, or at least to fear enough to change their sinful ways: “You can break the ten
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commandments in the name of the law,” declared The Fiery Cross, “but you cannot hide
the fragments of your evil deed from the eye of the Klan.” 548 The Klan’s brand of
visuality altered the behavior of those who threatened American values, morals, and
institutions as they were interpreted by the Klan.
The pro-KKK newspaper, Badger American, which was published in Milwaukee,
created its own hymn that followed the tune of the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” again
showcasing the Klan’s desire to police American communities through organized
eyepower. The lyrics to the opening stanza of “The Klan Is Marching On” read: “Our
eyes have seen the coming of a dangerous treacherous foe, / We are finding out the
secrets that they thought we’d never know, / But the day is not far distant when to all the
world we’ll show, / The Klan is watching on.” 549 The sighting of a “dangerous
treacherous foe,” typically immigrants, Jews, and Catholics, here coincides with a
kluxing look that claims to see through the secret designs of their enemies. Such a look
was especially turned toward the Pope. The Texas American exhorted its readers on
February 1, 1924: “we must ‘dig deep’ and work with an ‘all seeing eye’ to prevent this
Vatican control of our life.” 550 Catholics were accused of disloyalty, of seeking world
domination, of engaging in monetary and political conspiracy, of advocating “deformed”
masculinity (celibate priests), and of enslaving nuns in convents for sex and labor.551
Instead of seeing the coming of the glory of the Lord, this Klan claimed the visual
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capacity to sight and uncover enemies of “true” or “right” American values. It was their
own “glory” that would illuminate the deeds of darkness. Further, the sighting of foreign,
immoral, or un-American threats coincided with Klan calls for a fortress mentality that
sought to protect its own. The lyrics of “The Klan Is Marching On” continue: “We have
gathered here together in this our sacred cave, / To perpetuate the nation that to us our
fathers gave, / Let us be a living monument to those within the grave, / As we go
marching on.” The lyrics are especially pertinent in their reference to how the Klan felt it
their “birthright” to control the nation and its peoples, and to “our sacred cave,” where
those threatened by foreign intrusions and the perceived breakdown of pure American
values and institutions might go for refuge to plan a counterattack. The cave is a fitting
space for training and nurturing a cycloptic eye, an eye that throws up walls and is geared
toward blunt, direct sightings of perceived intruders. It is also fitting that “Exalted
Cyclops” was the name the Klan gave to the head of a local chapter, or “Klavern.”
Naturally, the head of the Klan body had only one eye.
Sometimes the posing of the Klan as the great “all-seeing” eye could take on epic
proportions. Again, in an article in The Texas American entitled, “The Klan: A Tribute to
America’s Greatest Force For God,” we read:
I am a Searchlight on a high tower. I run my relentless eye to and fro throughout
the land; my piercing glance penetrates the brooding places of Iniquity. I plant my
eyes and ears in the whispering corridors of Crime. Wherever men gather
furtively together, there am I, an austere and invisible Presence. I am the
Recording Angel’s proxy. I am the haunted dread of the depraved and the hated
Nemesis of the vicious. When the Law is weak, then I am strong. When Justice
stands impotent and dumb, then do I speak with majesty and power. I am an
outstretched arm to Society’s unrequited victim – the swift avenger of Innocence
despoiled… Always and ever I speak for the sanctity of the home, for a stainless
Flag, and for the preservation of these benign institutions of the free… I am a
bulwark and bell-tower to Democracy… The poor man here is as rich as the
richest and the rich man as poor as the pauper. I know but one distinction, and that
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is unsullied manhood. I am the burning beacon in the uplifted hand of Liberty. I
am the Sword and Buckler of that mighty, invisible Emperor of a free people –
Justice. 552
Here the cycloptic eye is a “relentless eye,” a “piercing glance,” an eye that has an
“austere and invisible presence” within American communities. It is an eye concerned
with seeing to the sanctity of the home, discovering criminal activities, and giving justice
to innocent victims. The eye’s practices of seeing are promoted as a force for good and
not evil. Further, this eye is concerned with its own purity and that of others. The rhetoric
of cleanliness and purity is essential: the cycloptic eye looks to a “stainless Flag” and
knows only the distinction of “unsullied manhood.” Yes, the cycloptic eye always bears a
machismo obsession with control over the domestic and sexual spheres of life. 553 Finally,
the cycloptic eye seeks self and national “preservation” in searching out “Iniquity” and
“Crime,” and poses as the protector of national life and white womanhood. The selfimage of the cycloptic eye is that of the hero of the nation, of the American “race,” or, as
Hiram Evans liked to say, “the pioneer stock.”554 The Klan tried to mask its violent
marking out, its violent looking, by adopting an angelic guise and a heavenly viewpoint.
As “the Recording Angel’s proxy,” the cycloptic eye would discover the sins against
Americanness, mark out the sinful, and dish out its own brand of justice. Ironically, this
accusatory eye performs the original function of “satan” in the Hebrew Bible: the accuser
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(ha satan), adversary, or even the prosecuting attorney in God’s heavenly courtroom. 555
The cycloptic eye is all judgment, leaving no room for mercy.
Finally, an ode written by “D. D. B.” (Daisy Douglas Brushwiller, a Hoosier
Klanswoman) entitled “The Soul of America,” put into poetic form the shared
convictions and self-understanding of the Klan organization:
My hand typifies strength,
And although untrained in cunning
Its movements mark the quaking
Of the enemies of my country.
My eye, though covered, is all-seeing;
It penetrates the dark recesses of law violation,
Treason, political corruption and injustice,
Causing these cowardly culprits to bare their unholy faces
In the light of my all-seeing revelations.
My vision is so broad
That my daily meditations force upon me new problems,
New situations and new obligations.
My feet are swift to carry the strength of my hand
And the penetrations of my all-seeing eye.
My nature is serious, righteous and just,
And tempered with the love of Christ…
I am the Spirit of Righteousness.
They call me the Ku Klux Klan.
I am more than the uncouth robe and hood
With which I am clothed.
YEA, I AM THE SOUL OF AMERICA. 556
In this description of the Klan, many of the themes from this project come together: the
hand understood as a metaphor for power; the “marking” capacity of eyes and hands as
they craft images of “alien” others; the self-ascribed “all-seeing” capacities of the Klan as
organized eyepower; the “penetrating” aspect of Looks that kill which violates land,
social terrain, and human bodies; the rhetoric of moral goodness and Christian virtue; and
the language of purity to justify mastery over the “unclean.” The popularity of the Klan at
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the time further suggests that their claim to being “the soul of America” was not entirely
without merit. In the next chapter we will explore another mode of white (eye) power that
existed on mutually beneficial, and often overlapping, terms with the cycloptic eye and
which itself shows the true scope of white visuality as personal, social, and even
atmospheric: the Jim Crowing eye.
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Chapter 6: Hate-Stares
“What does it mean… to write race on a social body whose substance is not tissue,
organs, blood, or skull, but trains and buses, waiting rooms, lunch counters, drinking
fountains, restrooms, and movie theaters?” 557
“As a colored woman, I may enter more than one white church in Washington without
receiving the welcome which any human being has a right to expect in the sanctuary of
God. Sometimes the usher is stricken with a peculiar kind of color blindness which
prevents a dark face from making any impression on his retina, so that it is impossible for
him to see colored people at all. Or, if his eyesight happens to be normal, he will keep
these dusky Christians waiting a long time when they have had the temerity to thrust
themselves into a temple where only fair faces are expected to worship. Then he will
ungraciously show them a seat in the rear – the Jim Crow section of the house of
God.” 558
“There is also a sign, on an old beatup Southern store that reads NEGRO KEEP OUT.
There are signs like this all over America. And where there are no written signs, brains
have been marked, so that the same sentiment leaps out of people’s eyes.”559

Much of the analysis so far has attempted to show how unjust looks shot by white
people have historically been official, that is, publicly sanctioned, and geared toward
sexual and labor extraction from, and the maintenance of social domination over, those
marked as “black” or “Negro” or some other contrived label. Looks, stares, and gazes
given by an individual, such as an overseer, slave patroller, or Kluxer, often manifested
the eyes (read: values, judgments, desires) of the white group in power. Unjust looks do
not operate on a personal basis alone, as the look of even one individual is to a large
extent socially produced through the imitation of models such as peers, family
upbringing, education (or its lack), legal rulings and precedents, linguistic practices,
political discourse, and cultural norms and habits. We have also explored how looks have
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been used to demarcate space and place as to who belongs where and what can be done in
these spaces and by whom. There is something like a topography of vision by which the
eye moves over the contours of space and collectively with other similar-seeing eyes, the
eyes of society, comes to regard such space as valuable, useful, or important to their
lives. Eyes produce space in terms of how it will be experienced and what relations
various people will have to this space and that which is within it. Having seen “value” in
a space – which is itself not always a conscious activity and is formed by accumulated
historical practices and present needs – one decides how to relate to that space, what goes
with that space, and what is out of place, that is, who or what threatens the space as
valuable and good for one’s life. The eyes of the law help to solidify or fix a certain
regard or perspective toward spaces, as in property, real estate, or vagrancy laws, and this
legal eye adds legitimacy to the eye claims being made by those with social, political, and
enforcing power in communities. When these eye claims are threatened or taken away,
the deprived eyes can turn monstrous and get brutally territorial.
The Jim Crowing Eye
As we saw in the last chapter, the rise of various forms of organized vigilantism
and the cycloptic eye came about when white eye claims were most felt to be challenged.
These satyric and brutal forms of organized eyepower remained in force until the social
and political subjugation of the free black population was largely secure by the late 1870s
and subsequently appeared only when new “threats” were seen on the horizon. White
communities both North and South increasingly sought to hold power against African
Americans through informal practices and laws that discriminated against them in the
social realm. As Elizabeth Abel notes, “Especially in urban areas where patterns of racial
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subordination were least entrenched, white Southerners worked quickly after the end of
Reconstruction to devise a horizontal urban grid to replace the vertical structures of
supervision and subordination that had ensured that the proximities of slavery would
remain hierarchical and unthreatening.” 560 In terms of the developing modes of white
visuality, the grid would come to gain importance over the field as people moved from
rural areas to towns and cities, and especially as African Americans moved en masse to
Northern industrial cities in what has been called the “Great Migration.” As the grid came
to be more important in terms of white social, spatial, and visual control of others, urban
planning, real estate, retail, public transportation, and school districting practices, among
others, would come to be the areas where attempts at social domination and active
resistance to these attempts were most played out.
Note, however, that the visual shift from the field to the grid was never complete
or total; visual practices related to the field informed and shaped practices related to the
grid, and vice versa. This mutuality can best be seen in the rise of prison plantations in
the South following emancipation, which were really a kind of field/grid hybrid. In the
prison plantation, a grid, as “an arrangement of parallel bars with openings between
them,” was superimposed on the field as prisoners were forced to labor without
payment. 561 The prison plantation, such as the Louisiana State Penitentiary known as
“Angola,” was a carceral field or a field with bars. Despite this crucial overlap, the white
grid in town and urban settings would become a principal way for white communities to
visualize and implement social control over African Americans. As “a network of lines”
generally, and more specifically as lines “provided on a map as a means of specifying the
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location of places and objects,” white visuality in grid mode mapped racialized meanings
onto spaces and those within them, with the ultimate goal being the arresting of unknown,
feared, or simply unwanted social forces. 562 As Abel, using the language of David
Delaney, astutely explains, “Jim Crow’s trompe l’oeil… is its manifestly disciplinary
grid… a ‘geography of power’ contrived to manage the ‘interplay between (largely
white) territoriality and (largely black) mobility’ through the ‘de jurification of race’…
[and] ‘the promulgation and proliferation of laws’… that constructed a ‘legal landscape’
of ‘lines and spaces.’” 563 This mode of white visuality that persistently attempted to
superimpose a grid of legal and social meanings and values on others to control and
relegate them to second-class citizenship is explored throughout this chapter as the Jim
Crowing eye. The last part of the chapter highlights the personal lives of those who
continued to look back, to look white people in the eye, to create a liberating and
protective space for their themselves and their communities.
Staging and Barring Eyes
In his classic The Strange Career of Jim Crow (1955), C. Vann Woodward
defined Jim Crow as “the public symbols and constant reminders of [the Negro’s] inferior
position” that were enshrined in “segregation statutes” or laws. 564 Other scholars have
defined the Jim Crow era as “a combination of the de facto second-class citizenship and
racial separation that emerged in 1877 at the end of Reconstruction, and the de jure
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arsenal of laws and official regulations that came to fruition in the 1890s.” 565 The term
“Jim Crow” itself came from the American minstrel tradition of the 19th century; Abel
explains that, “As the name of the legendary black stableman or servant whose dance was
imitated to wild acclaim by T. D. Rice in blackface around 1830, Jim Crow has come to
signify the expropriation of black expressive culture, the repudiation of black social
mobility (to enhance that of the blackface performer), and, by extension, the construction
of the system of restrictions that constitute segregation.” 566 In this way a “cultural
scenario gave its name to a political formation, which continued to enlist cultural forms
to instantiate its message.” 567 During his own performances, “Rice darkened his face,
acted like a buffoon, and spoke with an exaggerated and distorted imitation of African
American Vernacular English.” 568 These acts became so popular that ‘Jim Crow’ became
a common “stage persona” for white performers in blackface. Jim Crow became a
performance of white people mocking black people and humiliating them for
entertainment and social value.
From these origins, we can initially say that the Jim Crowing eye was a staging
eye; it worked to forcefully display and position black people on the social stage in
deprecating and caricatured fashion. James Scott explains that while dignity is “at once a
very private and a very public attribute,” it is nevertheless clear “that any indignity is
compounded greatly when it is inflicted in public. An insult, a look of contempt, a
physical humiliation, an assault on one’s character and standing, a rudeness is nearly
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always far more injurious when it is inflicted before an audience.” 569 Enrique Dussel
importantly defines the “public sphere” as “the mode that the subject adopts as an
intersubjective position in a ‘field with others,’ a mode that allows the subject to operate
as an ‘actor’ whose ‘roles’ or actions are ‘represented’ before the gaze of all other
actors.” 570 A staging eye tries to force other “subjects” into adopting certain modes of
subordinate intersubjective positions, operations, and appearances before the gaze of all
others, rendering them less intersubjective and more subjected. And a staging eye
attempts to control the public sphere by controlling how other subjects are made to
appear before the gaze of all; it tries to make all other subjects subject to its own gaze.
These other subjects, themselves seeking to adopt their own intersubjective positions,
operations, and appearances before the gaze of all others, continually face the checks of
other eyes that objectify them and so debilitate, to a greater or lesser degree, their
subjectivity in public. A staging eye tries to dictate who can act and exercise their own
subjectivity in public, and also who must be acted on and moved about in public as any
other object of contempt, use, or ridicule. As Barbara Fields explains, “With the end of
slavery, in which owners exploited laborers by owning their persons, employers
commanded labor by controlling access to the means of labor, subsistence, and
livelihood… and those seeking access understand full well the protean quality of the
force that blocks them, as well as the complicated rituals through which they must
dramatize their own subjection.” 571 Jim Crow social dramatization included performance,
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masks, ritual, and staging, all for the effect of positioning white people on top of all
others.
The Jim Crowing eye as a staging eye saw to it that the virtues of whiteness were
displayed in public in and through the parodic presencing of “blackness.” Meanings and
values of blackness not staged and controlled by white people were violently kept
offstage, at the peripheries of the white public’s eye. Unwanted or threatening meanings
of blackness that propped up on the public stage were contested and typically eliminated
through violence, threat, ridicule, or economic and social reprisals. What was important
was that, at least in the eyes of society, white mores, virtues, manners, beauty, and
character – white looks – would forever eclipse black looks and remain the shining,
dazzling star of the show. If there were “other” bit parts to be played in society, then
white people would stage these parts for themselves, making even “blackness” or
“otherness” exhibit their own qualities. Or, if these others played parts for themselves,
their parts or roles were to be tailored to fit the desires of white people. As we will see,
such a fantastical view of the world and humans would not last, as a great deal of people
were not willing to play the part assigned to them by the white world.
Another major feature of the Jim Crowing eye in its legal mode was a hyperlegislation of everyday spaces as people moved toward towns and cities and came into
increasing contact with one another, and a reliance on individual white people to serve as
a micro-policing force of these various laws and informal social arrangements. As Abel
elucidates, “Reinforcing and exceeding [the] legal landscape was a more pervasive
system of surveillance sustained by the watchful eyes of white residents, whether
formally organized into units such as the Ku Klux Klan or informally bound in a common
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project of vigilance backed by a range of extralegal threats.” 572 These white, watchful
eyes that channeled the eyes of society and the eyes of the law into everyday life
situations were a mobile grid that marked the movements, gestures, and self-presentation
of “colored” others and often arrested their social mobility. The beams stemming from
white eyes served as invisible bars for African Americans and people of color which,
while they were never absolute and were often permeable, attempted to bar them from
various spaces in shops, parks, movie theaters, train cars, hospitals, cemeteries, labor
organizations, professional organizations, and other positions in society. The Jim
Crowing eye, then, was also a barring eye. 573 As Malcolm X stated in an interview with
psychologist Kenneth Clark in 1963, “If you’re born in America with a black skin, you’re
born in prison, and the masses of black people in America today are beginning to regard
our plight or predicament in this society as one of a prison inmate.” 574 Yet as the makeup
of the grid reveals, there were always “openings” between the parallel bars of white
looks, and these bars were constantly tested for their strength and no doubt broken on
numerous occasions.
Importantly, Jim Crow existed not only in abstract laws, regulations, and
structures, but in the dynamic interrelation between the personal and the social, between
individual agents and socio-cultural laws and customs. “In order to maintain dominance,”
we read in Remembering Jim Crow, “whites needed more than the statutes and signs that
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specified ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ only; they had to assert and reiterate black inferiority with
every word and gesture, in every aspect of both public and private life.” 575 One gesture,
such as a Look, was often a way to “assert and reiterate black inferiority.” In this sense it
is appropriate to speak of a Jim Crow-ing America alongside a Jim Crow America, to
emphasize that everyday encounters and gestures produced a social grid and environment
just as much as laws and other social policies; these encounters and gestures allowed for
flexibility in the seemingly rigid structure of segregation. Jim Crow was done and
performed as white people attempted to dictate the very terms in which contact between
white and black people could take place. 576 For the editors of Remembering Jim Crow,
“there was neither escape from, nor redress for, the ubiquitous, arbitrary, and cruel reality
of senseless white power” during this brutal time of American history. 577 Ironically, it is
the development of white hypersensitivity to black people and contact with them that
rendered their actions so senseless.
Blighting Eyes
Yet the most consistent and underlying feature of Jim Crowing America was “that
blacks and whites were different in the eyes of their society.” 578 The social character of
vision, the eyes of society, regarded some lives as of more worth than others. Informant
Lillian Smith, who grew up in a predominantly black neighborhood in Wilmington, North
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Carolina in the 1930s, recalled that, “The question would always come back that we were
living in a country that had segregated laws, and [we were] called ‘colored’ people at that
time. See, the signs said ‘colored.’ You were not looked upon as having full rights that all
other citizens should have. We should be treated differently.” 579 To give just one example
of how unjust societal looks showed up in the concrete, one need only to look at city or
state budgets and the amount of money spent on segregated black and white schools.
Census statistics from Beaufort County, South Carolina in 1910 revealed that, “while
state expenditures per white pupil averaged $40.68, the average black pupil received
$5.95. The average value of a white school was $30,056, and $3,953 for a black school.
Similarly, Macon County, Alabama spent $57,385 on 1,435 white students and only
$27,813 on 7,145 black students – the majority of the school population.” 580 These
statistics were not exceptions to the norm but were rather the rule. Further, interviewees
who grew up at the time testified to the lack of other resources that black schools
received when compared to white-only schools, from hand-me-down textbooks and
sports equipment to less money to pay black teachers at these schools. The budgetary
priorities placed on these institutions, while a number on paper, were realized and made
visible in nicer-looking schools for white children, with more educational and
recreational resources, and neglected or inferior facilities for black children. The superior
spatial products were naturalized, or made to appear natural, for white people, and
blighted or neglected spatial products were likewise naturalized for black people. The
same phenomenon could be seen not only in educational settings, but also in the relative
condition of housing, businesses, and even prisons. As we saw in Chapter 4 while
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discussing Jewish ghettos in Poland, these socially-produced spaces could signal to an
observer the “moral qualities” of the people inhabiting these spaces; they could visually
educate the people moving in and out of these spaces. White observers of segregated
areas could find “empirical” confirmation for their beliefs about “colored” people which
might be used justify further discriminatory practices: they (black people) must be lazy,
dirty, immoral, or have low standards, and we (white people) must be clean, upright,
hard-working, and morally respectable. Spaces were thus made to visibly reveal the legal
codes separating white and black people, a phenomenon which went hand in hand with
their social and moral separation through the associations of respectability and
cleanliness with white people and indecency and uncleanliness with black people. Jim
Crowing eyes consistently linked the ontological values of various people to their
localities and attempted to determine and present the being-situatedness of black people
on its own terms: We’ll situate you… over here… like this.
Relatedly, the Jim Crow situating/sighting of African Americans was based on
what the Fields call “sumptuary codes” that “enforce social classification” by governing
“what goes with what and whom.” 581 According to them, “sumptuary codes consist of
rules, written or unwritten, that establish unequal rank and make it immediately
visible.” 582 Like sumptuary laws in the past that regulated consumption of various statusbearing foods, luxury items, and clothing, or that regulated levels of consumption, it was
important for white people to put social relations of domination and subordination on
display both to naturalize these relations and to remind all parties not only of the way
things were, but also how they ought to be. Sumptuary rules worked to “produce a
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regular supply of circumstantial evidence about what the world is made of and who
belongs where within it.” 583 Scott puts his finger on the importance of sumptuary codes
in what he calls the “public transcript” of social life:
Regardless of the particular form of domination, it is a safe bet that a vital sector
of the elite-choreographed public transcript will consist of visual and audible
displays of rank, precedence, and honor. Here I have in mind such expressions of
domination as terms of address, demeanor, speech levels, codes of eating,
dressing, bathing, cultural taste, who speaks first, who gives way to whom. By the
same token whenever the public transcript is breached – whether inadvertently or
by design – it is also a safe bet that such breaches will disrupt or desacralize the
ceremonial reverence. 584
In Jim Crowing America sumptuary codes, as part of the public transcript controlled by
white people, were a key feature of imposing white grids on socio-spatial reality. As
“intimate yet public practices,” they helped to “organize individual perception of physical
appearance.” 585 The Jim Crowing eye was both a shaper of, and shaped by, social
displays of the appearances and actions of people and the meanings of these appearances
and actions; it sought to exhibit “coloreds” in such a way, and in such places and times,
that the space between white perceptions of these others and the moral evaluations of
these others would collapse. Our senses can’t lie, right?
Sumptuary codes that organized perceptions created environments where
everyone not only knew their place but sensed their place. They could also do the
opposite work of creating environments where everyone sensed what or who was out of
place. 586 From wearing the “wrong” kind of fabric or dress, to purchasing expensive
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items or services, to being found in the “wrong” neighborhood, social and moral status
markers created by white people could be policed with a Look. In addition, these social
and moral status markers were made visible and sensible, filling the spaces and
neighborhoods of towns and cities with meaning. Consider these comments made by G.
K. Butterfield in Remembering Jim Crow: “When you live in the South and have been in
the South all your life, you could find places to eat and sleep instinctively… Southern
towns are laid out in the same fashion, basically, and you could use your senses and sense
where you are and where you’re not. And if you keep driving, you can see the quality of
the housing decreasing and blight setting in – abandoned cars and people hanging on the
streets and then you can begin to see blacks.” 587 Seeing “blacks” in Southern towns
meant seeing them in blighted sections of the town, and “the quality of the housing” was
often seen to reflect the quality of the people living there, and vice versa. According to
the editors, “Decayed buildings and dirt roads were primary markers of a person’s entry
into the black section.” 588 Further, “travelers usually knew they were entering the ‘black
section’ of a particular city or town based on increasing signs of ‘blight.” 589 These
socially-produced spatial environments served as the space within which black people
“appeared” before the eyes of white people – as dirty, poor, and blighted. The visual
learning that resulted from visiting or seeing these “realities” would serve to continually
reaffirm both the legal discrimination and the economic policies and practices designed to
benefit white people and keep African Americans “in their place”; it would not be long
before it was common to refer to the “blighted” sections of town as “ghettos.”
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The Jim Crowing eye in its social, legal, and personal modes worked in various
ways to produce a climate, or atmospheric vibe, that signaled to one’s senses the
“whiteness” or “blackness” of certain areas with their corresponding mental, moral, and
affective associations. While “blight” is typically used to describe negative
environmental impact on plants, such as insects or disease, in this case the definition
could be equally spoken of the Jim Crowing eye: “Any baleful influence of atmospheric
or invisible origin, that suddenly blasts, nips, or destroys plants [or people].” 590 The Jim
Crowing eye as a blighting eye is quite fittingly atmospheric and climatic; a crow is a
bird of flight. This mode of white visuality shaped spatial and interpersonal environments
so that white people were revealed in all their goodness, cleanliness, status, wealth, and
beauty, while it blighted all nonwhite others along with their living spaces. As Durrheim
and Dixon note, “Ecological arrangements form part of a meaningful and constantly
evolving system for experiencing, interpreting and managing social relations.” 591 To be
Jim Crowed was to be blighted by the eyes of white people who sought, whether
consciously or not, material confirmation of their prejudicial and discriminatory beliefs
and practices. To use a crasser metaphor, under Jim Crowing America nonwhite others
were subjected to the continual threat of being s— on by white people, as if a flock of
birds hovered overhead seeking either bowel release or a perch. As a blighting eye, the
Jim Crowing eye created a toxic environment for those gridlocked into nonwhite spaces,
whether through restrictive covenants, zoning laws, neighborhood planning,
transportation services, policing practices, “sundown” towns, school districting,
employment discrimination, or interpersonal encounters. Dozens more concrete practices
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could be named, but the overall shape of these practices is clear: white people posing and
posturing as socially superior and entitled to the best quality of life, and black people
legally and forcibly positioned to receive the handouts and leftovers of white society. For
white people seeking control over reality and various access points to livelihood, the
presencing of African Americans within certain socio-spatial scenes was made to feel
obscene; the Jim Crowing eye made sure of it. As Calvin Hernton explained in the early
1970s,
in any racist society, the physical presence of black men and women in public is
secretly and openly perceived as something terribly vulgar. This is why white
people have always tried to keep black people off the scene, i.e., Negroes in
public are “obscene”; they must hide themselves or act in such a way as to draw
as little notice to their physical presence, their bodies, as possible; they must
become “invisible.” 592
From this line of thinking we can see that the Jim Crowing eye shares with the
overseeing, patrolling, and cycloptic eyes the visual concern with keeping African
Americans “in their place,” in a circumscribed social, economic, sexual, and political
position of subordination. When they appeared in public they were made to deal with the
manicuring and curating eyes of white people, with eyes that trimmed environments to fit
white standards of beauty and cleanliness and with eyes that selected, organized, and
looked after “others” as items in a collection or exhibit. As we have seen, keeping an
individual or a group in place itself assumes the connection between spatial practices and
social status. Kenneth and Mai Young spoke about this reality in an interview in 1994
about growing up in Alabama and Georgia under the Jim Crowing eye: “The black folks
learned early their place in life and you got along fine as long as you didn’t step over the
line. You knew who was white, you knew who was black and you don’t make a mistake.
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In other words, white men and women were addressed as ‘Mr. and Mrs.’ You didn’t
address blacks that way… White folks Mr. and Mrs., blacks by their first name,” or the
more denigrating shorthand, “boy.” 593 The “line” that the Youngs learned not step over
was both a social one and a spatial one, manifested in railroad tracks, roads, doors or
entrances, and other neighborhood boundary lines. The Jim Crowing eye afforded
approving looks to white people and their dominant/independent status and maturity (as
revealed in the “nice and clean” spaces they moved within) and disapproving looks to
African Americans and their subordinate/dependent status and immaturity (as revealed in
the “bad and dirty” spaces they moved within). What was it like to move within this
environment where white looks staged and barred you from certain places and positions,
rained down on you like a storm, blighted you like a plague, or stabbed in your direction?
And how would you look back?
Leering Eyes
As has been well documented, there was an almost obsessive interest among
white men during this period of history in protecting the honor of “their” women. Willie
Harrell, who grew up sharecropping on a mid-twentieth-century plantation, stated
bluntly: “Shit, you couldn’t even look at a white woman hard back then when I come up.
You would get hung… Blacks couldn’t look at no white. But whites could look at blacks
all they wanted.” 594 When the white writer and reporter John Howard Griffin went
“undercover” in 1959 to experience what life was like for African Americans, one black
woman who thought he was too ignorant of the ways of white folk told him:
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you don’t want to even look at a white woman. In fact, you look down at the
ground or the other way… you may not know you’re looking in a white woman’s
direction but they’ll try to make something out of it… If you pass by a picture
show, and they’ve got women on the posters outside, don’t look at them either…
Somebody’s sure to say, ‘Hey, boy – what are you looking at that white gal like
that for? 595
Griffin, who dyed his skin black and exposed himself to ultraviolet radiation in order to
experience the impact of racism in the South, notes throughout his book, Black Like Me
(1960), the negative impact of white looks toward him. While riding on a bus one time,
Griffin smiled and indicated to a white woman that the seat next to him was available.
Sure enough, “Her blue eyes, so pale before, sharpened and she spat out, ‘What you
looking at me like that for?’” 596 In another place he describes the “hate stare” as “far
more than a look of disapproval one occasionally gets,” for it is “exaggeratedly
hateful.” 597 Griffin describes what it’s like to be on the receiving end of a hate-stare:
“Nothing can describe the withering horror of this. You feel lost, sick at heart before such
unmasked hatred, not so much because it threatens you as because it shows humans in
such an inhuman light. You see a kind of insanity, something so obscene the very
obscenity of it (rather than its threat) terrifies you.” 598 He was so terrified of the hatestare that he would even have nightmares about it: “White men and women, their faces
stern and heartless, closed in on me. The hate stare burned through me. I pressed back
against a wall. I could expect no pity, no mercy. They approached slowly and I could not
escape them.” 599 Griffin only experienced the hate-stare for a couple of months; one
wonders how he would have fared if he had to face it for a lifetime.
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While hate-stares were often deeply personal, public contestations over looks and
their meanings were also prevalent. Historian Danielle McGuire relates the story of one
forty-two-year-old man and father of nine children, Mack Ingram, who in North Carolina
in 1951 was charged with “eye raping,” that is, sexually assaulting by look, an eighteenyear-old white woman. 600 The woman claimed that Ingram “leered at her” as he drove
along the highway, and then, after he stopped the car and got out to walk across the field
“about seventy-five feet” behind her, she screamed and ran when she realized he was
headed in the same direction. She told her brother that Ingram was “looking at her in a
leering manner,” and they called the police who came and arrested Ingram. At trial a
couple of weeks later, the woman admitted Ingram never spoke to her, but her father
argued that his “eyes were all over her.” 601 Ingram was initially convicted and sentenced
to two years hard labor. The case was eventually thrown out by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1953 with the help of the NAACP. 602 Although this Court found
Ingram’s explanation that he was only looking to borrow a trailer “rather lame,” it held
that, “It cannot be said that a pedestrian may be assaulted by a look, however frightening,
from a person riding in an automobile some distance away.” 603 The Court even defined
“leer” straight out of Webster’s dictionary: “a look askance, conveying the suggestion of
something sly, malign or lustful,” even though the defendant using the word said it meant
only “a curious look.” 604
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Similarly, in narrating his experiences growing up in the Jim Crowing South,
Richard Wright often alluded to the deep fears and anxieties he had about being caught
looking at a white woman. Wright wrote in his highly acclaimed Black Boy (1941) that,
while working at a hotel as a bellboy and bootlegging liquor to white woman who
engaged in sex work,
I grew used to seeing the white prostitutes naked upon their beds, sitting nude
about their rooms, and I learned new modes of behavior, new rules in how to live
the Jim Crow life. It was presumed that we black boys took their nakedness for
granted, that it startled us no more than a blue vase or a red rug. Our presence
awoke in them no sense of shame whatever, for we blacks were not considered
human anyway. If they were alone, I would steal sidelong glances at them. But if
they were receiving men, not a flicker of my eyelids would show. 605
He then recalled an episode one night when a “huge, snowy-skinned blonde” was staying
on his floor and had a customer. In Wright’s words:
One night she rang for service and I went to wait upon her. She was in bed with a
thickest man; both were nude and uncovered. She said that she wanted some
liquor, and slid out of bed and waddled across the floor to get her money from the
dresser drawer. Without realizing it, I watched her. ‘Nigger, what in hell are you
looking at?’ the white man asked, raising himself upon his elbows. ‘Nothing, sir,’
I answered, looking suddenly miles deep into the blank wall of the room. ‘Keep
your eyes where they belong if you want to be healthy!’ ‘Yes, sir.’” 606
As Wright tells it, white men took it upon themselves to police the looks of black men
when it came to white women’s bodies. Like land, white women’s flesh was the terrain
that only white men could speculate on and satisfy their desires with. This not only
increased their own sense of manhood and self-esteem, but also perpetuated the myth of a
southern white womanhood that must be protected as a virginal flower. White
womanhood, according to bell hooks, existed as an “object of the phallocentric gaze.” 607
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These accounts and others like them display the operation of what Michael Eric
Dyson has described as the mythos of black male sexuality, namely, “that black men are
imagined as peripatetic phalluses with unrequited desire for their denied object – white
women.” 608 Calvin Hernton would say the same: “While the Negro is portrayed as a great
‘walking phallus’ with satyr-like potency, he is denied the execution of that potency, he is
denied the most precious sexual image which surrounds him – the white woman.” 609 It
can be said that white power was not, and is not now, abstract, but embodied, extending
its hands, eyes, and members – both sexual members and organizational members – to
diminish or cut off its embodied rivals through looking, shooting, handcuffing, black
eyeing, sexual humiliating, and castrating. All these efforts were made to secure the
dominance and gratification of the white man, whose power lay most of all in the power
to look as he desired. Even today, with the “controlling images” of “the black sexual
predator and the white savior,” white supremacists “attempt to reinforce the
normativeness of white sexuality while punishing people of color for their real or
imagined sexual improprieties.” 610 For Barbara Perry, these myths, images, and the
actions they inspire are “a means of degrading the bodies of the Other, with an eye to
controlling them.” 611 Those who challenged the boundary-making and boundary-crossing
practices of white male bodies (personal and social) were in for a desperate struggle for
their lives.
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Eye Warriors
The Jim Crowing eye could show up in massive public gazing events, such as a
lynching, or in the everyday business of life; it could be deployed in various modes as
staging, exhibiting, humiliating, blighting, or barring African Americans from organizing
too much, gaining too much political, economic, or social influence, having too much of
a will of their own, or challenging white standards and values. A final example in this
chapter that shows the functions of the Jim Crowing eye is Melba Pattillo Beals’ memoir
Warriors Don’t Cry (1994), where she recalls her experiences as one of nine African
American high school students who fought to integrate Central High in Little Rock,
Arkansas in 1957. Through her story we can trace not only the manifold Looks that kill
shot her way, but also understand more fully the intimate yet social visual power of the
Jim Crowing eye and the intense fight against it. The unjust looks thrown at Pattillo also
bring to the surface the psychological harm that Looks that kill can do to those hit by
them. Her story is a testimony to her courage to stand up and face the eyes of a white
community which sought in more ways than one to make her disappear from the scene.
After the landmark Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954), Pattillo was chosen to be a part of a group of high school students who would
enroll in the all-white Central High in Little Rock, thus delivering a practical blow to
segregation in public school systems. But for most white people in Little Rock, sending
black children to white schools meant eventual “social equality,” an eye to eye situation,
and even more feared, intermarriage. According to historian Karen Anderson, the fear
that “desegregation portended a loss of patriarchal control so serious that it could lead to
consensual interracial sex on the part of one’s own children… was broadly shared with
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other segregationists, giving emotional power to their states’ rights arguments and
justifying extreme measures.” 612 A leading segregationist of the time said: “Smith and
Wesson, Colt, and whoever made the grass rope have kept the nigger out of the white
bedroom. If you integrate your schools, you invite the niggers to marry your daughter.”613
No one ever seemed to ask black people if they wanted to marry, let alone intercourse
with, white folks.
On September 3, 1957 Pattillo and the other eight students were blocked by angry
mobs of white people, and even the Arkansas National Guard sent by Governor Orval
Faubus, from entering the school building in defiance of a federal court order. The mob
was “shouting and pointing,” yelling such things as “Niggers, go home!”; “Niggers, go
back where you belong!”; and the barely more original, “Two, four, six, eight, we ain’t
gonna integrate.”614 What was vital for the white mob was that black people stay in their
place, something they had been attempting to do for quite some time. After this first
failed endeavor to get into Central High, Pattillo and her family were mobbed by
threatening phone calls at nearly all hours of the day. Faced with these threats and backed
by the superb legal minds of the NAACP such as Thurgood Marshall and the tireless
work of Daisy Bates, Pattillo and others continued to seek legal injunctions against the
attempts of the governor to block their entry into Central High. 615 Yet for Pattillo there
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were few other allies in Little Rock. For her, “the integration dispute made me feel as
though we were much more vulnerable. Whites had control of the police, the firemen,
and the ambulances. They could decide who got help and who didn’t. Even if the Ku
Klux Klan ravaged one of our homes, we wouldn’t call the police for help. None of us
was certain which of our city officials wore civic uniforms by day and the white sheets at
night.” 616 The segregationist Capital Citizens’ Council even ran an advertisement that
claimed that white children who had “been reared to believe in a segregated society”
would find in integration a “way of life foreign to their training, contrary to their
convictions, and nauseating to their esthetic being.” 617 It seemed to Pattillo as if the
whole white world was sensually trained to reject any form of contact, let alone
integration, with anyone like herself; if integrated, she would be vomited out.
On September 23 Pattillo and the other students finally snuck into Central High
with violent crowds surrounding the building. 618 Shuffling through the hallways to find
her homeroom, Pattillo suffered verbal and physical abuse from both students and adults.
One scene she describes is particularly sinister: “Suddenly I felt it – the sting of a hand
slapping the side of my cheek, and then warm slimy saliva on my face, dropping to the
collar of my blouse… A woman stood toe-to-toe with me, not moving. ‘Nigger!’ she
shouted in my face again and again. She appeared to be a little older than my mother. Her
face was distorted by rage. ‘Nigger bitch. Why don’t you go home?” she lashed out at
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me. ‘Next thing, you’ll want to marry one of our children.” 619 In another place Pattillo
recalled that, “as I walked through the crowded spaces, I felt almost singed by their
hostile words and glares.” 620 Again, the power of vision is on full display; looks, like
weapons, can do violence to another person.
Once in homeroom Pattillo received glares and insults from other students with no
intervention from the white teacher. One student lashed out, “Are you gonna let that
nigger coon sit in our class?” while another voiced, “Look, it’s twenty of us and one of
her. They ain’t nothing but animals.” 621 As glares and stares shot at her like arrows and
bullets, Pattillo was reminded of a piece of wisdom from her grandma: “God loves you,
child; no matter what, he sees you as his precious idea.” 622 The fact that God saw her as
precious, as dignified and deeply loved, proved to be a powerful counter to the unjust
looks being thrown around at Central High. Yet the mob outside the school continued to
push for blood; school administrators even debated whether to “sacrifice” one child to
save the rest or not. Because of this “disgraceful” display, U.S. President Eisenhower
finally ordered 1,200 federal troops into Little Rock to provide escorts and protection for
the students, which even though spotty sometimes, was better than the free-for-all that
took place before their arrival.
To assert her own place and space in the school as a human being who would not
suffer to be treated as “less than,” Pattillo herself engaged the power of vision to ward off
potential attackers. She dared to look back, to look others in the eye, thus asserting her
equal dignity and personal power. This looking was even more necessary since Pattillo
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and the other African American students were often “taunted by large groups of students
who picked certain days simply to stare at us. They came to be known as ‘stare days.’” 623
During these stare days “large, boisterous groups of hecklers stared intensely and
harassed the living daylights out of us.” 624 Here displayed as a collective activity, vision
had the power not only to objectify the Little Rock Nine, but also to communicate a
dizzying number of items to them, such as: you’re less than, you’re nothing, you’re an
animal, you’re not worthy, you’re stupid, you’re not welcome, you don’t belong, you’re
filthy, you have no right, you’re not our equal… and on and on. The negative
psychological impact of these collective stares of Pattillo and the others suggests that
unjust looks were often just as harmful as punches, slaps, kicks, or golf balls wrapped up
in paper thrown across the hall at them. 625
When white students realized that Pattillo and the others were likely to stay at
Central High for the foreseeable future, their tactics shifted from physical hostility to the
cold shoulder. She writes that, “It was frustrating to have people so close, have them
chatting to each other while saying absolutely nothing to me, and never even looking me
in the eye. Occasionally students stood or sat close enough to touch, talking over and
around me as though I didn’t exist. It was a very painful insult I didn’t know how to
combat. They were treating me as if I were invisible.” 626 Sometimes she would even
pinch herself to feel if she was really there, for she thought, “They don’t see me as a real
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person.” 627 She wanted to shout: “I’m Melba, don’t you see me?” 628 Her desire to be seen
was a desire to be recognized and treated as a person with legitimate desires, pleasures,
likes and dislikes, hobbies, and skills, yet such recognition rarely happened because her
peers did not take the first step of looking her in the eye. Those white students who did
try to help in little ways were often met with hostile looks from their peers. One white
student reported in 1959 that after lending a few cents to an African American student at
lunch, “The whole cafeteria got quiet. I went back to my seat. I felt like people just
followed me with their eyes.” 629 Anderson reports that many white students succumbed
to the “peer pressure to ostracize the black students and turn a blind eye to the violence
those students were experiencing.” 630
As graduation came closer Pattillo noticed that “using new tactics, with more
frequent attacks that involved more people, the segregationists watched and followed us
constantly, looking for ways to isolate us.”631 This occurred both inside and outside of
school. According to Anderson, school board members who approved of the token
integration plan at Central High “hoped that placing a small number of African American
students in a student body of almost two thousand at Central High would create such a
sense of isolation for the black students that they would voluntarily return to Mann High
School [the all-black school in Little Rock].”632 Further, rumors were circulated about
one of the nine students, Ernest Green, who was accused of having a “roving eye and was
flirting with a particular white girl.” 633 Such an allegation was typically the prelude to
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violence or death for the accused. One particularly boisterous white segregationist
student, Sammie Dean, deliberately tried to charge Green with making sexual advances
toward her. According to one teacher’s account: “You should have seen Sammie Dean in
the cafeteria today. She paraded to and fro past Ernest Green four times, staring hard at
him each of the eight times she passed his table. Ernest never raised his eyes.” 634 To raise
his eyes could have led to violent recriminations. Hernton would call these looks given to
black men “hate-stares,” which for him stemmed from “a prurient conception of the black
male as a sexual being… [and] from a mixture of repulsion and attraction toward the very
qualities and features which racism in America has stereotyped as ‘vulgar,’ ‘animal,’ and
‘revolting’ – the black man’s genitals, his style of behavior, and the blackness of his skin,
along with his Negroid features: in a word, his Negritude.”635 The cumulative effect of
such hate-stares was to make it so that, “the black man is vulgar upon perception.” 636
Here again, Beals’ grandma countered this distorted perception of the black man as
vulgar with a different, theological perception of Ernest in order to reassure her in their
common struggle: “God’s watching after Ernie just like he’s watching over you.” 637 In
her mind, God sees especially those who are under the threat of racialized and sexualized
Looks.
Ernie Green became the first African American to graduate from Central High in
May 1958, but governor Faubus, through legal action (or foot-dragging) and the efforts of
leading segregationists, closed the school for the 1958-59 school year contrary to the
Supreme Court’s desegregation plan. The school would open again for 1959-60 but not
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without bitter resistance. Beals herself would complete her senior year of high school in
California; become a journalist and professor; and continue to write about her
experiences in Little Rock and her faith. Having experienced a full offering of Looks that
kill, Beals ended her “searing memoir” with the admonition: “The task that remains is to
cope with our interdependence – to see ourselves reflected in every other human being
and to respect and honor our differences.” 638 To be an eye warrior like Beals, then, is to
fight with visual and perceptual tactics against those Looks that seek to restrict or control
the presencing of those deemed “different” or “other” within the field or grid of vision.
These Looks communicate an ultimatum: either disappear as this or that, or from this
place, or don’t appear. In contrast, eye warriors not only open space in the grid of vision
for full recognition as equals, but also re-envision the space of seeing itself – shifting the
terms in which people can appear and be recognized as unique instances and genres of
the human. When people, social organizations, and the laws refuse to see with justice,
then eye warriors use their own eyepower to resist such blindness and seek new ways of
envisioning life and society.
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Chapter 7: Eye for an Eye
“… because I look anyone who addresses me in the eye, they feel that I may start a riot
anytime.” 639
“There is a saying here that every Milwaukee policeman has a thousand pair of eyes…
the extra ‘eyes’ are those of people here – men, women and children who have come to
be accepted as an arm of law enforcement.” 640
“The rage of the disesteemed is personally fruitless, but it is also absolutely inevitable;
this rage, so generally discounted, so little understood even among the people whose
daily bread it is, is one of the things that makes history.” 641
“Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony.” 642

The overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes were genetic
elements involved in the production of the policing eye in history that gradually moved
from informal night watches, city guards, and other individual roles such as the sheriff
and constable into what we recognize today as a modern, organized police force.
According to Kristian Williams, distinctly policing activities can be characterized by 1)
the authority to use force, 2) a public character and accountability, at least in principle, to
some central governmental authority, and 3) general law enforcement duties (as opposed
to limited, specified duties such as parking enforcement or animal control). 643 With these
criteria in mind, it is clear that overseeing and slave patrolling could be considered
policing roles only in a limited sense, although the second much more so than the first, as
patrols had both the legal authority to use force and a public character with some
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accountability. 644 However, patrols did not have general law enforcement duties but were
limited to the control and oversight of the population of enslaved persons in a local area.
As Williams argues, “while slave patrols did anticipate the creation of modern police, it
must still be remembered that they were not themselves modern police.” Rather, “The
slave patrol, which began as an offshoot of the militia… provides a transitional model in
the development of policing.” 645 For their own part, overseers can only be considered a
form of private or domestic policing at best, although even here they did have some
authority to use force. They were mainly accountable to planters and masters and not to
some public authority, although overseers were often legally required to be on
plantations.
As we have seen, there was also a great deal of overlap between overseeing,
patrolling, cycloptic, Jim Crowing, and policing eyes in history, a reality that can be felt
even today. For example, overseers sometimes served on slave patrols, and patrollers
might serve in various policing capacities in towns and cities. 646 After emancipation, both
policemen and former patrollers could be involved with vigilante groups like the KKK or
the American Legion. According to the memoirs of former Atlanta Police Chief Herbert
Jenkins, during the height of the Klan’s power and influence in the 1920s, “it was helpful
to join the Ku Klux Klan to be an accepted member of the force. This was your ID card,
the badge of honor with the in group, and it was unfortunately often an allegiance
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stronger than the policeman’s oath to society… The Klan was powerful in that it worked
behind the scenes with certain members of the Police Committee and the City Council…
The Klan was like a kind of Mafia in dirty sheets.” 647 Williams has documented instances
of Klan-Cop connection throughout the 20th century, and so it will not be repeated here,
but his conclusion should be noted even if some might consider it overstated: “The police
did not create the racism in American society… But the police have, since their inception,
enforced and defended the racist status quo – by controlling slaves, maintaining
segregation, resisting civil rights efforts, and generally terrorizing the Black community
and other people of color.”648 As the eyes and hands that enforced the laws, views, and
judgments of a white body politic, it should be no surprise to find that various policing
figures and organizations operated against black communities and for white
communities. If the body politic with its organized eyepower remained segregated it
would continue to keep watchful eyes on those “outside” forces and threats to white lives,
property, and morality, i.e. their substance. In this chapter we explore aspects of the
policing eye as they relate to contemporary visitations of Looks that kill, suggesting that,
although the struggles for civil rights and battles for integration would bring about
changes to this eye, violent eye habits from the past still hang around and result in
talionic and spectral moments of mistrust, fire, and violence.
The Policing Eye
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As the forceful expression of the hand-eye coordination of the white body politic,
policing institutions, through repeated gestures, movements, and activities, were
historically organized and trained to protect the substance of white communities (bodies,
property, status, morals) from black and otherwise “unsubstantial” others. 649 This idea is
related to what Judith Butler argued in her reflection on the police beating of Rodney
King in 1991: “the police are… structurally placed to protect whiteness against violence,
where violence is the imminent action of that black male body.” 650 The policing eye was
trained to forcefully protect against threats to “whitestuff,” which was justified in part by
the consistent interpretation of the actions of the nonwhite other as being violent
themselves. White eyes were trained to see violence or resistance in the actions of the
nonwhite other. Butler continues, “because within this imaginary schema, the police
protect whiteness, their own violence cannot be read as violence; because the black male
body… is the site and source of danger, a threat, the police effort to subdue this body,
even if in advance, is justified regardless of the circumstances.” 651 With Rodney King,
not even a video of the event, which at the time was thought to provide a neutral and
objective view of the scene, could disrupt “the racist production of the visual field.”652
Even while on the ground with numerous officers surrounding him, King was still viewed
as a threat; he could still, somehow, inflict harm.
Butler’s comments about the black body can refer not only to Rodney King’s
black body, but to black social bodies in their coordination and organization in history.
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We can insert one word into, and excise “male” from, her quote to expand the meaning:
“the police are… structurally placed to protect whiteness against violence, where
violence is the imminent action of that black [social] body.” Historically, a primary goal
of overseers, patrollers, and law enforcement officers was to prevent, out of fear of revolt,
illegal activities, or interracial mixing, the unsupervised congregation of black people. In
social bodies, black people might, and often did, “compare injustices, scheme, conspire,
and foment revolutionary intrigues.” 653 James C. Scott, quoting Albert Raboteau, notes
that, “The plantocracies of North America and the West Indies regulated very closely the
circumstances in which their slaves could assemble. In the United States, ‘gatherings of
five or more slaves without the presence of a white observer were universally
forbidden.’” 654 The purpose of such surveillance was to prevent people from sharing their
common experiences and aspirations and from developing common cause with one
another. The best way to do that was to keep individuals relatively isolated, to atomize
them so they could not link up in a body with others in a stable and powerful manner.
One individual was relatively controllable, three or four was a loose grouping that should
probably be watched, a dozen or more should be made illegal outside supervised contexts
and always broken up, while twenty and up was a potential organized body that posed a
real threat, especially if they got arms beyond their physical arms. Scott summarizes the
strategy well: “The least dangerous assemblies of slaves were, therefore, small,
supervised, work parties during the daylight hours; the most dangerous were large,
unauthorized, apart from work, and at night.” 655
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White eyes which sought to control black populations through a racialized visual
field or grid were not historically limited to the South. In Boston, for example, a curfew
was instituted in 1703 to control the city’s black community, and the city watch was
ordered in 1736 to “take up all Negro and Molatto servants, that shall be unseasonably
Absent from their Masters Families, without giving sufficient reason therefore.” 656 In his
monumental sociological study, The Philadelphia Negro (1899), W. E. B. Du Bois refers
to a 1693 ordinance about “Negro slaves” which ordered
the Constables of Philadelphia, or anie other person whatsoever, to have power to
take up Negroes, male or female, whom they should find gadding abroad on the
said first dayes of the weeke, without a ticket from their Mr. or Mris., or not in
their Compa, or to carry them to gaole [jail], there to remain that night, and that
without meat or drink, and to Cause them to be publickly whipt next morning
with 39 Lashes, well Laid on, on their bare backs, for which their sd. [said] Mr. or
Mris. should pay 15d. to the whipper. 657
Here constables or “any other person whatsoever” had the power to “take up” male or
female “Negroes” who were “gadding abroad” without a pass and put them in jail to be
whipped. Similarly, Booker T. Washington recorded that “in 1710 the city of New York
passed an ordinance forbidding slaves appearing in the streets after dark without a lighted
lantern, on penalty of being locked up in the watch-house that night, and sent to prison
the next day until the master paid the fine; after which the slave received fifty lashes and
was discharged.” 658 Again in 1713 the Common Council of New York City passed a
“Law for Regulating Negro & Indian Slaves in the Nighttime” (amended in 1731) which
declared that “no Negro or Indian Slave above the age of fourteen years do presume to be
or appear in any of the streets… on the south side of the fresh water in the night time
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above one hour after sun sett without a lanthorn and a lighted candle.” 659 “Negroes” and
“Indians” must be made visible, whether through natural or artificial means, to be
controlled.
For Simone Browne, these “lantern laws” were a “prosthesis made mandatory
after dark, a technology that made it possible for the black body to be constantly
illuminated from dusk to dawn, made knowable, locatable, and contained within the
city.” 660 These laws and others are examples of what Browne terms “racialized
surveillance,” whereby the white community and its police utilized various technologies,
whether lanterns, badges, brands, newspaper advertisements, etc., as a way to “reify
boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines” and to “exercise a ‘power to define
what [or who] is in or out of place.’” 661 The streets, being public byways, were controlled
by the gazes of white people who therefore controlled not only who or what appeared in
the streets, but also the flow of movements within that space (of people, of goods, of
ideas, etc.). As Browne pithily states, “surveillance is nothing new to black folks. It is the
fact of antiblackness.” 662 The policing eye was a biased surveilling eye; and its many
looks in history regarded people of color as suspicious, dangerous, or criminal.
The Profiling Eye
Since the 1990s one controversial but real aspect of contemporary policing
practices is that of racial profiling, which social psychologist Jack Glaser defines as “the
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use of race or ethnicity, or proxies thereof, by law enforcement officials as a basis for
judgment of criminal suspicion.” 663 Sociologist Karen Glover reminds us that while the
term “racial profiling” is “relatively new, emerging in 1980’s discourse… the targeting of
people of color by law and law enforcement is an American tradition.” 664 Glaser himself
argues that such profiling is concerning because “if police pay more attention to (are
more likely to stop and/or search) members of some racial or ethnic groups, then
regardless of actual criminality or offending rates, those groups will bear a
disproportionate share of sanctions.” 665 Among these sanctions is higher rates of
incarceration and monetary fines. For Glaser, “a non-trivial proportion of Americans,
especially young men, are under correctional supervision, and that proportion is
dramatically higher among minorities, particularly black people. The impact is dire; in
2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics projected that, assuming existing incarceration rates
persisted, 5.9% of white men born that year would be incarcerated at some point in their
lifetime. For Latinos it would be 17.2% and for African Americans 32.2%.”666 The
disparities cannot be explained away by offending rates either. After discussing surveys
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2008) and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (2007), which showed that “Blacks were only slightly more likely
than Whites to report having used illicit drugs in the preceding month (9.5% and 8.2%,
respectively)” and that “Black students were less likely (17.2%) to indicate that they had
carried a weapon at some point in the preceding 30 days than were White students
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(18.2%) or Hispanic students (18.5%),” Glaser concludes: “while offense rates appear to
be higher among Blacks for some crimes, and lower for others, even when they are
higher, these discrepancies are not enough to explain the much more dramatic
overrepresentation of Blacks in the criminal justice system.” 667 Rather, “we must
consider… the possibility that some of the racial disparities in those who are caught and
punished result from racial bias in law enforcement.” 668 Considering the history of
policing and the control of enslaved and then free black populations, this conclusion,
correct as it is, must seem tautological for those who experience various forms of
profiling in its everyday expressions.
The strength of Glaser’s analysis lies in using the latest social psychological
research to explain aspects of profiling. For example, he defines a stereotype as “a belief
about a trait being disproportionately possessed by members of a particular social group,”
and says that stereotyping serves three primary functions: 1) to rationalize inequities, 2)
to boost in-group esteem and, by extension, self-esteem, and 3) to serve as “cognitive
shortcuts,” which allows people “to make quick inferences without considering all the
information one would need to make a 100% certain determination.” 669 Some stereotypes
are sinister, as when black people and Latinxs are associated with criminality. In addition,
experiments conducted by social psychologists have shown that “merely seeing a Black
face instantaneously causes people, including police officers, to think of crime, and vice
versa.” 670 The phenomenon known to researchers as “shooter bias” also points to the
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potentially lethal impact of these implicit or automatic associations and stereotypes.
Glaser describes one experimental scenario that tests for shooter bias:
Seated in front of a video monitor with your hand on a control stick, you are
instructed that you will see a series of photographs of men. Each will hold either a
gun or a harmless object like a cell phone. Your job is to “shoot” by squeezing the
trigger on the stick as quickly as possible whenever there is a gun and to pull back
as quickly as possible whenever there is no gun. Partway through the task you
realize that some of the men are Black and some are White.
The results of this experiment show that even “well-intentioned” people “do tend to shoot
Black men faster and erroneously shoot more unarmed Black men.” 671 Glaser draws out
some important considerations when moving “from the lab to the field”: “The
implications of shooter bias need not be constrained to shooting incidents. Rather, the
phenomenon is likely representative of the potential for a much broader class of troubling
forms of unintended discrimination, including more commonplace uses of nonlethal force
as well as judgements of suspicion, decisions to search, and so forth.” 672 Because these
biases often, but not always, operate without explicit reflection, their subtle normality and
everydayness renders them all the more troublesome as they are difficult to notice and
control. Profiling eyes, biased eyes, and stereotyping eyes, whether intentionally or not,
can skew the vision of organizations and lead to injustice and violence, especially if they
become habitual.
As James Baldwin noted in his own time, “The white racist has ruled the world
for a long time, and the crises we are undergoing now are involved with the fact that the
habits of power are not only extremely hard to lose; they are as tenacious as some
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incurable disease.” 673 Habits, obviously, develop over time through repeated and
accumulated performances of like actions – whether linguistic, economic, bureaucratic,
perceptual, etc. – and are eventually done in an unconscious manner as second nature.
Habits of power, as in organized eyepower, are not developed in the abstract, but in
concrete and embodied practices. They are formed and coercively applied even through
something as basic as seeing, watching, and looking, in Looks that kill. Habits of seeing
formed and developed at both a personal and organizational level through a
discriminatory social and economic regime became so ingrained, such a part of “nature,”
that their impact is still felt in our mental and perceptual comportment toward the world
and to other humans. Unjust looks still infiltrate our street of vision and seek to dominate
it. According to George Yancy, “the production of the Black body is an effect of the
discursive and epistemic structuring of white gazing and other white modes of anti-Black
performance. And while these performances are not always enacted consciously but the
result of years of white racism calcified and habituated with the bodily repertoire of
whites, whites are not exempt from taking responsibility for the historical continuation of
white racism.” 674 The policing eye was historically formed by the white community as a
watching eye, shaped as a profiling eye, and did not ever really see eye to eye with
various black communities in which it made its rounds and arrested the movements,
bodies, and even spirits of people with a look: Freeze! 675 These freezing looks that arrest
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the hearts of community members are felt across the nation and elicit impassioned, even
fiery, responses.
The Talionic Eye
The phrase “An eye for an eye!” was one among many slogans shouted in anger
and frustration at a line of uniformed police officers in the aftermath of the shooting of
Sylville Smith in the Sharman Park neighborhood of Milwaukee in August 2016.676
Smith had been pulled over and was fleeing the police when he was shot twice by officer
Dominique Heaggan-Brown, first while attempting to throw his firearm over a fence, and
again 1.69 seconds later in the chest as he lay on the ground. According to the testimony
of Heaggan-Brown’s partner, Ndiva Malafa, whose body camera recorded the brief chase
and fatal shooting: “I saw Mr. Smith exit the vehicle. I observed the firearm and at that
point, we made eye contact. At that moment, I believe I started to – I see him running
northeast. Out of the corner of my eye, I see Heaggan-Brown chase him as well.” 677 As in
so many other cases, the “eye contact” made between Smith and the officers proved
disastrous, with one eye putting out the other. 678 By nightfall the clash of eyes had grown
in proportion, as a large body of people took to the streets to protest the killing. They
would be met by a body of police officers donned in riot gear. Some eyes were

lens of “types” (“criminal,” “predator,” etc.) that bear only upon surface appearances and ignore the depth, dignity,
inviolability, and potentiality of the unique individual mode or genre of being human.
676
See Gina Barton, Rick Romell, Ashley Luthern, and Calvin Mattheis, “A night of conflict, chaos and courage in
Sherman Park,” Journal Sentinel, August 20, 2016, accessed May 28, 2017,
http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2016/08/20/night-conflict-chaos-and-courage-sherman-park/88994022/.
677
See Darran Simon and Tony Marco, “Sylville Smith’s family sobs at body cam footage of fatal police shooting,”
CNN, June 15, 2017, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/15/us/sylville-smith-heaggan-brownbody-cam-video/index.html.
678
Heaggan-Brown was charged with first-degree reckless homicide, of which he was found not guilty in 2017. He was
later convicted in a separate case of sexual assault and soliciting prostitution and is now serving three years of jail time.
He has also filed a lawsuit against the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office for alleged mistreatment while in custody.
See Theo Keith, “Disgraced ex-cop Dominique Heaggan-Brown files lawsuit alleging mistreatment at Milwaukee
County jail,” Fox6 News, July 9, 2018, accessed May 4, 2019, https://fox6now.com/2018/07/09/heaggan-brown-filesfederal-lawsuit-against-the-milwaukee-co-sheriffs-office-alleging-mistreatment/.

215
militarized and armed, while others remained organic. Other eyes watching events unfold
on a television or computer screen saw a numberless variety of things: some saw their
stereotypical beliefs about “inner-city” life with its rampant violence and criminality
supposedly confirmed; others saw a missionary opportunity for either spiritual or
economic redemption; others saw the inevitable failure of government policies and social
welfare; others saw a rising social revolution; others saw the anger, frustration, and
delinquency of adolescents out of control; others saw yet another instance of institutional
racism; others saw a repeat of the “Burn, Baby Burn” mentality of the 1960s; others saw
a repeat of 2014 when the streets were taken after Dontre Hamilton, a young black man
with a history of mental illness, was shot fourteen times by officer Christopher Manney
in a public park; still others saw nothing worth noting. 679 As for myself, I saw eyes
everywhere and the power in looking, as well as an after-image of a Look that kills.
Defined as “a visual sensation which remains after the stimulus that gave rise to it
ceases,” an after-image fittingly describes the connection between the lighting up of an
African American man by the police and the subsequent lighting up of a neighborhood
via urban riot. 680 The fires in the streets pointed to the gunfire that was itself trained by a
targeting eye. The unfolding scene suggested an underlying talionic logic: the eyes, or
their proxies, that violently light up others will themselves be lit up. An eye for an eye!
As is well known and documented, African Americans throughout the 20th
century sometimes considered white (eye) power and its embodied carriers, police
officers, to be the greatest threat to their lives. This divide between the police and various
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African American communities is nothing new. According to James Baldwin, who on
this occasion is speaking of Harlem, “None of the Police Commissioner’s men, even with
the best will in the world, have any way of understanding the lives led by the people they
swagger about in twos and threes controlling.” 681 He continues,
Their very presence is an insult, and it would be, even if they spent their entire
day feeding gumdrops to children. They represent the force of the white world,
and that world’s real intentions are, simply, for that world’s criminal profit and
ease, to keep the black man corralled up here, in his place. The badge, the gun in
the holster, and the swinging club make vivid what will happen should his
rebellion become overt. Rare, indeed, is the Harlem citizen, from the most
circumspect church member to the most shiftless adolescent, who does not have a
long tale to tell of police incompetence, injustice, or brutality. I myself have
witnessed and endured it more than once. 682
There are still “long tales” being told in various neighborhoods around the nation about
the police and those holding power over large swaths of their lives, a hidden transcript
that the dominant public would most likely reject vehemently, refuse to hear, or simply
ignore. The police officer also remains “a perfect representative of the people he serves,”
just as in Baldwin’s day. 683 They are not merely individual persons representing their
own personal good intentions, charitable wills, and concern for all people, but more
importantly they represent, as embodied symbols, the eyes and hands, the members, of
the dominant body politic. This means that their policing “has its explicit or implicit
burden the cruelty and injustice of the white domination,” of white eye power, both
historical and contemporary. 684 The accumulation of unjust practices leads to the
“accumulating contempt and hatred of a people,” and so, an eye for an eye is heard. 685
What might this shout, this hidden transcript bursting into public, mean today?
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Hearing the lex talionis in the streets signals that something is off with justice in
society, especially regarding actions pertaining to bodies and the compensation for harm
done to these bodies. It signals that eyes are confronting each other not in terms of a
seeing with, an eye-to-eye situation, but a seeing against, an eye-for-an-eye situation. As
has been hinted at, the shout clues us into the reality that the Sherman Park episode,
variously labelled a riot, rebellion, uprising, or civil disturbance, is a talionic moment,
that is, a moment that gives back “in kind” what has first been received. Here, what is
given back “in kind” (from the Latin talis which forms the base of talionis) are calls for
revenge and acts of violence and destruction. Note, however, that what is given back “in
kind” (talis) is not applied literally; no one is killed for killing a member of the
community. As we will see, other material realities served as substitutes, or scapegoats,
for the eye of power that killed. In this context, an eye for an eye should be evaluated
more for its rhetorical and situational function than its presupposed good or bad morality.
It would be irresponsible to make moralizing claims that an eye for an eye is primitive,
terroristic, barbaric, or even unchristian, before attempting to understand what such a
shout and others like it might reveal about a social phenomenon. That the shout was
heard in Sherman Park meant that, at least in the eyes of one person, “just legal, political,
and social institutions” had failed in their duties to justice.
“An eye for an eye!” ringing out in Sherman Park thus discloses the perceived
breakdown of what Dussel terms “institutional systems of legitimation” that allow for the
“creation of mediations between the political community as a whole and its leaders, who
are necessarily much fewer in number.” 686 Under ideal circumstances, community
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members can see and experience themselves in these social institutions, such as judicial
bodies or police organizations, and this experience of coming to see and know oneself as
objectified in social institutions is what makes these very institutions legitimate in the
eyes of the people. They are seen by community members as expressions of their own
wills, of their very selves, and as such the people will consent to the demands made upon
them by these institutional powers because they trust these forces as their own selfexpression and self-representation. 687 Therefore, institutions are legitimate insofar as they
provide a real link between people and how they objectively organize themselves into a
community through their delegated representatives who make laws and enforce them.
The eye for an eye shout calls into question the legitimacy of certain social
institutions. For some community members, these institutions, such as the police, are no
longer, or never were, legitimate, as they cannot see themselves in these bodies as in a
mirror. They do not trust these institutional forces, because they are not perceived and
experienced as the people’s own self-expression, as a product of their consensual will,
but are rather experienced as their own destruction at the hands of another (an-“other”).
Instead of binding people to their own objective and institutional self-expression to create
an environment for the flourishing of all members of the community, the mediating force
of the police – ideally mediating between the people and the objectified laws they create
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for themselves as enforcers of the law – have attacked and wounded; they have taken an
eye. In response, the eye for an eye shout expresses the attitude that if those charged with
embodying and enforcing the eyes of the law cannot see straight or cannot see with the
people they are charged to protect, then they shouldn’t be allowed to see at all. This eye,
too, must be taken. And so we hear yet another shout in Sherman Park: “We want blood
like y’all want it!” 688 These potent words, along with those that called for an eye for an
eye, manifest an intense desire for retribution. If the words sound “savage” it is because
they are in response to a previous “savagery.” They call into question the very legitimacy
of social institutions because these institutions are perceived as destructive of the very
lives they are meant to represent and protect. Following David Michael Levin, it is
always legitimate “to call the body politic into question from the standpoint of the wellbeing of the human body.” 689
An eye for an eye also speaks to the embodied character of justice and to reality
that mistrust and antagonism between community members and the police is at least
partially rooted in conflicting practices of looking with a history of their own. An eye for
an eye is necessarily an eye versus an eye, the eye of the police, of the law and those who
enforce it (policing eye), versus the eye of those in the streets (talionic eye). For an eye
for an eye to be heard in Sherman Park there must already be a perceived institutional
failure to see to the needs of the people and to see with them, from a shared cultural and
existential perspective. Instead, one eye has failed to see the other, to mirror the other,
and has set itself against the other and harmed them. As Kimberlé Crenshaw and Gary
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Peller explained regarding L.A. in the early 1990s, and which still applies sometimes
today:
In a deep sense, Blacks in L.A. live in a different world from whites, in something
like a different nation. They and the police are like foreigners to each other. And
understanding this distance means comprehending relations, not according to
norms of universal equality and equal treatment, but as the rule of one community
over another. From this counternarrative, what is needed is not color blindness on
the part of the police force, but the redistribution of power so that the police force
is not an outside occupier, but rather a part of the community itself, subject to
regulation by the Black community in L.A. The community doesn’t need formal
equality from the police, but actual control over the police – as well as other
public institutions.” 690
The feeling that the police are “foreign” does not go away even if the officer is African
American or grew up in the same neighborhood, like Dominque-Heaggan Brown.
Embedded within the badge and uniform are symbolic connotations and historical threads
difficult for many to “see past” or “see through.” While in other communities, such as the
white suburban communities of Chicago and Cincinnati I grew up in, the eye of the
police and the eyes of community members seemed to be one, as they saw the world from
the same viewpoint and with the same values placed on what is seen, for some in
Sherman Park there is no such seeing-with but only a being-watched, a looking-at, a
sharp – and legal – Look that kills. An eye for an eye means, in this local context, that the
policing eye must be blinded before it kills again. Having met this eye violence in the
past, the talionic eye is conjured up again to meet it and defend against it in the present. If
the specter of Looks that kill continues to loom in the streets, so also will the specter of
the talionic eye and its scripted production: the urban riot.
Blinding a Spectral Eye
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The poet Calvin Hernton wrote a poem called “Jitterbugging in the Streets” in
1967 in which he likened urban riots across the country to “the rage of a hopeless people
/ Jitterbugging in the streets.”691 In this brilliant and explosive poem, Hernton explores
problems associated with the urban ghetto and white people’s attitudes, violence, and
callous indifference to them, all the while invoking the image of a specter haunting
America. The opening stanza includes the lines, “The only Messiah we shall see this year
/ Staggers / To and fro / On the LowerEastSide / Being laughed at by housewives in
Edsel automobiles / who teach their daughters the fun of deriding a terror / belched up
from the scatological asphalt of America.” 692 According to the poem, there’s no
celebrating the Fourth of July this year, no “Holyman crying out,” no Santa Claus, no
“Jesus Christ born this year,” only “the Messiah” that is “a bullet / In the belly / of a
Harlem youth shot down by a coward crouched / behind an outlaw’s badge.” Hernton’s
poem ends with his own interpretation (I say!) of events: “TERROR is in Harlem, / A
Fear so constant / Black men crawl the pavement as if they were snakes, / and snakes turn
to bully sticks that beat the heads / of those who try to stand up.” The specter haunting
America that the poet speaks of seems to depend on the perspective and position of the
person in society. For those living in “the asphalt plantation of America,” the specter is of
shots and Looks that kill, of the violence of “inorganic phalluses” cracking your head
open, of bodies in the streets because of police work. The specter is poor housing and
rats, as well as “absentee slumlords” and “millionaire humanitarian philanthropists /
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Forcing little black girls to get down and do the dog before they learn to spell their
names.” 693 The specter that haunts white people is the black person who commits
violence, destroys property, breaks windows, eats “my children,” and messes with white
wives and daughters. The former specter produces real violence and destruction, while
the latter is largely a product of white people’s imaginations and pathological projections.
Those stuck in the urban ghetto contend with an ever-watchful and sometimes destructive
policing eye, with its phallic sticks and shooting guns, while white people live in luxury,
with nice cars and large bank accounts, producing and maintaining the policing eye as it
haunts the streets of others.
Being stuck with this haunting specter, this following “It” – of the ghost of
slavery, of organized racism, of police brutality, of poverty, of white (eye) power – is a
reality that some people still have to contend with. As Jacques Derrida says, “a specter
does not only cause séance tables to turn, but sets heads spinning.” 694 For some
Milwaukeeans today there is a sense of being stuck in a hostile environment, whether due
to institutional arrangements, crime, unwelcoming shopkeepers, the school-to-prison
pipeline, prevailing economic structures, personal experiences of racism, or harassment
from the police. As Robert Gooding-Williams says, “being stuck is… a social condition,
since the world and worlds which impinge on us are always and everywhere the products
of social histories and ongoing social practices.” 695 Further, “being stuck… is a matter of
being inexorably caught up in a network of political, economic, and cultural legacies that
escape the aura of the extraordinary. Neither news nor old news, these legacies constitute
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the uneventful conditions of social existence.” 696 Perhaps people in the community feel
stuck —fixed— with a spectral eye whose genetic makeup can be traced back to the
overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes in their various forms and
historical manifestations. 697 The present still seems to ripple with Looks thrown in the
past. The shooting of Sylville Smith became the perfect match for lighting the anger and
frustration that already saturated the neighborhood. Those who took to the streets had
been force fed unjust look after unjust look, injustice after injustice, and they had enough,
they were full; they simply couldn’t take “It” anymore. Lighting up police cars and
businesses felt by some to be outside or foreign intrusions, these symbolic burnings could
be interpreted as an attempt to distort or smash the seeing presence of the ever-watchful,
ever-critical eye; to give back what it had dished out and served up: an eye for an eye! 698
And because a gaze, a stare, a look, and bullets fly through the air and yet must have their
launching point on the ground in places such as a squad car or behind a counter, these
material scapegoats could be burned as symbolic substitutes. The eye that wants to “put
me/us down” was looking from these locations. Who wouldn’t want to put out an eye that
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puts one down? Yet the spectral eye, the eye that haunts memories and places, the eye
that reappears time and again as the re-collection and visitation of the fragments of the
overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes, remains elusive. It is difficult to
kill a specter, to take its eye, for it is also a revenant eye: “one cannot control its comings
and goings because it begins by coming back.” 699 The people in the streets of Milwaukee
at least attempted to bruise this spectral eye in a gesture of looking back, of returning
what they had received, by lobbing bricks like concretized looks.
Amid this spectral event, an event which discloses the “non-contemporaneity with
itself of the living present,” one’s mind hovers not only over the present particularities of
events in Milwaukee, but flies to other victims of police violence and brutality, whether
in Baltimore, Ferguson, L.A., Detroit, Harlem, Newark, Marion, Charleston, Cincinnati,
or other places in the past where a similar (same?) eye – overseeing, patrolling, kluxing,
or policing – had a similar (same?) lethal impact. 700 Connections are made in the minds
of many between police officers of the now and overseers of the past, as Deborah Mathis
did in reflecting on the police beating of Rodney King: “Certainly the police officers,
reminiscent of the plantation bosses of yore, had shown no hesitation in their attack on
King.” 701 During this spectral event, the accumulated and “reminiscent” sites/sights of
violence against black people and other people of color become present to the minds of
many, and with this presence the thoughts and feelings of ah man, another one?!, didn’t
this just happen?!, it doesn’t surprise me!, and it’s the same old story. The scene plays
repeatedly before the eyes of many throughout history, and these episodic memories
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haunt minds, social relations, and material realities. As George Yancy explains, “Given
the long history of white racism in North America, it is not unusual to have specific
memories that fail to fade, memories that associate the experience of whiteness with
instances of lynching, castration, and terror, memories that justifiably push Black people
to the precipice of existential fear and trembling.” 702
And just as one might turn and flee a policing eye, one might also hide their
children from them. This is no exaggeration: one “longtime Sherman Park resident
Tyrone Joiner” shared with Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporters that he “doesn’t trust
the police and doesn’t want his children to interact with them: ‘I tell my kids to come
inside if I see police in the neighborhood. I’m afraid they are going to kill one of
them.” 703 While some go inside, others take to the streets: “Whose street? Our street!” 704
Recall that, as a public location, the street is a place where one acts “before the gaze of all
other ‘actors.’” 705 Taking to the streets is thus a way to publicly affirm one’s right to act,
to be, to defy, to move, to dissent, and to fight back against those who seek to control the
public sphere, the visual grid of intersubjectivity. Taking to the streets affirms one’s right
and ability to take place. As George Lipsitz explains, “For black people in the United
States, struggles against the oppressions of race have by necessity also been struggles
over space. African American battles for resources, rights, and recognition have not only
taken place, in the figurative term that historians use to describe how events happen, but
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they have also required blacks literally to take places.” 706 This struggle to take place, to
exist, to happen, and to stand before the eyes of others has, as we have seen, often been
repressed and put down by various manifestations of Looks that kill.
Given such a history, with such a habitual occlusion of justice, we must creatively
reflect on and practice seeing eye to eye as equals at the levels of our personal and social
bodies. Social, economic, educational, and political institutions must genuinely be the
self-expression of the people and must always have their eye on (seeing-to) the people
whom they re-present. The people are meant to see themselves in the eyes of social and
political institutions, which in turn are meant to act as forms of self-mediation for people.
People come to see, know, and experience themselves in these institutional
objectifications and so have their lives corroborated and enhanced by a stronger social
environment. Yet if institutions and social organizations continually fail to regard or see
eye to eye with a certain group of people, then can they continue to be legitimate? For
example, if the police or other parts of the criminal justice system and the people are
strangers to one another, if they do not see eye to eye, if they live in different worlds –
then where can justice come from? Must “savagery” and terror reign? These are the
questions prompted by the events in Sherman Park and the writing on the walls of urban
neighborhoods and bodies.
To get a feel for others, to see them, we must develop a consensus – literally a
“thinking or feeling with,” or more interpretively, a “sensing with.” For Nicholas
Mirzoeff, a consensus means “not a single point of view, but a uniform range of
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views.” 707 And as Dussel explains, “power is the consensual will of the community or the
people, which in its first moment demands the obedience of the authority.” 708 Authorities
have too often demanded the obedience of the people, and thus reversed the truth. As
long as institutional authorities view themselves as the seat of power and deem it as
within their rights to demand the obedience of society, rather than the other way around,
then there will always be dissent: a counter-thinking, a counter-sensing, a counter-feeling
to dominant “sensibilities.” 709 There will always be sites of resistance, the “streets,” lit up
with sights of resistance – people looking back. We might also put it another way and say
that those who took to the streets in Sherman Park and elsewhere were acting the
dissidents, that is, public opponents of an established system or organization, through
their dissing of various businesses and organizations, especially the police. To “dis” the
system is to talionically treat authorities without respect, for example, by talking or
staring back, or by being purposely rude, insulting, or inconsiderate; it is to be
dismissively critical of power structures and of those in power. It is to stick it to the man,
or in some minds, to the monstrous. To dis the spectral eye in any of its manifestations is
to lampoon it, to harpoon it, and ultimately to blind it so it stumbles around in its own lair
of darkness and defeat, starving itself to death. Yet is this the only way?
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Part III: Towards Just Looks
“There is a purity of gaze that maintains human beings in a steadfast openness to
truth…” 710
“I want to reiterate the message that ‘we must learn to see.’ Seeing here is meant
metaphysically as heightened awareness and understanding, the intensification of one’s
capacity to experience reality through the realm of the senses.” 711
“The saints were capable of seeing through the masks that cover the faces of humanity,
and they saw that the masks are unreal. In the innumerable faces of men they saw only
one face: the face of love (that is to say, the face of Christ).” 712

Parts I and II of this project were concerned with finding a way to think and speak
about present visitations of Looks that kill and how these Looks historically, socially, and
materially developed. We also sought to understand the complex and awesome reality of
human looking from as many angles as possible, not only to come to grips with the
hurtful and unjust ways we see other people, but to search for openings out of a kind of
seeing that is really a violent unseeing. Looks that kill startlingly reveal how human
seeing can be imbued with social and political meanings for the purposes of control,
intimidation, exploitation, or elimination. We have also seen that, while usually
associated with theory on a metaphorical level, human seeing is also a form of praxis, or
practice. For Clodovis Boff, praxis is “the complexus of practices orientated to the
transformation of society, the making of history,” which as such “has a fundamentally
political connotation.” 713 Looks that kill are politico-sensorial practices that aim to ensure

710

Jon Sobrino, Spirituality of Liberation: Toward Political Holiness, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1989), 36.
711
bell hooks, Belonging: A Culture of Place (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 132.
712
The quote is from Thomas Merton’s introduction to Ernesto Cardenal, To Live is to Love, trans. Kurt Reinhardt
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 8.
713
Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1987), 6. Italics in original. As Boff informs us, “praxis comprises the senses, the meanings, that the individual
or transindividual human being, consciously or no, invests in it, in the form of theory, latent or patent” (210).

229
society and history follow the course laid out by the dominant and pluriform modes of
white visuality. More specifically, these Looks often make foreign or nonwhite others
feel or sense their “out-of-placeness” not only in space, but in the social and political
body; they are marginalizing eyes. Looks that kill communicate to others that they are not
fully part of the polis and have little or no claim to being or identifying as “We the
People,” a cultural and existential order providing legal, economic, military, and social
protections and recognition for those who live, move, and have their being in it. Our
seeing, which manifests the unity of theory and praxis in the flesh, works to build a home
for us to live in, a web of interpersonal relationships – yet who is “us” and who can
appear and live in “our common home”? 714 Answers to these questions can be partially
found by tracing something as simple – and as complicated – as a look.
In Part III we offer a theological analysis of seeing that is not intended as a
complete and total answer to solving or healing problems associated with Looks that kill
and white (eye) power in its various concrete modes. Rather, as a supplement to the work
already being done by individuals and organizations to challenge violent, exploitative,
and discriminatory eyecraft and organized eyepower – such as the local Milwaukee
efforts of Black Leaders Organizing for Communities (BLOC), Leaders Igniting
Transformation (LIT), and Parklawn Assembly of God – we point out a few areas of
Christian belief and practice that might prove especially fruitful for interpreting,
combatting, and defending against Looks that kill at a personal and social level. 715
Furthermore, given the unity of love of God and love of neighbor in the Christian
tradition, the case is made in Part III that a Christian individual or community who fails
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to see, or wrongly sees, other people, especially the poor, oppressed, and those struggling
against Looks that kill, are guilty of heteropraxis, an incorrect practice of the faith. A
consistent failure to see others reveals that one has failed to see God in Christ, whose
own presence is especially seen in the “least ones” (Mt. 25:45). As John Chrysostom
exclaimed in a homily on the Gospel of Matthew, “Do you really wish to pay homage to
Christ’s body? Then do not neglect him when he is naked. At the same time that you
honor him here with hangings made of silk, do not ignore him outside when he perishes
from cold and nakedness… Your brother is more truly his temple than any church
building.” 716 Just as one cannot love God without loving one’s neighbor, so also one
cannot see God if one does not see, or rightly see, one’s neighbor. This situation demands
that Christians take seriously the call of Christ to contemplate him in the faces of others,
especially in those who are despised and looked down upon. Christians must learn with
Christ to see otherwise, against the grain of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic
productions of the visible. Contemplation and action, just like theory and praxis,
interpenetrate each other and reveal the other. 717 Our seeing of human others manifests
the depth of our vision of God, our faith, or our blindness to the truth.
Part III of this dissertation thus performs the theological task of critically
reflecting on a fundamental though easily overlooked aspect of Christian practice,
namely, the praxis of seeing. Following liberation theologians in their emphasis on
orthopraxy, or correct practice of faith, it is suggested that a central Christian practice is
to incarnate the eyes of God in Christ by concretely seeing to the needs and concerns of
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others through charity and justice, especially those who are harmed, misshaped, or
attacked by the unjust looks of others. “Incarnation” will be seen to be not only a
“meaning” concept – referring to the idea that God became human in Jesus of Nazareth –
but also a “praxic” one, which implies “putting its meaning into practice” and in doing so
“generating a better understanding” of what the Incarnation is. 718 What this means
precisely will become clearer as we move through some biblical writings and discover
that God’s seeing does not remain abstract or detached from the existential order of
humans but realizes itself in the tangible substantiation of it. God’s seeing “does”
something in the world that goes beyond the mere policing of morality; it is praxic.
Furthermore, according to Christian faith, God’s seeing transgresses the boundary
between the divine and human, ultimately running “the risk of the relative” through
incarnation, passion, and death. 719 God does not force God’s vision for the world on
humanity through violent displays of power, but invites humanity to visualize the world
and other people from the perspective of an incarnate love that sees itself with and in the
other: Jesus the Christ. It is fitting that Jesus’ own invitation to his first followers was
“Come and see.” 720
In the same Spirit, the eyecraft of Christians is to gently work on the world and
other people, not for worldly power, undue influence, or exploitation, but for justice: to
assist in opening up spaces for the appearing, freedom, and self-actualization of human
persons in societies. This eyecraft can take many expressions: seeing to the recognition
and preservation of the dignity, beauty, and truth of the human person as created in the
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image and likeness of God, or of the natural world; revising canon law so that the eyes of
the law (for the Church) are not so judgmental and concerned with outward appearances
and behaviors; actively combatting corporate looks (even from the Church) that dish out
injustice, such as in the clergy sex abuse crisis; chiseling away at racist and sexist habits
of seeing that prevent a full recognition and participation of everyone in the life of the
community; rejecting a technocratic vision of the world and people that is overly
concerned with use value; looking at Sacred Scripture with a new sensitivity to the views
and experiences of others; or moving into the streets, under the public gaze, to protest
social injustice. This eyecraft inspired by Christian faith will, following the dynamic
movement of God’s own seeing, express itself in concrete instantiations of neighborly
provision and concern. As Christians flesh out – however imperfectly and asymptotically
– God’s vision for the world and God’s preferential optic for the poor and the oppressed,
they can discover and more fully understand some of the central beliefs of their faith
(orthodoxy), especially the identity and meaning of Christ and the reality of the
Incarnation. By developing a just and orthopraxic regard for all people, the organized
eyepower of Christian communities can be a creative force for love and justice in the
world. But first and always they must learn to see.
Chapters 8 and 9 accordingly parallel the movement of the Incarnation in the
ordering of its material for analysis: God’s seeing, then Jesus’ seeing, and finally
Christians’ seeing. From the light gained from our examination of historical and current
malpractices of seeing in Parts I and II, we can look anew at places in Christian Scripture
and tradition to see what God’s own eyepower looks like in practice and what kind of
seeing God inspires in humans. In doing so, the ideal of just looks can be more fully
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illuminated which in turn can lead us to see each other more faithfully, in accordance
with the truth of our various genres of being human. Such an approach follows the “three
moments” of liberation theology as described by Zoë Bennett: “the moment of praxis, the
moment of reflection on praxis, and the moment of return to a renewed praxis.” 721
Having adjusted our eyes and perspectives to see what is involved with Looks that kill
and the struggle against them, we can read passages from the Bible with a new sensitivity
to the power in looking. These readings and interpretations can then inspire personal and
organizational practices that seek to counter the dominant distribution of the visible,
perhaps even opening beyond it. The focus in Chapter 9 on Pope Francis is also
intentional and is not meant to be an argument from authority. Instead, as the most visible
Christian leader in the world who is himself an episkopos (bishop), or overseer, Francis’
seeing and “takes” on the world and the faith is very influential and authoritative for
many. Tracing the lines and modes of his eyepower becomes necessary once we have
understood the connection between personal and social bodies as well as exploitative and
racist modes of overseeing. As Pope John XXIII once noted, it is the Chair of St. Peter
“whence every apostolate draws its motive and life,” so one who sees ex cathedra ought
to have a sense of justice that is up to the task of genuine Christian mission in the
flesh. 722
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Chapter 8: God’s Eye View
“Do you have eyes of flesh? Do you see as a mortal sees?” 723
“The helpless are crushed, laid low;
they fall into the power of the wicked,
Who say in their hearts, ‘God has forgotten,
shows no concern, never bothers to look.’
Rise up, LORD! God, lift up your hand!
Do not forget the poor!
Why should the wicked scorn God,
say in their hearts, ‘God does not care’?
But you do see;
you take note of misery and sorrow;
you take the matter in hand.
To you the helpless can entrust their cause;
you are the defender of orphans.”724
“But whatever else it may be, identity is connected with the fateful appraisals made of
oneself – by oneself and by others. Everyone presents himself to the others and to himself,
and sees himself in the mirrors of their judgments. The masks he then and thereafter
presents to the world and its citizens are fashioned upon his anticipations of their
judgments.” 725

Recently in a book entitled God is Watching You, Dominic Johnson suggested
that “the idea that one’s good and bad deeds will be observed, judged, and rewarded or
punished by God or some other supernatural agent is a recurring feature of virtually all of
the world’s religions, both past and present.” 726 Building on scholarly work in
evolutionary science and the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR), Johnson claims that
the ideas of supernatural observation and punishment or reward is an evolutionary
adaptation that helped god-fearing people “avoid raising the ire of their fellow man,
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[lowered] the costs of real world sanctions, and [raised] the rewards of cooperation.” 727
The sense that one is being watched by another person, especially a supernatural agent,
modifies one’s behavior due to the anticipated rewards or punishments of certain actions.
Johnson also notes that, even outside a religious context, eyes have the power to affect
our behaviors. He refers to experiments in which images or replicas of eyes in a room
contributed to the cooperation of people in a social situation. As he explains, “the
presence of eyes reduces selfish behavior and increases cooperation,” perhaps because
the presence of eyes “are thought to subconsciously activate concerns for reputation.” 728
God’s eyes have been particularly powerful because “God offers remarkably penetrating
detection.” 729 Even more, “supernatural agents, though variable in their power and
characteristics across and within cultures, often have the ability to be in many places at
one time, to observe people’s actions, and even to have access to their thoughts.” 730 God
or other supernatural agents also mete out severe punishments for bad behavior lasting
into eternity. God-fearing people, then, are concerned to adjust their behaviors in the eyes
of the divine to avoid God’s judgment or to gain certain rewards. This kind of behavior,
according to Johnson, brings about social benefits.
Even today the picture of God as peeping, policing, and judging human behavior
floats around in the popular imagination, often to the point of caricature. Much like Santa
Claus, God “sees you when you’re sleeping” and “knows if you’ve been bad or good,” a
creepy truth to tell children to get them to modify their behavior. Even C. S. Lewis began
his book, Christian Behaviour (1943), with a child’s impression of God: “There’s a story
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about a schoolboy who was asked what he thought God was like. He replied that, as far
as he could make out, God was ‘The sort of person who is always snooping round to see
if anyone is enjoying himself and then trying to stop it.’” 731 The schoolboy’s notion of
God as having a snooping eye and as someone who acts as a cosmic killjoy is found in
adults as well. But is this schoolboy notion the heart of God’s seeing? Is God’s seeing
primarily connected with surveilling people’s morality and rewarding or punishing them?
Such a focus ignores other aspects of God’s seeing, namely, its relation to justice and its
basic life-giving, substantiating role. The schoolboy notion of God’s seeing needs to be
informed by a mature and theological understanding of God’s seeing that considers both
justice and love. Further, a Christian understanding of God’s seeing must include the
reality that God’s eye, often depicted as disembodied and floating around in the sky, was
incarnate in Jesus the Christ, who as a full human being saw in a human way with two
eyes. This event fundamentally shapes, or ought to shape, how Christians internalize the
gaze of God and see other people.
The Providing Eye
One example of God’s seeing as a seeing to the needs of humans, and not
necessarily as a moral watchdog, occurs in the book of Genesis in the story of Hagar, an
Egyptian “maidservant” or slave of Sarai, Abram’s wife. In this story, because she is
barren and childless, Sarai tells Abram to “Have intercourse with my maid” so she can
have sons through her (Gen. 16:2). Abram, following a widely attested practice at the
time, has sex with Hagar and she becomes pregnant. Then Sarai complains that she has
“lost stature in her [Hagar’s] eyes,” presumably because Hagar now has the status that
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Sarai could never obtain for herself. Sarai then “mistreats” Hagar so much that the latter
runs away. While Hagar is out in the wilderness, “the LORD’s angel” visits Hagar and
tells her to return to Sarai, promising that her descendants will be too numerous to count.
After this promise, Hagar gives the name El-roi to God, saying, “You are God who sees
me.” This name, which could variously be translated as “God of seeing” or “God sees,” is
the only time in the Bible that someone is attributed with the power of naming God.
Womanist theologian Delores Williams notes that in this story God’s seeing becomes an
impetus for “a woman’s self-initiated liberation event,” inspiring Hagar “to hope and
act.”732 God’s seeing becomes a catalyst for fresh beginnings throughout the Hebrew
Bible.
Later in the book of Genesis Abraham is told by God to sacrifice his “only” son,
Isaac, whom Sarah miraculously conceived and bore in her old age. As Abraham walks to
the place of sacrifice with his son, Isaac asks, “Here are the fire and the wood, but where
is the sheep for the burnt offering?” Abraham responds, “God will provide the sheep for
the burnt offering” (Gen. 22:7-8). Abraham builds an altar, binds Isaac, puts him on top,
and just as he is about to sacrifice him with a knife the angel of the Lord stops him.
Rather than offering his son Isaac, Abraham finds “a single ram caught by its horns in the
thicket” which he sacrifices instead, and so we are told Abraham named the place
“Yahweh-yireh,” meaning the Lord will see or provide (22:14). Here, as in the case of
Hagar, God’s seeing is connected to God’s act of providing. The English word “provide”
finds it etymon in the Latin providere (pro [to, for] + videre [to see]), which means “to
see in advance, to see beforehand, to foresee,” but also, to see to or to make provision for.
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In this case, God sees to it, or provides, a ram in place of Isaac for a burnt offering. That
God sees means that God is providing for the well-being of people, especially those who
might lack other social protections and recognition, whether enslaved persons or children.
God’s eye is a providing eye, which forms the anthropomorphic basis for the theological
notion of God’s providence.
In Catholic magisterial teaching God’s providence is related to the notion that
God is the Lord of history and directs all things according to God’s good purposes. In Dei
Filius, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith from the First Vatican Council
(1869-70), we read that, “By his providence God protects and governs all things that he
has made, ‘reaching mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all
things well’ (Wis. 8:1). For ‘all are open and laid bare to his eyes’ (Heb. 4:13), even
those things that will be done by the free action of creatures.”733 Here the seeing of God
is protecting, governing, ordering, and foreseeing, all for the sake of things being “well”
in creation and for humanity. Karl Rahner builds on this basic notion of God’s
providence and suggests that God is “not merely the sole Lord of time and history, but
also guarantees that time shall be shaped and directed in a way that is ultimately
meaningful for history, and does not allow this to be fragmented and so to sink into a
formless succession of particles of time following one upon the other.”734 God’s seeing is
involved with substantiating personal and collective matter/s of a biological and historical
nature and with giving the universe and all peoples an ultimate and glorious end. The
reality of God’s seeing is not meant to leave people in fear of punishment but to provide a
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new ground for hope in the ultimate transformation of one’s own life, community, and
world. God’s seeing is praxic because it realizes itself in concrete instantiations of
provision and help.
From this basic sense of God’s providence, we can see that God’s eye is a
substantiating eye, an eye that gives substance to something or someone. God’s seeing
gives substance and form to the universe and to humans, including their bodies, and it
also gives substance to personal and social histories. In its obsolete meaning, but which is
still relevant for our purposes, the verb substantiate means to feed or nourish, whereas in
its more common usage the word means to make real or substantial. 735 God’s seeing
feeds and nourishes the inner-depths of human lives and sees to the feeding and
nourishment of people, especially in working on the hearts, minds, and consciences of
others, moving them to see and meet each other in their immediate needs. The word
substantiate also means “to prove the truth of” something or someone. 736 God’s eye
affirms and proves the truth and value of humans, especially when these realities are most
denied by other people or systems of exploitation. God’s substantiating seeing has the
ultimate take on human matter/s, especially in seeing to the vindication of those
victimized in various way by unjust looks. Finally, to substantiate can mean “to give
solidity to (something); to make firm, to strengthen; to affirm.” 737 God’s substantiating
eye performs these myriad functions in relation to the universe and to humans in creation,
providence, and salvation, which itself includes the resurrection of the body. God sees to
it that human matter/s, whether in terms of bodies or histories, does not or do not become
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so fragmented as to “sink into a formless succession of particles.” God gives shape and
form to human lives and substantiates them through all available means. For Rahner,
God’s seeing and knowing of the world and people is not “strictly the infinite
consciousness of the world-cause,” but rather “the eye of the personal God, whose
discerning, comprehending and provident gaze penetrates man’s inmost heart and is felt
there by him.” 738 Such a gaze lends substance to humans, giving them matter and a sense
of mattering, a sense of solidity, of existing, of being seen, protected, and loved, and
feeds their hearts with strength and affirmation to live in the face of life’s fragmenting
forces, such as labor and sexual exploitation, unjust economic policies, police brutality,
domestic abuse, or those persistent and habitualized Looks that kill. The substantiating
eye of God is the opposite of an exploiting eye which harvests or extracts “stuff” from
land or people to fulfill or satisfy itself. God’s eye does not suck the substance out of the
world or out of the lives of humans, but rather feeds them with substance, weightiness,
and life.
Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible we find instances of God’s seeing connected with
a concern for the suffering and the oppressed. In the book of Exodus, when the
descendants of Abraham and Isaac are enslaved and being exploited by Pharaoh and his
overseers, we are told that, “The Israelites groaned under their bondage and cried out, and
from their bondage their cry for help went up to God. God heard their moaning and God
was mindful of his covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. God saw the Israelites, and
God knew…” 739 God’s seeing of the Israelites immediately precedes the story of Moses’
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call by God to lead the people of Israel out of bondage in Egypt. God’s seeing-to takes
the form of a human liberator and freedom fighter: Moses. In another recounting of these
events we read, “When the Egyptians maltreated and oppressed us, imposing harsh
servitude upon us, we cried to the Lord, the God of our ancestors, and the Lord heard our
cry and saw our affliction, our toil and our oppression.” This God who sees “brought us
out of Egypt with a strong hand and outstretched arm, with terrifying power, with signs
and wonders, and brought us to this place, and gave us this land, a land flowing with milk
and honey” (Dt. 26:6-9). One feature of this land is that, “It is a land the Lord your God
cares for; the eyes of the Lord your God are continually on it from the beginning of the
year to its end” (Dt. 11:12). This is not merely a poetic statement, but one which
expresses the belief that God sees to it that the land is fertile and produces various fruits
and trees to sustain life. Considered with the eyes of faith, if God “sees” the land, then the
land will indeed flow with milk and honey. Without this seeing, the land will be barren.
God’s substantiating eye provides the ground for human life and existence.
The anthropomorphic language of God having eyes and seeing human guilt,
wickedness, or goodness, connects with God’s understanding of human hearts and their
deeds, with God’s justice. Yet God’s seeing also has a personal touch, a protective
concern and regard that sees to human substance both individually and
intergenerationally, as seen in God’s promises of descendants to both Abraham and
Hagar. God’s providence is concerned with both seeing to the good and the wicked for
justice in society and to bringing all things to their proper end or goal which is God, who
is goodness itself. The power of God’s eye, that is, when God’s eye takes in human
matter and matters, consists in its power to prevent these things from falling into the

242
formlessness and chaos of insubstantiality: “God saw that it was good.” 740 For Christians,
God’s substantiating and providing eye becomes incarnate and takes shape in a human
being, Jesus, with radical results.
Prosopagnosic Eyes
In a memorable passage from the Gospel of Matthew we are told that some
Pharisees and Herodians preface their entrapping question to Jesus about the lawfulness
of paying taxes to Caesar by telling Jesus that “you show no partiality,” or more
woodenly translated, “you do not see the prosopon [“face” or “mask”] of a human being”
(ou gar blepeis eis prosopon anthropon).741 While bypassing the finer exegetical
questions, this underhanded yet truthful declaration itself suggests that Jesus is a kind of
prosopagnosic in the sense that he is un-seeing regarding the faces or masks of humans.
This does not mean that Jesus does not see or appreciate the uniqueness and beauty of
other people’s faces. Rather, Jesus is, as it is traditionally put, “no respecter of persons,”
that is, he does not consider the outward appearance, position, front, social role, or
surface of a person in making judgments. He is the master of “un-seeing” or “unknowing” the face, or mask, of human beings, the surface level stuff that often covers up
and hides the matters of the heart, the true self within. But what does it mean to say that
Jesus does not see the “face,” or the fronting, of a human? How exactly does Jesus
perceive others in the Gospels? More crucially for those of us living in a world struggling
with the constant specter of Looks that kill, does the Spirit of Christ, poured into our
hearts by the grace of God, help us to see each other at a level beyond appearances, and if
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so, how are we to describe this process theologically and live into this reality in our own
lives?
It is a common idea in the Bible that God sees the human heart rather than mere
appearances; the corollary to God the prosopagnosic is God the cardignosic, the knower
of hearts (from kardia [heart] + gnosis [knowing]). In the story about the prophet Samuel
in search of a new king to replace Saul, we read that the Lord instructed the prophet about
Eliab, who Samuel thought might be God’s choice for king, as follows: “Do not judge
from his appearance or from his lofty stature, because I have rejected him. God does not
see as a mortal, who sees the appearance. The Lord looks into the heart” (1 Sam. 16:7). In
this case, as in others, the fact that God sees the heart is tied to the reality of God’s
judgment. Basically, because human beings in their seeing have a propensity to settle on
appearances and surfaces, and perhaps only glimpse the hearts of others, they are not
qualified to judge others in an ultimate and definitive sense. As taught at the Second
Vatican Council in 1965, “God, who alone is the judge and the searcher of hearts, forbids
us to pass judgment on the inner guilt of others.” 742 Only God, who sees the heart, can
judge a human being in this manner, a fact which can be unsettling or comforting
depending on the individual. Thus Karl Rahner could write in an essay on a Catholic
view of guilt, punishment, and responsibility that every person must eventually “answer
for himself and the whole of his life before the divine judgement seat” and so be judged
by “a judge who does not regard the mere appearance of life, the ‘face’, but the freely
disposable core of the person, the ‘heart’.” 743 God sees through the fronts that humans put
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on in relation to others, to themselves, and to God and sees what ultimately matters: the
heart, the deepest “stuff” of human life.
In the Gospel of Matthew Jesus calls the Father the one who “sees in secret” (6:4,
6:6) and who “sees what is hidden” (6:18). These statements about how and what the
Father sees appear in Jesus’ discussion of the “hypocrites” who “love to stand and pray in
the synagogues and on street corners so that others may see them,” and who also “look
gloomy when they fast” because “they neglect their appearance” to “appear to others to
be fasting” (Mt. 6:5-6). It should be noted here that in classical and Hellenistic Greek the
word hypocrites can refer to an actor or someone who plays a part on the stage of human
life. 744 Jesus is against the hypocrites because they are what we might call too superficial,
caught up in appearances, and because they attempt to draw the gazes of others through a
certain presentation of themselves. The hypocrites put too much stock in prosopon-based
(prosoponic) looks and actions, in those things that are “directed to the eyes (of
another).”745 Hypocrites live and view themselves and others within a one-dimensional,
prosoponic plane. Their regard for themselves and others is based solely on externals, on
that which presents itself to the eyes and its desires. Later in the Gospel of Matthew Jesus
states about them that, “[a]ll their works are performed to be seen” (Mt. 23:5). He also
says that the hypocrites “cleanse the outside of cup and dish, but inside they are full of
plunder and self-indulgence,” and they “are like whitewashed tombs, which appear
beautiful on the outside, but inside are full of dead men’s bones and every kind of filth”
(Mt. 23:25-27). A fixation on surfaces leads to a neglect of the depths, the heart. Jesus’
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rebuke of the hypocrites brings together these themes: “you justify yourselves in the sight
of others (enopion tou anthropon), but God knows your hearts (ginoskei tas kardias); for
what is of human esteem (hypselon) is an abomination in the sight of God (enopion tou
theou)” (Lk. 16:15). Again, appearances deceive, and may even fool other people, but
God sees the heart, the “freely disposable core of a person.” In the Gospels Jesus sees the
heart, and therefore sees through the façades and staging that the hypocrites put on to
draw the gazes and honor of others. He also reveals the basic error involved in their
judgments of others: they stop at the surface. In contrast, Jesus is both a prosopagnosic
and a cardignosic, therefore his judgment is sure and true.
Another aspect of Jesus’ seeing of others as presented in the Gospels is that he
sees with compassion. To begin with, catching sight of others, or seeing them, typically
precedes important events and healings narrated in Jesus’ life. One such example is the
calling of the first disciples; we are explicitly told that Jesus sees Simon and Andrew
before he calls them to come after him, as well as James and John, and later even
Matthew the tax collector (Mt. 4:18, 21; 9:9). Jesus sees Peter’s mother-in-law lying in
bed with a fever before he touches her hand and heals her (Mt. 8:14). He sees the faith of
those bringing a paralytic to him on a stretcher to be healed (9:2). And when Jesus saw
the crowds following him, “his heart was moved with pity (esplanchnisthe) for them
because they were troubled and abandoned, like a sheep without a shepherd” (Mt. 9:36).
Compassion for others results directly from seeing them, a notion repeated later in
Matthew’s gospel: “When [Jesus] disembarked and saw (eiden) the vast crowd, his heart
was moved with pity (esplanchnisthe) for them, and he cured their sick” (Mt. 14:14).
Finally, in Luke 7:13 Jesus encounters a widow whose only son has just died: “When the
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Lord saw (idon) her, he was moved with pity (esplanchnisthe) for her and said to her, ‘Do
not weep.’”
On these occasions Jesus’ vision of others hits him in the guts, those vital organs
so necessary for a genuine and transformative encounter with other people. It is as if the
neural circuity in Jesus is powerfully connecting the eye to the affective core of his body
and of his person: guts, or elsewhere, the heart. 746 To use the words of Christopher
Castiglia writing in a different context, Jesus fleshes out the insistence “on the connection
between witnessing (seeing) and affect (crying), between vision and interiority.” 747 The
soundness of Jesus’ eye floods his entire body with light, and this light allows him to see
the other person with heart, with compassion, and even with a sense of justice. In Jesus
there is an excess, not a limitation, of light that moves him to be impartial, to be no
respecter of persons. Calling Jesus a prosopagnosic does not mean he does not see the
individual dignity, beauty, and faces of the people he encounters, he does. He is
especially attuned to these realities. Rather, Jesus does not allow the surface to be the
“end all be all” of his regard for, and judgment of, other people. Following Jon Sobrino,
Jesus embodies a “praxic love that swells within a person at the sight of another person’s
unjustly inflicted suffering, driving its subject to eradicate that suffering for no other
reason than that it exists, and precluding any excuse for not so doing.” 748
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Some other examples of Jesus’ compassionate and visceral seeing of others comes
up in the Gospel of Luke in the parables that Jesus tells his followers. In response to the
question, “who is my neighbor,” Jesus tells of a man who fell victim to robbers and who
was left on the side of the road half-dead. The gospel writer tells us that both a priest and
a Levite see the man but pass by on the opposite side of the road. But of another we read:
“a Samaritan traveler who came upon him was moved with compassion at the sight (idon
esplanchnisthe)” (Lk. 10:33). For Jesus, the Samaritan was neighbor to the half-dead
man, who saw to it that the man’s needs were met and his health was restored. Did the
priest and the Levite really see the man on the side of the road? They certainly saw him in
a physical manner, as the parable reports, but their vision ultimately failed because they
did not allow such a sight to hit them in their core and so they remained unmoved; they
didn’t budge.
The compassionate vision of the Samaritan is a true seeing-to that considers the
human dignity of the other and their immediate situation. This seeing-to is precisely how
humans participate in and cooperate with the providence of God as a providing and
substantiating eye. 749 Theologian and monk Maximos the Confessor (c. 580-662 CE)
explained providence as follows: “‘For providence (pronoia),’ according to our Godbearing fathers, ‘is God’s attentive care for all things,’ and they also define it as follows:
‘Providence is that purpose of God whereby all beings receive their most favorable
assistance and direction.’” 750 The Samaritan demonstrates both “attentive care for” the
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half-dead man and gives him “favorable assistance and direction,” thus fleshing out
providence through concrete action. This seeing-to implies a personal stake in the other
as well as a personal responsibility and investment in their wellbeing. Neighboring thus
means in the first place providing the other with a loving and respectful look filled with
heart, a look that engages the whole person in freedom and seeks the concrete good of the
other especially in their time of need. This neighborly provision should not be understood
in some paternalistic sense, as it was sometimes understood by slave masters who
considered themselves to be “providence” to their “property,” but rather in the sense that
one be entirely open to and disposed to the truth about the dignity of the other and the
related truth of their immediate situation and general life experiences. It also means to be
ready to respond to them in whatever way is both desired by others and respects their
inherent dignity. This provision ought to be mutual, yet the other can never be coerced
into providing such feedback; they must be left to their own freedom. As Enrique Dussel
states in Ethics and Community, “human beings, be they ever so meritorious or heroic,
cannot coerce the self-bestowal of the other person. They cannot force that other to open
and to establish the face-to-face. The mutual face-to-face presupposes the free selfproposal of both parties as absolute gratuity.” 751 Finally, let us not forget that this
connection between neighboring and seeing is still apparent in the French language,
whose word for neighbor, voisin, is related to the verb voir, to see. The neighbor is
primarily the one seen, the one who catches our sight and so engages our hearts and
minds in responsible and just action.
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However, for there to be genuine love and compassion for another human being
our vision must be restored, and our perspective shifted. The place from which we view
the world and other people must be moved as well. As Pedro Casaldáliga and José-María
Vigil explain when speaking of the necessity of being contemplatives in liberation:
“Analogously to what happens with normal spatial vision, there is also ‘perspective’ in
matters of the spirit: the place we choose to look from influences what will be in the
foreground, the middle ground and background, what will be emphasized and what
hidden. Each viewing point brings its own perspective: ‘You don’t think the same from a
cottage as you do from a palace.’” 752 Casaldáliga and Vigil aptly sum up their point with
the potent words: “The outlook of the powerful obscures liberation.” 753 In contrast, Jesus
is eye to eye with those whom he encounters. This can be seen especially in the story of
Zacchaeus the tax collector, who is described as someone who “was seeking to see who
Jesus was” (Lk. 19:3). In the story about him, we read that Zacchaeus “could not see
(idein) him because of the crowd, for he was short in stature. So, he ran ahead and
climbed a sycamore tree in order to see (ide) Jesus, who was about to pass that way.
When he reached the place, Jesus looked up (anablepsas) and said to him, ‘Zacchaeus,
come down quickly, for today I must stay at your house” (Lk. 19:3-5). Perhaps for the
first time in his life, Zacchaeus, a short man, did not have someone looking down on him,
both physically and metaphorically; he was, after all, a tax collector, and most people
would have looked down on him for this despised occupation. Jesus, therefore,
encounters tax collectors, sinners, prostitutes, lepers, the possessed, the undesirables, and
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the unsubstantial in society to see them for who they are beyond those labels and
categories of social life which ostracize and exclude. Jesus substantiates these people,
signified by eating with them. He desires to see into the heart of matter/s, to pass through
the appearances that occlude in order to see the person within and without. He is a
cardignosic, a heart seer, not content with mere appearances.
Respecting and Despecting Eyes
The variety of looks given by characters in the Gospels can be categorized into
two general forms: 1) respecting looks and 2) disrespectful, or “despecting,” looks. 754
While it might be a truism to say we should respect one another, this word has been
dissociated in popular discourse from its more original, ocular sense. “Respect,”
etymologically from the classical Latin respectus meaning to look round or back, can
mean a regard, a gaze, or simply visual attention. 755 Thus in the King James Bible of
1611 we read in the prophet Isaiah: “At that day shall a man looke to his Maker, and his
eyes shall haue respect to the Holy one of Israel” (Is. 17:7). In the Gospels, the eyes of
Jesus have respect not only to the Holy One of Israel, but also to his concrete neighbor,
considering their existential situation, their appearance or manifestation in the world, and
their heart. Jesus’ eyes look round at, or re-spect, his neighbor, attentively taking in the
whole of the person in a loving, not dominating, manner. Jesus sees not simply someone
who is a mere iteration of a more general category, but as irreducible, irreplaceable, and
as someone who possesses innate dignity being made in the image of God. An image is
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primarily meant to be contemplated, and in the case of a human person, it is hoped that
by seeing them our gaze might also be taken in by the incomprehensibility of God in
whose image each person is made. A respecting look does a perpetual double take, a
continual review, when encountering others, never settling with quick, pre-judged,
superficial, or totalizing observations. Never content with false categories, appearances,
or quick peggings of people, a respecting look gives to the other what is due to them as a
creature of God filled with incredible depth and complexity, and whose own person is a
sacrament of the mysterious presence of God that is itself incalculable, unmanipulable,
unexpected, and full of wonder. So also a respectful encounter with another person
begins with a certain look, an open and warm regard for the concrete neighbor. Such a
look opens circuitry to the heart and guts and allows for genuine compassion and justice
to manifest itself. 756 This kind of respecting look is truly no respecter of persons because
it sees everyone as associated with the eternal love, compassion, and mercy of God.
But a disrespectful or despecting look, from the Latin despectus (looking down),
characterizes the hypocrites who put undue trust in appearances and judge others and
themselves solely by the external props of life. 757 These characters shirk a genuine,
loving, and fully engaged encounter with others, so their damning judgments of them
remain superficial and therefore false. There are numerous examples of this judgmental,
disrespectful looking in the Gospels, some of which we have touched on. For example,
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when some Pharisees “observed that some of [Jesus’] disciples ate their meals with
unclean… hands,” they questioned Jesus’ teachings and practices. In response, Jesus
quoted the prophet Isaiah: “This people honors me with their lips, but their hearts are far
from me” (Mk. 7:6). The hypocrites are so busy despecting others, looking down on
others and judging them, that they are blind to themselves. Jesus knows the directionality
of their hearts, whether freely moving outward toward others and therefore to God, or
trapped within themselves, in the flesh of mortal appearances. But in encountering Jesus
these scrutinizers are given a chance to see what is really in their hearts. Jesus acts as a
kind of Archimedean point or mirror from which they can get outside of themselves to
see from a different perspective who they are and what they really want. In challenging
them, Jesus clears the space for that distance from self so necessary for any true selfcriticism, conversion, and love. Whether they reject or accept Jesus’ view and judgment
of themselves is another matter entirely. Yet it remains the Christian view that in the eyes
of Jesus the sight of God which judges according to the truth of God’s own goodness and
holiness enters the world in a tangible and historical form and begins the work of
convicting and healing the false and unjust looks of humans. As Heinrich Fries says in his
Fundamental Theology: “God looks at human beings through the face of Jesus Christ.”758
Immaculate Eyes
As God in the flesh, Jesus brings together the substantiating eye of God and the
neighboring eyes of humans. God looks to substantiate humanity precisely as their
neighbor, as one of them. In Jesus, the seeing-to and neighboring of God is given flesh
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and he is empowered by the Spirit to heal and enliven individuals and communities. An
important aspect of the Incarnation is precisely the saving reality of God neighboring
humanity with concrete looks of love. Yet in the Catholic tradition magisterial teaching
on Jesus’ sensorial and perceptual powers is slim. The most attention it receives is
probably Pope Pius XII’s encyclical on the Sacred Heart, Haurietis aquas (1956), which
teaches that “[n]othing… was wanting to the human nature that the Word of God united
to himself. Consequently he assumed it in no diminished way in no different sense in
what concerns the spiritual and the corporeal: that is, it was endowed with intellect and
will and the other internal and external faculties of perception and, likewise, with the
desires and all the natural impulses of the senses (itemque sensuum appetitu omnibusque
naturalibus impulsionibus).” 759 Moreover, Jesus’ heart is “the symbol of that burning
love which, infused into his soul, enriches the human will of Christ and enlightens and
governs its acts by the most perfect knowledge” 760 Even more important for my
considerations is the statement that “the body of Jesus Christ, formed by the Holy Spirit
in the womb of the Virgin Mary, possesses full powers of feelings and perception, in fact,
more so than any other human body” (magis utique quam cetera omnia hominum
corpora). 761 My intention in quoting this last passage is not to speculate extensively on
what it might mean for a human body to have “full powers of feelings and perception,”
but to note that we have already met these powers of feelings and perception in the
biblical portrait of Jesus’ heart, or guts, and his eyes. The perceptual and feeling powers
of Jesus’ human body, because of being radically united with God, is greater than all
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other human bodies. While being distinct powers, they are intimately united in the soul of
Christ and at the disposition of his will, a will which again is disposed to and infused with
the reality of divine love. In Jesus there was no perceiving without feeling. This feeling
(sentiendi), though, should not be confused with a vague sentimentalism or mere
emotions, but rather with a sense of truth, a sense of justice, a sense of goodness, a sense
of beauty, but also more concretely a sense for the met-along-the-way neighbor. These
different “senses” get after in a better way what is meant by a verb such as sentire,
translated here as “feeling.” 762 This is also why Jesus could encounter others in such
starkly different ways, either through powerful rebukes or acts of tender compassion.
One other historical statement especially testifies to the reality that in the human
nature of Christ there is an elevation of the bodily senses by divine power. In a letter to
Julianus of Cos (449 CE), Pope Leo I writes that Christ “had nothing that was in
opposition to his flesh, and no discord of desire produced a conflict of wills; his bodily
senses were strengthened without the dominance of sin (sine lege peccati), and the truth
of his feelings (affectionum) under the guidance of his Godhead and the Spirit (sub
moderamine deitatis et mentis), was not tempted by enticements, nor did it give way in
the face of abuse.” 763 By virtue of the hypostatic union, through which the Divine Person
of the Word assumed a complete human nature, the core of Jesus’ nature was infused
with supernatural love and power which perfected his bodily senses, his feeling, and his
perception. Jesus’ “outwardness” expressed in seeing and perceiving neighbors was
empowered by an inwardness, a heart, that was inseparably united to God. His bodily
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senses were, to use Pope Pius IX’s words that defined Mary’s Immaculate Conception,
“preserved immune from all stain of original sin.” 764 Jesus beheld the world and others
with an Immaculate Perception, a pure and holy regard not distorted, distracted, or
blinded by the integralist and concupiscent cravings which are such a part of the lege
peccati, that is, the law or condition of sin that dominates. Jesus’ eyes were not
concupiscent, desiring to grasp and forcibly integrate the visible into one field or grid for
his own self-reference, gratification, or preservation, but rather were open to the truth,
unpredictability, and self-standing of those who made themselves manifest.
These statements reveal that the self-communication of God in and to a human
being does not only touch, elevate, and perfect the soul as a spiritual substance in
isolation from the body, but also elevates human nature in its corporeality and sensibility
given the unity of body and soul in a Christian understanding of human nature. If God is
love, then the self-communication of God in and to human nature will strengthen this
nature’s ability to “go out” to others in its own expression of this love they have been
graced with. The strengthening of Jesus’ bodily senses in their union with the Divine
Person of the Word reveals that the love of God is intimately united to the love of
neighbor. We see this in the fact that the original and basic way we as humans connect
with one another is through sensibility, and it is only once these active powers are
developed that anything like love can occur. This love ultimately moves from the heart
out to another in self-forgetfulness. As Rahner notes, “He who is really compassionate
loses himself, identifies himself with his brother in his need, dares to commit himself to
the unknown. His freedom achieves its ultimate act of daring, that of abandoning
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himself.” 765 The notions that Jesus possessed full powers of feeling and perception, or
had strengthened bodily senses, is not something that God performed to show off Jesus as
some kind of superman, but to reveal how divine love and compassion fittingly reaches
out to humans through other humans. José Comblin beautifully says that, “personhood
arises from a cognitive identity, on a visceral level, with other persons. It arises from the
contemplation of another person, from love, from physical contact with another.” 766
Further, a love that did not concretely and tangibly affect how humans go out to one
another in sensibility, or “connect” with one another, would not be love, and definitely
not the love of God. As 1 John says, “whoever has the world’s possessions (ton bion tou
kosmou) and sees (theore) his brother in need and shuts off his compassion (splanchna)
against him, how can the love of God reside in such a person?” (3:17). 767 Or again, “the
one who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not
seen” (4:20). We might add that the one who does not really see her brother cannot even
begin to love him. This entails that without truly seeing other people it is also impossible
to see and love God.
Further, Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et Spes teaches that everyone has the
obligation to “make ourselves the neighbor of every person without exception and of
actively helping him when he comes across our path, whether he be an old person
abandoned by all, a foreign laborer unjustly looked down upon (iniuste despectus), a
refugee, a child born of an unlawful union and wrongly suffering for a sin he did not
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commit, or a hungry person.” 768 In this vital passage, those who look down on, or
despect, foreign workers give them an unjust look; they fail to respect their person in the
sense we have been giving this word. Such injustice is rooted in a certain sensorial
approach to the world and others. Despecting eyes give off looks that say: You are not my
neighbor, I don’t see you for who you are, and you are not proximate – close, equal, and
face-to-face – to me. Looks that kill and other forms of racism are clearly manifestations
of unjust, despecting looks whether on a personal or corporate level; they are overly
concerned with the skin of phenomena and the reduction of human matter/s to the
prosoponic alone. They fail to consider matter/s of the heart and spirit. Finally, those who
look down on others for their sins and so write them off completely in a definitive way
are usurping the judgment of God, who alone knows the heart and who alone gives a just
judgment, a definitive and just look. Jesus was a master of this contact with others, of
seeing others, because his heart was radically united with the invisible God who eludes
human comprehension and categorization.
Redistributing the Sensible
The French philosopher Jacques Rancière says that, “Human beings are tied
together by a certain sensory fabric, a certain distribution of the sensible, which defines
their way of being together; and politics is about the transformation of the sensory fabric
of ‘being together’.” 769 The sensible (of which the visible is a part) is never neutral or a
natural given, but is perceived and experienced along “certain” distributions and
configurations. It is, as Clodovis Boff states, “always found shot through with culture,
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and history, and steeped in the ideological significations that social groups, especially
dominant classes, have deposited at its heart.”770 Consequently, the sensory fabric – itself
interwoven with the fabric of society – is often torn by conflict and is never nearly as
uniform and patterned as those groups and people in control of the production process
would want people to believe. Further, some people are “hemmed” into subordinate
positions in the social and sensory fabric or are given weak materials with which to
weave their lives, as we saw in Parts I and II. What transpires in the Incarnation, the
Word of God made flesh in Jesus Christ, is a spiritual and material event that re-weaves
the sensory fabric of human existence and redistributes the sensible; social patterns and
perceptual lines of demarcation and distinction are reimagined and materially woven
anew both personally and organizationally. Through knowledge of God and the power of
the Spirit, both Jesus and his followers challenge the way people are “normally”
perceived and experienced. While it is common in the American experience to focus
attention and vision on the rich ones, the beautiful ones, the glamorous ones, the powerful
ones, the white ones, i.e. the substantial ones, Jesus is focused not on appearances, but on
the dignity of every human being, on the depths of the heart, and especially on those
typically left out of the picture of mainstream culture. Jesus looks for and sees himself in
the unsubstantial and invisible ones and sees with them. As revealed on the cross, even
though he is God in the flesh, he can take a worm’s eye view of the world, a “view from
the victims.” 771 He doesn’t see from a tower but from the perspective of the leftovers in
society who are so rarely seen, noted, or substantiated by the public eye, the eyes of
society, the eye of government, the eyes of the police, etc. As Comblin explains, “Today
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the ‘absolute other’ dwells in our midst by the millions – the ostracized, exiled human
being, expelled in every sense of the word, expelled from everything, the leftover person,
the one never mentioned lest the nightmare be recalled, the leper of modern times,
forbidden to appear in the public square, persecuted by legal and illegal police forces
alike.” 772 The one “forbidden to appear in the public square” is precisely the one whom
Jesus encounters and who constantly draws his eyes. He regards them as “another self”
(alterum seipsum), which flows out of the compassion and mercy of God. According to
Rahner, “even God encounters himself in the creaturehood he mercifully accepts, sees
himself there as a compassionate man who sees his own need in the beggar whom he
succors. For the Word has become flesh, has become the Man of Sorrows and the
crucified one.” 773 Jesus’ visual attention, his special regard, is on the poor, the outcast,
the unsubstantial, the leper, the sinner, the unseen, the despised, the blackened, and the
blighted. Jesus, through his preferential optic for the poor, is attuned to the looks,
perspectives, and experiences of marginalized and suffering people, to those who are
bombarded with Looks that kill. He moves and acts so other people can open their own
space to appear before his eyes, in the sight of God, and in the eyes of society, regardless
of what labels, categories, laws, mores, or forces had initially excluded them. Jesus, in his
personal recognition of other people, challenges and empowers communities, especially
the Church, “to act in such a way that these strangers, these strange others, these poor…
be allowed to enter social life, to speak (whether or not they can express themselves
correctly), to manifest their existence.” 774
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For the Christian, the eyes and Spirit of Jesus are necessary to truly see others and
to challenge the status quo through a critical use of the senses, which must be at the basis
of any liberating political practice. On this point, Enrique Dussel claims that a “morality
of domination may be defined as insensibility to the sensibility or pain of another. All
ethics of liberation is corporeal: it is affirmation of the flesh, of sensibility; it is sensitivity
to the pain of another.”775 The Spirit of Jesus sensitizes us to others not only in our
consciences but also in our sensorial and perceptual comportment toward them. It is “by
the light of faith and by meditation on the word of God” that we can “see Christ in
everyone whether he be a relative or a stranger, and make correct judgments about the
true meaning and value of temporal things.” 776 The Spirit of God empowers us to take up
our own flesh so it is perceptually and affectively engaged with other people; this Spirit
moves us to “take” matter/s otherwise than the dominant and exploitative modes in
society. In this way we might enter into the process of personal becoming that Comblin
describes: “Human beings become real human beings, become persons, when they are
converted from their subjective assertion and their will to power, to accept the
interpellation of the other and look at the face of the other: the victim, the poor, the
widow, the orphan, in biblical terms.” 777 Other people, especially the poor and
unsubstantial ones, challenge us to open up our hearts, minds, and eyes. Following
Evagrius of Pontus, “A stranger and a poor man is God’s eye medication. One who
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welcomes them will quickly recover his sight.” 778 Therefore, it can be said that Jesus and
his Spirit redistributes the sensible, which was and is currently distributed according to
political, economic, and social strategies that honor and attend to certain fleshly
appearances and judgments and thereby benefit the few at the expense of the many. It is a
Christian conviction that the Spirit desires to move human beings toward what Dussel
calls “a communal unity, an interpersonal face-to-face of respect and justice,” 779 which is
ultimately a foretaste, and fore-sight, of the eschatological eye to eye and “face-to-face”
that is the beatific vision. In the fullness of time and by the grace of God, we will see the
light of the glory of God shining on the face of Christ, and in his eye-light we will see
each other as a communion of holy ones.
Already in the New Testament we see that Jesus’ followers are to carry on the
looks of Jesus in a kind of apostolic succession of the senses. As the “body of Christ,” the
Church is charged with incarnating the seeing-to of Jesus in the power of the Holy Spirit
whom Jesus promised to send during his earthly ministry. In the book of Acts we hear of
a man lame from birth begging for money outside the temple courts in Jerusalem, and,
“When he saw Peter and John about to go into the temple courts, he asked them for
money. Peter looked directly at him (as did John) and said, ‘Look at us (blepson)!’ So the
lame man paid attention to them, expecting to receive something from them. But Peter
said, ‘I have no silver or gold, but what I do have I give you. In the name of Jesus Christ
the Nazarene, stand up and walk!’” (Acts 3:3-6). Later when Paul is preaching in Lystra
he meets “a crippled man, lame from birth” who “listened to Paul speaking.” Paul, we are
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told, “looked intently at him, saw that he had the faith to be healed, and called out in a
loud voice, ‘Stand up straight on your feet’” (Acts 14:8-10). The parallels between Peter
and Paul’s “lookings” and healings suggest that these incidents represented the general
shape of early Christian preaching and ministry. First, there was eye contact between
Jesus’ followers and those left “by the wayside,” followed by the command to stand up.
The men stand up on their own in the power and authority of Jesus the Christ; the
“crooked” are made “straight.”
Let us not forget either that a basic leadership role in the early Christian
community was that of episkopos, or overseer. Paul’s farewell address to Ephesian
presbyters in Miletus included the admonition to, “Keep watch over yourselves and over
the whole flock of which the holy Spirit has appointed you overseers, in which you tend
the church of God that he acquired with his own blood” (Acts 20:28). The imagery of the
overseer is intimately connected with Jesus considered as the Great Shepherd, who
always moves outside the “usual” frame of reference to see and find his lost sheep. And
so, we have the beautiful historical example of one Abercius of Hieropolis (2nd c.),
possibly a bishop, who had converted to Christianity and inscribed on his tombstone
these words: “I am a disciple of a holy shepherd who feeds the flocks of his sheep on
mountains and pastures, and has great eyes that see all things.” 780 This holy shepherd,
Jesus Christ, with great, substantiating eyes that see all things, challenges us to see to
each other with a mind and heart attuned to his own. In this way we might exercise a
certain kind of episcopacy of all believers, a communal seeing-to-the-other that fulfills
the demands of justice.
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However, Christians also too often put their trust in appearances. In the book of
James we read the exhortation: “do not show prejudice if you possess faith in our
glorious Lord Jesus Christ. For if someone comes into your assembly wearing a gold ring
and fine clothing, and a poor person enters in filthy clothes, do you pay attention
(epiblepsete) to the one who is finely dressed and say, ‘You sit here in a good place,’ and
to the poor person, ‘You stand over there,’ or ‘Sit on the floor’? If so, have you not made
distinctions (diekrithete) among yourselves and become judges (kritai) with evil
motives?” (2:1-4). Apparently, this early Christian community had little qualms
practicing a kind of classism, despecting the poor in their “filthy clothes.” Yet the
temptation for them remains the same for us today. Our propensity to put so much stock
in appearances and to judge based on externals causes us to lose sight of the kingdom of
God that has definitively and tangibly arrived in Jesus Christ and in the power of the
Holy Spirit. In the next chapter we will ask how an engaged perceptual and
contemplative life might offer strategies into combatting and healing Looks that kill. We
will also see how Looks that kill stem in part from a diminished experience of being, a
flattening of being that occludes our looking and blinds our sense of justice.
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Chapter 9: Apostolate of Seeing
“Those who are afraid of you have not looked at you in the eyes. Those who are afraid of
you do not see your faces. Those who are afraid of you do not see your children.” 781
“Ethically, what I am is expressed and defined by the nature of the weapons that I
mobilize.” 782

In the previous chapter we saw that that, according to the Christian faith, God’s
eye most definitively and intimately sees to humans through the medium of Jesus’ human
eyes. After exploring some biblical and systematic highlights of this divine seeing in the
flesh, we then connected the seeing of Jesus to his followers who received his Spirit at
Pentecost so they could be the eyes of Jesus in the world. The Spirit of Jesus poured into
their hearts would, as it did for him, strengthen their bodily senses and perceptual
awareness of others so that they might contribute to the work of healing the moral,
spiritual, and physical blindness of the world. As Vatican Council II teaches, using a
good deal of body language, “As members of the living Christ, incorporated into him and
made like him by baptism, confirmation and the Eucharist, all the faithful have an
obligation to collaborate in the expansion and spread of his body, so that they might bring
it to fullness as soon as possible.” 783 The Spirit’s strengthening of the faithful’s sensorial
and perceptual comportment toward others was not magic, but the result of a long process
of discipleship, prayer, virtuous living, and the practice of holding all things in common
with each other. 784 While they did not have the same vision of God and others that Jesus
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did, themselves lacking a divine nature and a direct vision of God, they still participated
in the vision of Christ by grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit. 785 This Spirit would show
them that God shows no partiality and that the providing, substantiating, respecting, and
feeling eyes of God in Christ are meant for all people regardless of distinction and
appearance. 786 As the apostle Peter claimed in his speech to a gathering of Christian
leaders in Jerusalem: “God, who knows the heart, bore witness by granting them
[Gentiles] the holy Spirit just as he did for us [Jews]. He made no distinction between us
and them, for by faith he purified their hearts” (Acts 15:8). The Spirit’s reweaving of the
social and sensory fabric between Jews and Gentiles meant that those Jews and Gentiles
living in the Spirit of Christ would no longer see each other as they formerly did; they
would now see the image of Christ in their neighbors, who himself is the image of the
invisible God (Col. 1:15). Whereas they formerly might have seen enemies or the
unclean, they now saw in each other what was their “own,” and as such a demand was
placed on them to see to the substance of each other and of all people.
It was the Christian’s task to refuse to offer their bodies and senses to be
mobilized and organized for the state, a restricted sense of “their own,” or the economy
alone, and instead to offer their bodies “as a living sacrifice” to God and to each other. In
this way they might collectively “expand” and “spread” Christ’s own body in loving
service. 787 In contrast, because “the subjective yearning for security and power… is what
made possible the establishment of nation-states,” the state’s purpose, “like that of any
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power, is to increase its power. It attempts to make of its citizens the agents of its
growth.”788 Christians had to consider (and still do) not only what bodies (including the
Church) they would help to grow through their own incorporation and participation, but
how this growth might occur. The Spirit of God, as it did for Jesus, would mobilize and
organize their bodies, along with their feeling and perceptual powers, for the work of
justice, peace, and healing in the world, provided they were faithful in cooperating with
this divine work and mission. Because the substance of Jesus’ followers would be held in
common, what and who they considered to be their “own” was found in unity with others
by participation in the Body of Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit. “Persons,” says
Comblin, “create their own being with others, not in the sense of helping each other to
accomplish their own purposes, but in the sense of creating a common store of common
goods.”789 Inspired by the vision of God in Christ, Christians would seek to develop and
immerse themselves in a new visual commons of love, nonviolence, peace, and mutual
recognition. Too often, however, the ways of the flesh, of the world considered solely by
the skin of phenomena, would prevent the seeing that Jesus wished for all people with the
goal of the flourishing of human life in all its genres of being.
The general aim of this final chapter is to situate just and unjust looks in relation
to our relationship to being and to other beings in the world. To do this we explore the
latest teachings of Pope Francis on the contemplative gaze and offer the example of the
French Trappist martyr Christophe Lebreton as someone who fleshed out just looks in his
own life. Their words and example demonstrate that essential to any form of social
justice – especially the eradication of Looks that kill – is a contemplative justice, or, an

788
789

José Comblin, The Church and the National Security State (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984), 195.
Comblin, Church and the National Security State, 94.

267
orthopraxic way of seeing the world and other people. 790 Put in theological language, an
“apostolate of seeing” is needed to think about embodying, or fleshing out, the visionary
aspect of Christ’s mission of love, compassion, and justice. By thinking through the
apostolate of seeing and its connection with being, we are led to critically examine and
transform how we as personal and social bodies “take” reality and act on and within it. 791
If our looks are weak, impaired, extractive, absent, prosoponic, blind, or distorted, then
injustices are bound to occur; Looks that kill thrive in such an environment. The
following description of the apostolate of seeing should not be viewed as an abstract
intellectual exercise, but rather as a vital way to realize the interconnections between
thinking and living, seeing and acting, and the fact that Christian mission has to do not
only with evangelization, acts of charity, works of mercy, and the like, but at a most basic
level with concrete seeing and the mental and cultural constructs that accompany this
seeing.
It is important at the start to emphasize the connection between seeing and
mission. To begin with, the sensorial mission of humans doesn’t take place merely
through individual bodily experience, but also through social and political bodies and
organizations. “Mission” means, in a religious sense, “A body of persons sent out by a
religious organization to evangelize abroad; the enterprise or expedition on which they
are sent,” or, “the organized effort involved in preparing, equipping, and maintaining
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such bodies.” 792 Here the body language is explicit; in Christian missions, often called
foreign missions or missionary work, the body capacities, especially visionary capacities,
of individuals are organized, trained, and mobilized (put in motion) to be the embodied
presence of Christ and his looks in the world. As has been often pointed out, however,
historically this organization and mobilization of Christian mission blended, merged, and
was augmented by state and military bodies that enfleshed and deployed a different kind
of felt presence and gaze in the world. And so diplomatic and military “corps” incarnated
a mission that often had other goals in mind that were at odds with the mission of
Christ. 793 As we have seen, our senses are not merely receptors for phenomena outside of
ourselves and passively received as such, but also the dynamic way in which we “go out”
to meet the world and others even without, and before, conscious control or
intentionality. These experiences are themselves shaped by biological factors and social
histories that genuinely condition how reality, or matter/s, are apprehended by us. How
we “take” matter/s and what we understand the nature of “matter/s” to be in the first
place, are shaped by biological and social forces and so are not purely natural, although
we often experience our “take” on the world as natural and self-evident. And our eye
“taking” can be extractive, exploitative, possessive, grasping, or superficial, or it can be
receptive, yielding, open-handed, and attentive.
Because it is obvious that we have bodies and sense things in the world, we rarely
consider critically reflecting on and incarnating our flesh, that is, developing and filling
out our personal and corporate embodied connections to other sensible realities such as
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other people or the environment. 794 The visionary aspect of this basic human sent-ness, as
rooted in the flesh, is necessary for various missions of justice in the world. As Levin
states, “the body (the embodied subject) is not an essentially unorganized, autistic, selfcontained entity, but is already organized, from the very beginning, for social
interaction.” 795 Our enfleshed encountering of other people’s eyes, faces, and bodies
shapes the development of our identities and sense of self from the very beginning, and it
is also our primary initiation into receptivity and solidarity which themselves are the
pillars of justice. However, numerous economic, cultural, and technological forces are at
work in the contemporary world which shake these foundations. We turn to the latest
teachings of Pope Francis who provides a diagnosis not only of the flattening of being in
our world today, but also proposes a profoundly visionary approach to any solutions we
might find.
Apostolic Eyes
The most explicit connection between mission and being in Pope Francis’
teachings occurs in the apostolic exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (2013) when Francis
states: “My mission of being in the heart of the people is not just a part of my life or a
badge I can take off; it is not an ‘extra’ or just another moment in life. Instead, it is
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something I cannot uproot from my being without destroying my very self. I am a
mission on this earth; that is the reason why I am here in this world.” 796 Here Francis
identifies his very being with mission, which connects to the overall theme of Evangelii
Gaudium: the proclamation of the Gospel in today’s world. Throughout this document
Francis argues that Christian existence consists in sent-ness, in being-in-mission. Mission
in this sense is not to be understood as an external activity or program undertaken by the
Christian, but as the very being of a Christian. Further, this being is not a general,
abstract, or directionless sent-ness, but a being-in-the-heart-of-the-people. Thus,
Christian being as sent-ness is primarily a being-sent-towards-people at their deepest
level. It should not be forgotten that this is the primary movement of the Incarnation: the
Word of God made flesh, Jesus Christ, exists as a human being in embodied sent-ness
towards other people. 797 His mission is not something that can be added to or taken away
from his being, but constitutes his very being. Jesus’ being-sent-towards-people is
indispensable to who he is not only as the Son of God, but also as a human being. Losing
this sent-ness-toward-others would mean the loss of his “very self,” a characteristic
shared with all of humanity. Much of Francis’ exhortation is concerned with recognizing,
or seeing again, this integral connection between being and mission.
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Francis analyzes the contemporary world in Evangelii Gaudium with a description
of the challenges facing humanity. For him, being itself is under attack by unbridled
consumerism, the unrestricted free market economy, moral relativism, and extreme
individualism. 798 Such forces provide the environment in which Looks that kill and other
forms of unjust looks can develop, for underlying them all is competition and the drive to
take matter/s into one’s own hand in a restrictive and forceful sense. Driven by the law of
competition, whether in the realm of economics, politics, or ideas, a bellum omnium
contra omnes (“war of all against all”) results and the weakest members of society are
decimated or ignored. 799 Francis’ proposed solution to these contemporary deficiencies in
our vision can only be described in Christian terms as a discipleship in vision, a learning
from Jesus how to see the world and others, and which itself bears a direct connection to
contemplation. This contemplative way of seeing is foundational for social
transformation and justice in the world, and for genuine Christian mission. For Francis
and the Christian, through a “renewed encounter” with God’s love “we are liberated from
our narrowness and self-absorption” (§8). God can bring us beyond ourselves to attain the
fullest truth of our being (§8). However, because the fullest truth of our being is an
enfleshed being-sent-into-the-heart-of-the-people, a discipleship in vision must not be
myopic but continually turned outwards; it must not be a narrowing of vision but an
opening of vision.

798

“The culture of relativism is the same disorder which drives one person to take advantage of another, to treat others
as mere objects, imposing forced labour on them or enslaving them to pay their debts. The same kind of thinking leads
to the sexual exploitation of children and abandonment of the elderly who no longer serve our interests. It is also the
mindset of those who say: Let us allow the invisible forces of the market to regulate the economy, and consider their
impact on society and nature as collateral damage (Laudato Si, §123).
799
While Thomas Hobbes in De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651) thought that this state of war or struggle is the “state
of men without civil society,” that is, in the “state of nature,” we think that such a state of war and brutal competition is
not wholly “natural” but is produced in large part by specific social and economic practices and relations between
people, as well as between people and their environments.

272
Contemplative Eyes
As a way to relate to others which “truly heals instead of debilitating us,” Francis
calls for a true “mystical fraternity, a contemplative fraternity” of humans and all other
creatures (§92). Such fraternal love is “capable of seeing the sacred grandeur of our
neighbour, of finding God in every human being” (§92). Such a seeing pushes beyond
appearances to view the depth of being in every human person which is so much a part of
Christ’s own mission. 800 “Before all else,” says Francis, “the Gospel invites us to respond
to the God of love who saves us, to see God in others and to go forth from ourselves to
seek the good of others” (§39). The sent-ness of humans is here interpreted as a response
to a saving and loving God; a contemplative view of others which recognizes this God in
others; and a going-forth to seek the good of others. What better way could there be to
describe the apostolate of seeing, at least in the language of Christian theology? A couple
of paragraphs later, Francis, in speaking of the “going-forth” of the Church as a whole,
states that, “[g]oing out to others in order to reach the fringes of humanity does not mean
rushing out aimlessly into the world” (§46). Rather, “often it is better simply to slow
down, to put aside our eagerness in order to see and listen to others, to stop rushing from
one thing to another and to remain with someone who has faltered along the way” (§46).
The apostolate of seeing, while deeply lived and active on behalf of justice, is also an
unhurried and undistracted remaining-with that is more concerned with seeing, listening,
and welcoming than with fixing, doing, or with making the world or someone else into an
object of our own messianic expedition.
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Elsewhere in Evangelii Gaudium Francis speaks of “seeing reality with the eyes
of faith” (§68), of seeing “with the eyes of faith… the light which the Holy Spirit always
radiates in the midst of darkness” (§84). He speaks of looking at our cities “with a
contemplative gaze, a gaze of faith which sees God dwelling in [people’s] homes, in their
streets and squares” (§71). Later, and along the same line of thought, Francis describes
the work of Christian ministry:
In our world, ordained ministers and other pastoral workers can make present the
fragrance of Christ’s closeness and his personal gaze. The Church will have to
initiate everyone – priests, religious and laity – into this “art of accompaniment”
which teaches us to remove our sandals before the sacred ground of the other (cf.
Ex 3:5). The pace of this accompaniment must be steady and reassuring,
reflecting our closeness and our compassionate gaze which also heals, liberates
and encourages growth in the Christian life (§169). 801
The contemplative eye is the making present and tangible of Christ’s own gaze, a gaze
which is “steady and reassuring,” compassionate, healing, liberating, and encouraging.
“Far from being suspicious, negative and despairing,” this “spiritual gaze” is described by
Francis as not only “born of deep faith,” but also as “the gratitude which flows from a
heart attentive to others” (§282). Such a gaze is inseparable from the closeness of
accompaniment and enfleshed encounters with others that is meant to be at the core of
Christian mission.
As a faithful interpreter of Catholic Social Thought, Francis connects the
attentiveness demanded by the apostolate of seeing with the need for a preferential option
for the poor, or, a preferential optic for the poor, never to be reduced to a mere looking at
which would make poor people into objects of curiosity or even well-intended
benevolence. A gaze in a robust and positive sense suggests mutual presence, face-to-face
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encounter, a beholding in love and justice that recognizes the other’s autonomy, dignity,
and image-of-God-bearing quality. It also suggests risk and precariousness, as a gaze is
always open to being rejected or misunderstood. A gaze is unique, unrepeatable, and
intentionally open to the spontaneity of encounters. 802 As Francis exhorts his readers,
using the image of a magnifying glass to speak of how and where the Church should be
looking,
let us open our eyes to our neighbour, especially to our brothers and sisters who
are forgotten and excluded, to the “Lazarus” at our door. That is where the
Church’s magnifying glass is pointed. May the Lord free us from turning it
towards ourselves. May he turn us away from the trappings that distract us, from
interests and privileges, from attachment to power and glory, from being seduced
by the spirit of the world. Our Mother the Church looks “in particular to that
portion of humanity that is suffering and crying out, because she knows that these
people belong to her by evangelical right.” By right but also by evangelical duty,
for it is our responsibility to care for the true riches which are the poor. 803
Francis makes another evocative connection between the option for the poor and
vision in Evangelii Gaudium §199. In this paragraph he contends that the church’s
commitment to the poor “does not consist exclusively in activities or programmes of
promotion and assistance,” but in “an attentiveness which considers the other ‘in a certain
sense as one with ourselves’” (§199).804 For the pope, “this loving attentiveness is the
beginning of a true concern for their person which inspires me effectively to seek their
good” (§199). Again, the “loving attentiveness” that Francis mentions is the beginning of
concern for others which in turn leads one to seek the good of another. Put simply,
genuinely seeing other people is at the heart of both justice and love. “True love,” says
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Francis, “is always contemplative, and permits us to serve the other not out of necessity
or vanity, but rather because he or she is beautiful above and beyond mere appearances”
(§199). The apostolate of seeing challenges us to close whatever distances exist between
us and other people, to attentively see each other, to refuse to fasten on appearances that
distract from the deeper issues at stake, and to seek the other’s own good despite our
own, and often narrow, agenda and feelings of insecurity. 805
Francis next turns to biblical examples of seeing to flesh out more fully the
importance of contemplative eyes for the apostolate of seeing and for justice in the world.
For him, “[t]he best incentive for sharing the Gospel comes from contemplating it with
love, lingering over its pages and reading it with the heart” (§264). He argues that “we
need to recover a contemplative spirit which can help us to realize ever anew that we
have been entrusted with a treasure which makes us more human and helps us to lead a
new life” (§264). Such a contemplative spirit is not one-sided or one-directional, but
imbued with reciprocity and receiving from something or someone outside of oneself. 806
As Francis states, “[s]tanding before him [Christ] with open hearts, letting him look at us,
we see that gaze of love which Nathaniel glimpsed on the day when Jesus said to him: ‘I
saw you under the fig tree’ (Jn. 1:48)” (§264). A Christian’s contemplative eye for other
humans, for the environment, and for the entire world ought to be caught up in the sense
of being looked upon in love by God in Jesus Christ. And if Christians are not convinced
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that they are “missionary disciples” on earth, then they should “look at those first
disciples, who, immediately after encountering the gaze of Jesus, went forth to proclaim
him joyfully: ‘We have found the Messiah!’ (Jn. 1:41)” (§120). Here again is the
dynamic reciprocity of the contemplative gaze, a being-looked-upon-in-love which gently
moves the Christian to look upon others with tenderness, openness, and compassion, in a
word, with love. 807 Empowered by the Holy Spirit, they learn to see others as God in
Christ sees them.
In a dialogue with young people on a pastoral visit to Genoa in 2017, Francis
reiterated this connection between being, seeing, and mission. In response to various
questions, he explained that, “The mission, being missionaries leads us to learn how to
look. Listen carefully to this: learn to look. Learn to look with new eyes, because with the
mission, our eyes are renewed. Learn to look at the city, our life, our family, all that there
is around us. The missionary experience opens our eyes and our heart: learn to look also
with the heart.” 808 This is what a discipleship in vision is all about; Christians learn to see
as Jesus sees, often in direct confrontation with the way the world, social media,
historical and social habits, or the state teaches and trains us how to see. Francis contrasts
looking with the heart to being “tourists in life,” with those who “take photographs of
everything… and do not look at anything.” Looking at life with the eyes of a tourist is
superficial and is unable to “touch reality” as it is. For Francis, “The time of mission
prepares us and helps us to be more sensitive, more attentive and to look with attention.”
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When we don’t know how to look, or look with tourist eyes, “we end up ignoring.”
Mission requires drawing closer to the hearts of other people and looking with new eyes,
but we only develop these eye habits by actually encountering people and their hearts.
“The mission,” says Francis, “helps us to look at each other, in the eyes, and to recognize
that we are brothers,” a reality that breaks down a simplified division of the world
between saints and sinners, pure and impure, Jew and Gentile, rich and poor, white and
black. Francis even suggested to one young person on his visit that the way to be a peer
to those who are victims of drugs, alcohol, or violence is to begin with “a gesture of love,
a look of love.” For him, “Love means having the ability to hold a dirty hand and the
ability to look in the eyes of those who are in a situation of degradation and say, ‘For me,
you are Jesus.’” Mission, whether it is comforting people, sharing a conversation, visiting
prisoners, giving someone a ride, sheltering the homeless, or proclaiming the Gospel,
involves “learning to look with Jesus’ eyes, as Jesus looks, at these people.” Ultimately,
the point of such a mission of vision and love is not self-satisfaction and a feeling of
righteousness, but the forming of deeply human bonds with others and reweaving the
sensory and social fabric of human life.
Francis focuses his emphasis on the contemplative gaze and the apostolate of
seeing in his encyclical, Laudato Si’ (2015), which takes up the theme of environmental
justice. 809 Building on the work of his predecessors, the pope begins his reflections on the
care for our common home referring to both John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Francis
notes both John Paul II’s observation that humans “frequently seem ‘to see no other
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meaning in their natural environment than what serves for immediate use and
consumption’” (§5), and Benedict XVI’s comment that “creation is harmed ‘where we
ourselves have the final word, where everything is simply our property and we use it for
ourselves alone. The misuse of creation begins when we no longer recognize any higher
instance than ourselves, when we see nothing else but ourselves’” (§6). 810 The
environment has been reduced by many people, as well as economic systems and
practices, to nothing more than an object for human use and consumption, disregarding
its transcendent referent and ground. Francis recognizes that environmental injustice
results from a deficiency of vision, of attentiveness to being, and of a proper
comportment to that which is beyond mere appearances. The pope calls to mind the
“poverty and austerity” of St. Francis of Assisi, which represents for him “a refusal to
turn reality into an object simply to be used and controlled” (§11). Such a refusal to cave
in to integralist desires and practices in relation to reality, especially to the environment,
directly counters acting in integralist (i.e. racist and sexist) ways toward other humans. 811
Reductive and unjust looks toward the environment and to other humans are
inseparable: “environmental deterioration and human and ethical degradation are closely
linked” (§56). Francis claims that a “correct relationship with the created world demands
that we not weaken [the] social dimension of openness to others, much less the
transcendent dimension of our openness to the ‘Thou’ of God. Our relationship with the
environment can never be isolated from our relationship with others and with God”
(§119). There is a fundamental difference between seeing the environment as mere nature
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and seeing it as creation. In the former case, “[n]ature is usually seen as a system which
can be studied, understood and controlled,” whereas in the latter case, “creation can only
be understood as a gift from the outstretched hand of the Father of all, and as a reality
illuminated by the love which calls us together into universal communion” (§76).
Regarding human beings, Francis suggests that “[t]he biblical accounts of creation invite
us to see each human being as a subject who can never be reduced to the status of an
object” (§86). The apostolate of seeing is the challenge to avoid such reductions and to be
both attentive and receptive to the disclosure of being which comes to us as a gift from
others, whether from creation or other people.
Domesticating Eyes
The fact that seeing the environment and other species is tied up with seeing other
people is also the concern of Ghassan Hage’s recent book, Is racism an environmental
threat? (2017), in which he develops the insightful notion of generalized domestication.
His thoughts, which complement those of Francis, can help us see how Looks that kill
presume a certain “domesticating” relation to being in general that attempts to secure not
a “common home” in the world, as Francis would advocate, but a restricted “home of the
same” without the need to bother with difference or otherness. Looks that kill stem from
a mode of being in the world whereby dominating and controlling “otherness” of any
kind is the rule. As Hage explains it, generalized domestication is “a phenomenologically
understood mode of being,” which can also “be referred to as a mode of enmeshment, a
mode of inhabitance, and a mode of deploying oneself in the world.” 812 Generalized
domestication is the dominant mode of relating to the world that “in the process of
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relating, creates the very world it is relating to.”813 This unique mode of relating to the
world can be characterized by the struggle “to create a world where the most salient
quality of everything that comes into existence is that it ‘exists for’ something.” 814 Put
another way, generalized domestication “is a mode of inhabiting the world through
dominating it for the purpose of making it yield value: material or symbolic forms of
sustenance, comfort, aesthetic pleasure, and so on.” 815 Domestication relates to both
home-building and to the “general process of coopting or taming a potentially dangerous
or alien social force (such as The Domestication of Women).” 816 Domestication also
refers to how animals were historically captured and made to reproduce within a human
context to meet human needs. In all these cases, domestication requires the use of
instrumental reason to domesticate not simply this or that species or social force, but
“one’s whole environment.” 817 A domesticating eye, then, is involved in the struggle “to
make things partake in the making of one’s home… to create homely spaces or, to put it
more existentially… to be ‘at home in the world.’” 818 To speak of domesticating eyes is
to speak of how visual and perceptual powers (eyepower) are mobilized in relating to the
world in order to secure one’s own homely existence at the expense of others.
This domestication (from the Latin domus for home) is inseparable from
domination (from the Latin dominus). “Generalized domestication,” for Hage, “is the
fantasy whereby we make our existence viable by seeking homeliness through aggression
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and domination” but also attempt to conceal this domination from our own eyes. 819 In
addition, great effort is put into “managing the relations between the spaces of aggression
and domination… and the homely, cozy, and warm spaces that are equally entangled with
them.” 820 The mode of generalized domestication “aims not only at positioning things in
the proper way to extract value from them, but also at ensuring that the value extracted is
delivered in a homely way.” 821 So the one who desires to “dominate ‘nature’ in order to
feel at home in the world and the person wanting to racialize, dominate, and control the
‘Muslim other’ [or nonwhite other] in order to feel at home in their nation are at a
fundamental level engaging in one and the same practice.” 822 The domesticating eye
seeks to secure one’s homely existence, one’s “own,” by the governing or removal of
those with their own laws and modes of being at home in the world within “my space.”
At both the personal and national levels, we often seek “the eradication of that which can
harm us, and the appropriation, positioning, and shaping of the being and mode of
existence of whatever we find useful into a being and an existence for us.” 823 This
process is like what Martin Luther King Jr. called the “thingification” of people, but in
this case all aspects of reality, all beings, are “thingatized” in order to secure one’s own
enmeshment or homeliness in the world where one can feel secure and substantial. As
Calvin Hernton observes, “The overall emphasis is on the acquisition of expendable and
manipulatable things, of machines, appliances, artifacts of all kinds; and where the
thingness is not inherent in something’s or someone’s nature – in education or in a
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person, for example – then we tend to do everything in our power to ‘thingatize’ it or
him. A thingatized existence, a thingatized life-style and thingatized relations are the
order of the day.” 824 Even other people within the homely, domesticated space are
“thingatized” insofar as they can be moved, positioned, manipulated, or thrown away by
those having leverage over the control of social and political space and apparatuses.
Generalized domestication is the attempt to secure one’s home in the world through
domination, through thingatizing the world and “others” within the world so they
contribute to, or remain insignificant to, one’s own homely enmeshment in the world.
The attitudes, emotions, visualizations, and embodied practices involved in this mode of
“taking” reality make explicit its basic thrust: to render everything within one’s world
ready-at-hand to be used, positioned, or disposed of however one sees fit and according
to one’s own plan. To secure one’s being-in-the-world everything within the world is
regarded and treated as useful for this project and is good for little or nothing else. Looks
that kill, as gestures of meaning and violence, participate in and advance the cause of
“thingatizing” nonwhite others.
Yet Hage importantly notes that “no matter how dominant generalized
domestication, capitalism, and modernity are in the West, there was always an outside to
this dominance: modes of being that exist in a minor, marginal, or repressed (but in any
case less visible) way beneath or around or in the cracks of the dominant mode of life.” 825
He looks to critical anthropological studies that have highlighted “reciprocal” and
“mutualist” modes of existence in societies around the world, especially those with an
animist take on reality. According to Hage, a mutualist mode of existence, which is really
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“about interexistence,” is one that “underscores a reality where boundaries between self
and other, human and animal, and so on, are far less absolute and even nonexistent, and
where we experience an interpenetration between self and other.”826 While the
domesticating mode of existence “stresses a sense of boundaries concerned with the
delineation of a space of sovereignty,” a mutualist mode of existence “is a mode of living
and thinking where we sense ourselves and others as ‘participating’ in each other’s
existence, where the life-force of the humans and the nonhumans that surround us is felt
to be contributing to our own life-force.” 827 In mutualist modes of existence what is seen
and sensed as one’s “own” is experienced in and with “others.” Any legitimate
boundaries between self and other are not necessarily “problematized primarily as one of
sovereignty but as a point of contact and exchange.” 828 To summarize: “if generalized
domestication initiates a mode of being where otherness is always an otherness that is
instrumentalized and perceived to exist ‘for me,’ the reciprocal mode of existence
highlights a dimension in which otherness exists ‘with me’… in a state of giftedness in
relation to me.” 829 There are other ways of taking matter/s into one’s hands to secure
one’s life that do not involve opposition, force, competition, and “thingatizing.” Taking
can include receiving with an attitude of gratefulness and reverence at the gift of life and
the gift of being, especially of other creatures. There is, after all, a taking that is openhanded rather than grasping or fisted.
Intriguingly, Hage himself points to Pope Francis as a contemporary who
advocates mutualist and reciprocal modes of relating to the world and as someone who
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emphasizes “the interconnection between the ecological and the social.” 830 Francis’
language and ideas as found in Laudato Si’ do seem to speak of the phenomenon of
generalized domestication, especially in terms of the roles that science and technology
play within this mode of existence. The pope claims that many of the world’s problems
“stem from the tendency... to make the method and aims of science and technology an
epistemological paradigm which shapes the lives of individuals and the workings of
society” (§107). This paradigm causes a certain reductionism in terms of human and
social lives, and its products often “create a framework which ends up conditioning
lifestyles and shaping social possibilities along the lines dictated by the interests of
certain powerful groups” (§107). What is so problematic about this framework, this
generalized domestication, at least for Francis, is that it
exalts the concept of a subject who, using logical and rational procedures,
progressively approaches and gains control over an external object. This subject
makes every effort to establish the scientific and experimental method, which in
itself is already a technique of possession, mastery and transformation. It is as if
the subject were to find itself in the presence of something formless, completely
open to manipulation (§106).
Francis asserts that many people today prize “technical thought over reality,” a mindset
which “sees nature as an insensate order, as a cold body of facts, as a mere ‘given,’ as an
object of utility, as raw material to be hammered into useful shape; it views the cosmos
similarly as a mere ‘space’ into which objects can be thrown with complete indifference”
(§115).831 The reduction and reification of creation through a meticulous technicalscientific rationality constricts the fullness of being and often denies the depth of dignity
to both humans and the environment. As Francis states, “Men and women have
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constantly intervened in nature, but for a long time this meant being in tune with and
respecting the possibilities offered by the things themselves. It was a matter of receiving
what nature itself allowed, as if from its own hand. Now, by contrast, we are the ones to
lay our hands on things, attempting to extract everything possible from them while
frequently ignoring or forgetting the reality in front of us” (§103). Note the language of
“hands” in this statement and whether they follow the giving-receiving mode of being or
the domesticating-extracting one that ignores the “order of the gift.” 832 In this latter
mode, “hands” (technological or otherwise) are predominantly concerned with “taking”
matter/s and hammering them into a “useful shape” to secure one’s substance, whether
this matter/s be raw materials or human beings. Extractive looks and hands are laid not
only on things and animals, but on people; there is a fundamental unity between the
practices.
In contrast, just looks that ought to be practiced in an apostolate of seeing are
yielding, attentive, caring, circumspective, “letting-be,” relaxed, open, contemplative, and
deep, willing to go beyond the surface. They consist of moments of beholding and being
beholden within webs of intercorporeality and interfaciality that call for fellowship and
solidarity. 833 David Michael Levin himself invites us to “a gaze at peace with itself, not
moved, at the deepest level of its motivation, by anxiety, phobia, defensiveness and
aggression; a gaze which resists falling into patterns of seeing that are rigid, dogmatic,
prejudiced, and stereotyping; a gaze which moves into the world bringing with it peace
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and respect, because it is rooted in, and issues from, a place of integrity and deep selfrespect.”834 Just looks are not dominating, object-posing, controlling, domesticating,
manipulative, self-referential, cold, or distanced like Looks that kill; they are enfleshed,
genuinely heart-felt, and compassionate. Eyes that see with justice are continually opened
by tears, by lament, by a sense of history and understanding, and by a deep empathy for
others. 835 What would it look like for white Americans to cry over the damage their
collective seeing has done, for social organizations and people dishing out unjust looks
and even Looks that kill to lament what they have become and what they have done to
others? The tears might blur their old ways of seeing, unsettle their previously held
absolute points of view, dampen the raging fire of concupiscent desire that feeds their
inner eyes, and perhaps give a moment of blindness where the realization it needs the
eyes of others to see the world can occur. Ultimately, “the character of our perception is a
manifestation of our character.” 836 In the next section we offer an example of one man
who fleshed out the contemplative gaze that Francis speaks of so often, and who
embodied genuine Christian character and perception in seeking to live out the mission of
Christ.
All Gaze
Christophe Lebreton, one of the French Trappist monks martyred in Algeria in
1996, has left us a testimony of how the practices of communal prayer, contemplation,
and service to neighbors can open one’s vision to the eyes, faces, and glory of others. In
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the journals he kept from 1993-1996, we see in Lebreton a poet and a mystic who
wrestled deeply with his vocation to be a man of prayer and non-violence in a country
historically colonized by his home nation. Interestingly, Lebreton distanced himself from
past colonial and missionary enterprises that looked down on Muslims and extracted the
region’s resources, and rather sought to find a new way for a French man like himself to
relate to Algerians without the weapon of a Look that kills. He mused in 1994 that, “In
the house of Islam – in the present state of its Algerian structuring (!) – it’s probably not
opportune to present oneself as the house across the street – structured differently. It’s
better to be the Body of your Presence resolutely and simply, to be simply there in a
relation of love, vulnerable, exposed.” 837 Lebreton’s living in the Spirit of Christ, and his
body’s mobilization by the Spirit within the Body of Christ, meant that he would try
again and again to refuse to relate to Algerians on the basis of force, fear,
misunderstanding, superficiality, coercion, manipulation, and violence, at least if he was
to live according to the truth of Christ’s own witness and mission. His understanding of
what it meant to be a “body” of French monks in Algeria centered on “its wide-open ears,
its gaze, its Nazarene-Trappist accent: and its child’s size.” 838 His Gospel mission, his
apostolate of seeing, was not one of a conquering faith, but of a humble love and a
mission “to live the Good News of our relation with Muslims.” 839 Here the Good News is
not a stifling or extermination of one side of the relation (Islam and its faithful), but the
relation itself, in which mutuality, reciprocity, and gift are the order of the day. As
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Lebreton states in an entry from March 23, 1994: “I am not here to defend Christian
ideas, an ideological truth that can so easily be exclusive. What remains for us is the
freedom of hostages: not the freedom to escape, but the freedom of the person that goes
further, breaking through the imprisonment imposed by all violences.” 840 By freely
binding himself to Algeria and its people with all the risks this entailed given their history
of struggle against France, Lebreton sought to break out of the imprisoning spiral of
violence and find a way toward reconciliation and justice. The looks that Lebreton tried
to give Algerians during his life as their neighbor were ones that rejected the violence so
crucial to the French colonial enterprise in Algeria; his were looks infused with a look of
love and a disdain for Looks that kill. Yet his own looks did not transform by magic or
some natural development, but through intentional choices in how he would position his
body and soul in Algeria rather than in France; in a monastery rather than in a barracks;
humbly bent in prayer and service to neighbor rather than in sighting his foes; and in an
existential dialogue with Muslims rather than a detached condemnation of them. From
these embodied positionalities he was better able to sense the justice or injustice
occurring around him, to feel the pain and poverty of so many of his neighbors, and to
develop an aversion to war and violence at a visceral and not merely intellectual level.
Lebreton’s seeing of others was also transformed in part because of his
understanding and practice of the Christian life and the centrality of contemplative
prayer. Ushered into the experience of the incomprehensibility and the un-handleability
of God, Lebreton experienced other people as somehow sharing in this
incomprehensibility and un-handleablity. As he saw it, the Christian life was not about
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trying to manage or control people and getting them to believe or become just like him, to
live out his own mode of being human, but of nurturing loving friendships with people
within which a mutual sharing of gifts was possible (which, of course, could include talk
about one’s heart and religious beliefs). After hearing a homily on the role of religious in
the Church as being one of “re-collection,” Lebreton reflected that such a recollection
meant “to collect all that is seen, prayed and done here: this calls for a watchful
interiority… and then for a tireless opening outward, without fear or selective
withdrawal.” 841 Like Pope Francis, Lebreton suggests that an “interiority” based on
learning to see with Jesus provides inspiration for going out into the world, to others,
without the obsessive need for security or the use of violent force. With his contemplative
eye, Lebreton asked Jesus in prayer to “heal me of the violence lurking inside me: the
beast. Make me human according to your beatitudes.” 842 In this call for Jesus to make
him human is a longing for the Spirit to take up, train, and mobilize his flesh in a new
way, to transform both himself and his relationships with other people: “Human – you,
my Lord and my God – human until the end, so that I might today enter into your
skin.” 843 Lebreton recognized that the beastly violence he saw in the world was not
simply out there, but within his own skin. Whether he intended it or not, he was
connected to patterns, habits, mechanisms, and systems of organized violence and false
integralisms that shaped, and destroyed, the worlds he and others experienced. Christ’s
skin of vulnerability, risk, exposure, service, openness, and love would cover Lebreton
with a new self-understanding and way of being in the world.
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Lebreton’s own personal testimony was that he was “cured by being recognized,
by being loved” by Jesus, just like the woman at the well. 844 And his prayer was to
transcend his and his culture’s own limitations and boundaries: “Make me enter into your
infinite respect for the faith of the other: even if it is different or even hidden and sick.” 845
The desire to enter into God’s regard for others, a regard of “infinite respect,” is also
expressed in the final testament of Christian de Chergé, the prior of Lebreton’s monastic
community and fellow martyr, who imagined what it would be like after his own death:
“This is what I shall be able to do, God willing: immerse my gaze in that of the Father to
contemplate with him His children of Islam just as He sees them, all shining with the
glory of Christ, the fruit of His passion, filled with the Gift of the Spirit whose secret joy
will always be to establish communion and restore the likeness, playing with the
differences.” 846 For these Trappist brothers, prayer, worship, and a life in common were
not just pious actions or a form of spiritual escapism, but a way to struggle against their
own biases, stereotypes, latent violences, and concupiscent drive for the total integration
of the other into their own world and on their own terms. “Lord,” Lebreton prays, “lead
all the faithful to where you are disarmed: sunk in prayer, handed over, surrendered to
Love.” 847 Prayer was a way to develop “extreme attention to others, to those of the same
flesh. Even in the case of enemies. Prayer is the just, the free attitude.” 848 Prayer was a
way to get the heart moving along vectors attuned to transcendent, and therefore deeply
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human, ends through which they might break out of heartless, violent, indifferent, and
superficial habits toward other people. As Sarah Coakley notes, “the ascetic practices of
contemplation are themselves indispensable means of a true attentiveness to the despised
or marginalized ‘other.’” 849 Prayer developed a communing eye in Lebreton where
differences became not the justification for war, intolerance, or injustice, but the occasion
for the joy and surprise found in “playing.”
Lebreton explicitly counters integralist practices and ideologies in his journal
prayers: “Sooner or later, this Relationship with You (that is opening a network of other
relationships – a communion) is going to collide with a religious totalitarianism that
cannot but reject such freedom, such openness, such a breach in the dividing wall, which
defy its fundamentalist shutdown, its deceitful order.” 850 Lebreton’s powerful vision of a
“Relationship” with God and others as being ever-expansive and going out to include
everyone directly counters all tendencies to close up and shut out others who are sensed
as different. The “enclosure” of his community was “not armor-plated” but one that
“defines a space of welcome and has the form of an open heart: wounded by the suffering
of this world, it offers a resolution of crucified Love in the face of the enemy.” 851 Further,
Lebtreton’s vision of a “Relationship” that opens and expands in freedom calls into
question the basic affect and logic of all totalizing and integralist orders that have no
room for divine or human others in “their” space or hearts. In contrast, what is needed
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most is, according to Lebreton, “To see my brother at last as a subject who speaks: a face
where the Word unveils itself.” 852
It is this loving contemplation and seeing that most characterizes Lebreton’s
“Relationship” with God that opens a network or communion of “other relationships.” In
reflecting on the biblical story of Tobias and Tobit, Lebreton writes of his experience
with “the Gaze” of God his Father: “Being a father is simply to see your son: ‘I see you,
my son!’ Do I let myself be seen, looked at? ‘You are my son, Christophe!’ At bottom,
my lack of self-confidence nourishes my fears and my violence, and that lack comes from
not being present to the Gaze that gives birth to me: you want my joy, you want me to
live a free and happy life in the Gift.” 853 There is a sense in Lebreton’s words of the
mirroring aspect of the soul’s relationship with God, a sense that one is born and
develops a true sense of self by a look of love that comes from elsewhere, from a
personal God. This birthing “Gaze” that one experiences in the heart says, “I see you,”
and substantiates one’s own life and mission, not of domination but of peace. He
continues: “I must believe that You love to look at who I am becoming. I must believe
your eyes: the nakedness of your I love you, that strips me naked. Just like Jesus on the
cross: surrendered to your gaze, alone and trusting desperately.” 854 This intimate seeing,
trusting, and surrendering transformed how Lebreton related to other people. By letting
himself be seen by God; by presenting himself before God’s gaze; by believing what
God’s eyes said about him; and by surrendering to this loving gaze, Lebreton could see
others with God in the power of the Spirit. One day, when a “sheet-iron maker” asked to

852

Lebreton, Born from the Gaze, 64.
Lebreton, Born from the Gaze, 122. Elsewhere Lebreton claims that, “Paternity is a matter of seeing” (169).
854
Lebreton, Born from the Gaze, 122.
853

293
see Lebreton for no reason in particular, Lebreton mused that the “most essential thing of
all” is simply “to see each other.” 855 Or again, when he speaks of his friend Salim, who
“has become very close to me,” Lebreton says, “Friendship and intercession: not so much
to pray for as to feel my prayer pervaded by this brother I’ve received as a friend. I
should like to be his shield, his shelter in distress.” 856 The young French monk also
experienced loving gazes with his brother monks as they prayed, sang, and reflected on
Scriptures together. Speaking intimately of Jesus’ transfiguration on Mt. Tabor, Lebreton
beautifully reflects that,
On the mountain your face changes. The change comes from within, from where
the Father is speaking to you, gazing on you. What becomes manifest to the eyes
of the disciples is that at bottom you are ALL FACE, turned toward the Father
and drawing us into your light. Pure hearts are hearts that are susceptible to that
Light. They abide in the ultimate illumination: in the (resplendent) truth. In
chapter yesterday morning, a very soft light shone among us: we were ‘all gaze’
as we listened to one another, listening to you. 857
In these experiences described by Lebreton, wherein one tries to become ALL
FACE and ALL GAZE toward God and each other, there is a new light, a truth that
appears which disrupts stereotypical, reductionist, integralist, colonialist, racist, sexist,
and prosoponic ways of seeing others. Such a light inspires humility, gentleness, and a
great respect “for the countenance of others,” as revealed in another prayer of Lebreton’s:
“May your Spirit, O Jesus, impress in me your eagerness to come down, and deliver me
from pride, so that I may live at eye level with others as a simple brother, an artisan of
Hope.”858 Instead of a dominating position, Lebreton desires to be on eye level with
others in the simple position of a fellow human being, a brother, who also yearns for a
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heart that is pure and “susceptible to that Light.” Ultimately, Lebreton testifies to the
power of God’s light and vision to shape the enfleshed, organized sent-ness of individuals
and communities. As he says, “mission is radically liberated from the schema of
colonization to the extent that ‘contemplation,’ the night of the senses and the heart, more
than the detachment from one’s own culture, bring about the encounter at the same point
of rupture where the Spirit brings about its ‘conversion’ in the very depth of every being
and every people.” 859 The Spirit of God does indeed work on the senses and hearts of all
people to convert us from undue attachment to the skin of phenomena, to economies of
gratification, and to the addiction of force and to move us toward a new encounter and
communion with each other.
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Conclusion
Christophe Lebreton’s eye experiences, and others like them, need to be held up
in a world where Looks that kill continue to be shot from individual and corporate bodies
such as policing agencies, where white men such as Dylann Roof, Wade Michael Page,
Mark Anthony Stroman, Frank Silva Roque, and more recently Robert Bowers and
Brenton Tarrant, continue to resort to violent and despecting Looks in their contacts with
others. For these men, encountering others is not a rupture leading to inward conversion
and outward service, but a rupture leading to violence and a denial of human solidarity
and the individuum ineffabile. Bowers, who killed eleven people and injured seven at a
Pittsburgh synagogue in 2018, posted on a social networking site before the shootings
that, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our
people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going
in.” 860 Tarrant, who killed 51 people worshipping at mosques in New Zealand, claimed in
his “The Great Replacement” manifesto that, “There is no nation in the world that wasn’t
founded by, or maintained by, the use of force. Force is power. History is the history of
power. Violence is power and violence is the reality of history.” 861 While claiming to be
“just a regular white man, from a regular family,” Tarrant imagined himself to be
involved in a crusading, Knights Templar-like, anti-immigrant campaign: “We must
crush immigration and deport those invaders already living on our soil… It is not just a
matter of our prosperity, but the very survival of our people.” 862 His domesticating eye
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presumed the right to use violent force to manage, control, and police European space
fantasized as a Great White Home; he claimed to carry out the attacks to “show the
invaders that our lands will never be their lands, our homelands are our own and that, as
long as a white man still lives, they will NEVER conquer our lands and they will never
replace our people.” 863 Because these killers’ beliefs and use of violence are less and less
officially accepted and enacted by state apparatuses (while also revealing some of the
latter’s most fundamental biases, violences, and lusts for security), they take matter/s into
their own weaponized arms as the only way to relate meaningfully and powerfully to
those “others” they have targeted for exclusion. Out of desperation, anxiety, a sense of
home, or a desire to feel strong, their eyes evince a fixated concern with a restricted our
at the expense of an us that includes a true vision for and commitment to a common
home.
Attitudes and actions like these which feed off of whitestuff confirm that Looks
that kill couple a denial of other people’s shared humanity with an act of violence,
whether psychological, social, or biological. These Looks do not identify with people
perceived as different, but identifies them as potentially destabilizing. Looks that kill
work through visual means to control or remove a perceived threat to one’s life and
sphere of influence; they are involved in eliminating a perceived darkness, evil, or moral
corruption that threatens one’s values and sense of self. Looks that kill are ways of seeing
those dubbed “others” as enemies to one’s own culture, life, security, or space; they
police one’s homely environment and matter/s at hand to secure prosperity and substance
for its dispatcher. These Looks can also involve the reduction of another person to the
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realm of disposability, communicating that the other, as a mere plaything or consumable
thing (commodity), exists only at the pleasure or sadistic delight of the beholder. Looks
that kill occlude justice toward other people or groups of people by not giving them a due
regard, a just seeing that recognizes the incredible depth, gravity, and complexity
inhering in every person. As a prejudiced lens, or way of seeing others solely through
superficial appearances or stereotypes, a Look that kills is a narrowing of vision that gets
progressively thinner, sharper, and weightier until a bullet appears, the bullet being but
the incarnation of a Look that is no longer opening or yielding to another.
Against this show of forceful power, interpretation of history, and restrictive
sense of homely spaces, genuine Christian teaching and practice reiterates that there is
something more valuable and powerful than force and violence, namely, a contemplative
love and respect for others, even if they are one’s enemies. As Comblin states, “Love of
enemy comprises a relativization of the criterion of security.” 864 Further, Christian
witness, especially in martyrdom, demonstrates a hope in a future beyond death that only
God can provide, negating the notion that survival and ensuring “a future for my people”
is the ultimate goal of human existence. Again, for Comblin, “Because a Christian
conversion includes a total conversion of the whole person, nobody may offer to God
only his or her internal life; the offering must include the totality of one’s human
relations, work, and social existence, including the future of one’s people.” 865 Security,
future existence, and homely space, while all legitimate human desires, can never be set
up as absolutes in human life, nor can they be used as integralist rallying cries against
“outsiders.” Jesus and his disciples, such as Lebreton and Pope Francis, show us that
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expanding a vision of oneself, of one’s “own,” that includes all beings and all peoples, is
the only liberating way to see and live. Christians are also called to enflesh a different
kind of look, just looks, that are due to all people regardless of race, national origin, legal
status, religion, sex, class, and any other human divisions used to prop up one genre of
being human at the expense of others.
In Looks That Kill we have seen the complexity of human vision in its personal
and social aspects and its healing and destructive impact on our communities. We began
with Deborah Mathis’ description of an unhospitable Look shot at African Americans and
used this image to frame an exploration of white (eye) power as it historically developed
along multiple lines and what legacies it has left behind. We ended with stories about
Jesus and his disciples to suggest that the Spirit of Christ invites us not to a field, grid, or
screen of vision, but to a table of vision where each person sees at eye level with the
other and is fed not only by the gaze of God, but by the respectful and yielding looks of
one another. Around this table of vision set by God, the light of the glory of God shines
on each and all to bring a new kind of visibility, a “visage-ability,” to their faces that
reflects the image of Christ, the Son of God. In these times when Looks can be so
senseless, deadly, and cold, we need a renewed foresight or proleptic vision of the
ultimate reality of God’s banquet, where God substantiates humans with a loving regard,
a secret and unique gaze specially reserved for each member of the human family.
Coupled with this soul-gazing of God and others, just looks flowing from a deeper
appreciation of the depth, beauty, truth, and goodness of being(s) need to be continually
organized to meet Looks that kill in our communities, whether in religious settings or not.
Indeed the “inspiring” of human persons by God’s Spirit shows itself not in a
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forgetfulness or disdain of human bodies, organizations, and matter/s, but in a deeper
incarnating and fleshing out of the sensorial and perceptual capacities of human persons
in community. Let us organize to see each other in new and liberating ways!
We have also seen that Looks that kill come in a variety of forms and developed
out of various legal, economic, political, and religious contexts that need to be further
explored on their own terms. Perhaps the net has been cast too wide and, because the
label “Looks that kill” has been applied in so many contexts with different associations, it
thus loses its capacity to mean anything. This is a risk that was accepted in the belief that
the Looks, while multiple across space, time, and context, do have a general form or
shape to them; they have a spectral quality. Here in brief is an outline of this general
shape of Looks that kill as we have described them:
1) phallocentric: related to symbols and practices of masculine sexual dominance
and authority or its generative power, which does not mean that only men can “shoot”
their eyes in this way;
2) prosoponic: based on perceived human differences in appearance and the traits
and representations associated with these appearances, which in the American context
have been primarily marked, performed, and interpreted along racialized and
socioeconomic lines; 866
3) sociogenic: revealing how dominant desires, values, meanings, representations,
and genres of being human affect the psychological, physiological, and embodied
performances of individuals, and the social organizing of individuals’ embodied
capacities;
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4) capitalistic: concerned with valuations of, investment in, “thingitizing” of, and
the securing of one’s own substance in competition with the substance of others;
5) concupiscent: manifesting a lust for control, integralism, and leverage over the
disparate and pluralist elements of one’s world and which, in the theological sense,
inclines to actual sin and denies transcendent imperatives in relation to these other
“elements.”
Looks that kill in the concrete might involve all these characteristics to greater or
lesser degrees or might only involve a few, yet they are all present, if not in the actual
commission of the Look, then at least in the history and dominant culture within which
the Look is shot and from which it draws its inspiration and power. Finally, the above
sketch is not meant to be exhaustive or exclusive of other meanings attached to such
Looks that undoubtedly show up in lived situations; what has been presented is merely
the basic shape of Looks that kill as we have studied them in both their personal and
organized modes.
It is hoped that by tracing, in the sense of tracers attached to bullets for the sake of
seeing their trajectories and impacts, the Looks shot by white people in history we now
understand even more the power in looking, especially in its negative modes. Yes, there
are examples of white people who regarded African Americans and other people of color
in just ways and sought to combat Looks that kill in their personal and organized actions,
but our focus has been on the historically more prevalent and viable power of white
visuality in its negative modes to better understand the nature of sin and concupiscence as
they are manifest through human sensorial and perceptual powers. 867 Historically, the
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most dominant, organized, technologically-augmented, ideologized, economicallybacked, and militarized form of human eyepower was that mobilized by “white” people,
primarily Europeans and Americans, who saw others in racialized terms or its proxies and
acted accordingly. The numerous legacies left by these habits of seeing and acting can be
felt and seen in present expressions of eyepower, whether personal or social, in the
United States and around the world. Therefore, if we want to understand the struggles and
contestations of the present with a sense of history, the formation, mobilization, and
deployment of “white eyes” must be soberly looked at and understood. By describing the
negative, the occlusion of justice, it is hoped that we will not only not do the same things,
that is, inhabit the same “eyes” or modes of looking, but also creatively and critically use
our eyepower in fresh and just ways. We should also be on the watch and protect
ourselves and others against those present sightings with a similar shape and vibe to
overseeing, patrolling, cycloptic, and Jim Crowing eyes, and think critically about the
manifestation of these modes of looking in our own perceptions of other people and in
the social, political, and religious bodies we are members of. Let us also act to prevent
further unjust looks from developing and from being habitualized, mobilized, and
organized by various social bodies. We must be vigilant, in contemplation and in action,
to fight any monsters that might arrive both within and without. In the words of Pope
Francis,
Let us ask for the grace not to close our eyes to God who sees us and to our neighbour
who asks something of us. Let us open our eyes to God, purifying the eye of our hearts of
deceitful and fearful images, from the god of power and retribution, the projection of
human pride and fear. 868
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